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Abstract
We investigate the allocation and the effects of personal taxes and state and 
social security benefits in modern economies. The most prominent contributions 
are as follows:
(1) We propose a unified framework in which to discuss the progressivity, 
redistribution and equity of taxes and benefits. Through this, we offer a general 
class of indices of horizontal inequity that complements existing classes of 
progressivity and vertical equity indices. We highlight throughout the analytical 
and empirical contribution of individual taxes and benefits to the effect of the 
whole system, using the features of the 1985 British tax and benefit system.
(2) We analyse state benefit take-up and welfare programme participation 
in the presence of divergences between the assessment of entitlement made by the 
take-up analyst and that carried out by the government's agency. This explicit 
modelling helps remove important biases in the computation of take-up and 
participation rates. It also detects the presence of allocative errors made by the 
government in alleviating poverty. Our methodology -- which may be usefully 
extended to other microeconometric applications -- simultaneously identifies the 
distribution of costs to participating in welfare programmes.
(3) We provide econometric evidence on the level of claiming 
inconveniences inherent to the British Supplementary Benefit (now Income 
Support) programme and on how they dam pen the welfare impact of state 
support. Besides, we can illustrate the degree of misallocation of state support 
among the poor and the non-poor. These allocative errors are also respectively 
aggravated and mitigated by the deterrence effect of claiming costs. We also
2
examine the impact of allocative imperfections upon the level of progressivity,
equity and redistribution exerted by redistributive tools.
(4) We model the optimal design of state support in the presence of 
heterogeneity in original incomes and in the costs incurred in granting state 
support. We see that some simple rules which hold when income redistribution 
and poverty alleviation are costless do not hold anymore in more general cases. 
This also has important consequences for the consideration of principles of vertical 
and horizontal equity.
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Introduction
This thesis analyses the allocation and the effects of personal taxes and state 
and social security benefits in modern economies. Our aim is twofold.
Firstly, we focus our attention on the depiction of the progressivity, 
redistribution and equity of taxes and benefits. Our approach to such issues is 
primarily methodological and we indicate particularly how progressivity and 
vertical and horizontal equity may or may not yield insights into the desirability 
of the government's redistributive actions. We also illustrate the application of our 
methodological tools using a personal tax and benefit model similar to the many 
now widely found in government departments and research institutions. Through 
this, we can replicate and enhance the ways in which tax and benefit systems and 
reforms are often assessed.
Secondly, we extend this traditional analysis to incorporate the presence of 
imperfect information and allocative costs into the empirical, methodological and 
theoretical analysis of the state's redistributive tools. Imperfect information 
prevents the state from targeting precisely its taxes and benefits among the 
diverse members of a society; this leads to inequities and inefficacies in the use 
of the state's redistributive tools. Imperfect information also hinders a tax and 
benefit analyst from monitoring accurately the allocation and the impact of taxes 
and benefits in a population; when unchecked, this feature can generate 
significant biases in the normative and positive conclusions reached. Allocative or 
redistributive costs, which can also limit the effectiveness of government policy, 
easily arise, for instance, from the existence of administrative, claiming (for 
benefits) or enforcement (for taxes) costs. These imperfections have, among other
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things, important consequences for the optimal design of redistributive policy. We 
detect the empirical presence of such redistributive costs and imperfect 
information by deriving methodological tools that account for their existence. We 
also note their theoretical and empirical impact on progressivity, redistribution 
and equity as discussed in the context of the more conventional tax and benefit 
analysis.
All of the applications are on the tax and benefit system prevailing in 
Britain in 1985, although any other tax and benefit system combined with 
sufficiently detailed data could equally well have been chosen. The analytical tools 
developed and subsequently applied are thus universal, and so is probably the 
interpretation of some of the empirical results shown for Britain throughout the 
following chapters.
* * *
Chapter I introduces a computer model that constitutes an essential 
building stone to the empirical work offered by the thesis. It is there that we 
describe relatively briefly the data used, the approach taken to translate tax and 
benefit rules into a set of earning opportunities for a sample of households, and 
the features of the 1985 British tax and benefit system that were embedded in the 
model. In the second part of Chapter I, we shed light on the shape, irregularities 
and nonlinearity of the derived budget sets of households, we identify the 
distribution of marginal implicit tax rates across the population and we examine 
how good an approximation is provided by linearisations of the budget constraint 
at the point of actual labour supply. Apart from bringing forth some useful 
methodological contributions, this exercise also helps to illustrate the complex web
16
of taxes and benefit regulations that underlie implicitly the basis of the empirical 
results of the following chapters.
Chapter II displays a framework in which the progressivity, redistribution 
and equity of taxes and benefits can be systematically discussed and measured, 
both separately and in relationship to the other two concepts. The first section 
concentrates on measures of progression at specific points of budget constraints, 
and on how we may distinguish the separate effects of taxes and benefits. Using 
as a measuring rod a standard social welfare function, we attempt to quantify the 
social value of progression and we see how we may approximate the intricate 
1985 system to one w ith a constant degree of tax and benefit progression. The 
second section of the chapter extends the analysis to global progressivity and 
redistribution, emphasising again the separate contribution of various taxes and 
benefits. We concentrate our attention on a class of measures for which we 
subsequently see how total redistribution can be decomposed into a function of 
the degree of progressivity ("vertical equity") and of reranking ("horizontal 
inequity") achieved by each of various taxes and benefits. Having derived indices 
of redistribution and horizontal inequity, we may also combine them to yield 
indicators of the desirability of existing and simulated tax and benefit systems. 
The analytical tools developed are once again applied to the British tax and 
benefit system of 1985.
The material of Chapter IE first discusses extensively some of the concepts 
and the possible structure of an analysis of the take-up of state benefits. We are 
then able to derive an implementable econometric model that can help enhance 
our understanding of the take-up of state benefits in many significant ways. We
17
first ask whether the use of imperfect data to compute or predict eligibility may 
explain the observation of less than full benefit take-up rates. With this in mind, 
we then see how to justify and conduct the analysis of benefit take-up in the 
presence of divergences and errors in modelling entitlement. Among other things, 
this explicit modelling goes a long way towards removing important biases in the 
computation of take-up rates. Our methodology, which may be extended to other 
microeconometric applications, allows for the relative and absolute parametric 
identification of the distributions of observable and unobservable costs to claiming 
and of those of entitlement discrepancies. In particular, the procedure can readily 
yield direct estimates of the monetary equivalents to the burden of seeking state 
support.
Chapter IV applies the analysis of Chapter in  to some Family Expenditure 
Survey data gathered on the take-up of Supplementary Benefits in 1985 Britain. 
We discuss the survey data and we allow for the inclusion of the pensioners and 
the self-employed — for whom survey deficiencies have been repeatedly 
documented. We then present the results of our estimation over the sample, 
examining in particular the estimated "entitlement discrepancies" and "costs to 
claiming". We look at the validity of various empirical definitions of take-up 
statistics, considering among other things how the estimation of the level of 
entitlement as assessed by the government agency can amend our understanding 
of such figures.
The last chapter provides both a theoretical and an applied discussion of 
the impact of imperfections in the administration of state benefits upon the 
optimal allocation of benefits and on social welfare and equity. We derive the
18
optimal design of state support in a world where there exist known administrative 
or claiming costs to redistributing income. We provide empirical evidence on the 
efficiency and efficacy of government support in providing net benefits and thus 
in influencing the level of "social welfare". We subsequently look at the 
desirability of some marginal and major changes in government redistributive 
policies, discussing briefly a few other considerations involved in an optimal 
redistributive design. Finally, we use the material presented in Chapter II to 
develop both a general and an empirical analysis of the impact of allocative 
imperfections upon the level of progressivity, vertical equity, horizontal inequity 
and redistribution exerted by redistributive tools.
Each chapter is terminated by a conclusion which outlines very briefly its 
main findings. The final conclusion brings forward the chief contributions of the 
thesis and discusses their limits. As an epilogue to the whole work, it also 
indicates avenues for some useful further ventures.
19
Chapter I; A Computer Model of the 1985 British 
Personal Tax and Transfer System
Introduction
The analysis of personal tax and benefit systems has mostly and 
traditionally been concerned with the issues of vertical equity (redistributive 
justice), horizontal equity ("equal treatment of equals" or "maintenance of relative 
positions"), their effects on various incentives (to work, to save, to invest in one's 
hum an capital development, etc.), and on economic efficiency (e.g., the extent to 
which inefficiency costs are introduced by tax and benefit rules).
We present in section A a computer model adapted to the 1985 British 
personal taxation and transfer system that may be seen as an important building 
block towards the discussion of many of these issues in this thesis1. All tax and 
transfer modules are independently constructed and only need to be added to 
yield the final budget set (or subsets of it). Because of this, the model is very 
flexible and can handle all types of modifications and simulations, starting from 
the simple addition of a lump-sum tax or benefit to complicated forms of transfers 
which may be dependent on income unit characteristics, m ay be taxable or not, 
may be assessed against gross income or income net of various taxes and benefits, 
etc.. The computer programme is also capable of incorporating all types of 
discontinuities in the various modules leading to the net income function, and
1 For a description of three other tax and benefit models, the TAXMOD, the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies and the SYSIFF French tax-benefit model, consider 
Atkinson and Sutherland (1988). A tax and benefit model for the Quebec economy 
can be found in Fortin et al. (1989), and the application of one for Sweden, in 
Schwarz and Gustafsson (1991).
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also allows as many nonconvexities in the budget set and subsets as are required. 
A novel element is that of extending efficiently the arithmetical analysis of 
previous models into the complete space of possible labour supply and net income. 
In section B, we will present an illustrative view of the way in which our 
computer model throws light on the shape and irregularities of the resulting 
budget sets, on the distribution of explicit and implicit marginal tax rates, and on 
how good an approximation is provided by linearisations of the budget constraint 
at the point of actual labour supply. Apart from spurring some theoretical 
considerations on optimal tax and benefit design, this chapter also provides 
important insights on some of the features of the British tax and benefit system, 
features that underlie the basis of our empirical work in this thesis.
A- The Model
1- The Data
We use all of the 4471 income units figuring in the Family Expenditure 
Survey (FES) data from April 8th to October 7th, 1985, and which gather a total 
of 9043 individuals, of whom 4548 are adults (mostly spouses) living together. The 
"Statistical Notes on the Use of the 1985 Family Expenditure Survey Data" at the 
end of the thesis describe the derivation and the use of these data in our study.
We will sometimes have recourse to "typical" income units to illustrate the 
development of our analysis. Such procedures warrant a great deal of caution. The 
use of averages and sample groups may give the misleading impression of 
substantial homogeneity in the population: much of our analysis is in fact to show 
the extent to which differences in social and economic characteristics influence the 
role of the tax and transfer systems. Notwithstanding these remarks, we have
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defined four income unit types reflecting the average value of the characteristics 
of their corresponding group. In Table 1.1 we thus indicate some of the average 
characteristics of a
(1) family of four, owner-occupiers;
(2) family of four, renters;
(3) pensioner couple, owner-occupiers;
(4) family of four, of which the head is unemployed, owner-occupiers.
A family of four is taken to denote a couple and two dependent children, where 
these are as defined in Appendix A. A pensioner couple is one in which either the 
husband is 65 or above, or the wife is 60 or more. The head of a unit is, under the 
FES definition, the man in the presence of a couple. We note in Table 1.1 that the 
personal allowance of the pensioner couple is greater because of the extra age 
allowance. The amount of composite tax retained depends on the level of savings 
of the respective units. Eligible rates and rents under the Housing Benefit regime 
vary widely with the nature of the units, and Supplementary Benefit requirements 
in (1) exceed those in (2) because of the consideration of mortgage interest 
payments for owner-occupiers such as (1). Hourly wages are as defined in 
Appendix A, and their missing values have been estimated for those not in paid 
work. Appendix A also indicates the way in which FES variables have been used 
to compute some other values of Table 1.1 and, in general, the parameters of the 
tax and benefit model.
2- The Analysis
We denote the exogenous gross wage by w, weekly hours of work by h, 
and exogenous gross non-labour income by y. Thus, gross labour income is wh,
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and gross income, denoted by the function X(wh), is X(wh) = wh + y.
For each suitable adult, we construct from m tax and benefit provisions m 
{i=l,m) matrices [(hjif tjM YVyj, /=!,/,• of size (/,-,3), with hH4 and hj4 being 
respectively the lower and upper boundaries for the applicability of the vector (h^ 
tjif YVjJ- Income net of tax or benefit i is N,-. For the interval /7z;_I f, hjj, is the 
applicable marginal tax rate, w(l-t;-f), the virtual wage [the slope of the budget 
constraint in the (hours of work, net income) space], and YVjif the virtual income 
[the intercept of the budget constraint in the (h,N) space]. Each "notch" (or discrete 
jump or fall in the level of net income due to a discrete change in the level of 
benefit entitlement or tax payable) generates an additional interval with separate 
vector (hj# t Y V - ) ,  where, because of the discontinuity in the net income 
function, YV^+ h^/vt^ * Y V ^ + h ^ /v t^ .  Together these (27/,) vectors will jointly 
determine the shape of the feasible budget set for each suitable adult.
Taking one vector (hjif t;„  YVy and leaving out the subscripts, we may 
define the corresponding net income as
N(wh)= y+ y* + (1-0 wh ^
This is depicted on Figure 1.6b, where the horizontal axis shows hours of work, 
and the vertical one plots income per week. The filled line indicates the net 
income function, which differs from gross income by the amount of net taxes
payable or benefits due. Net taxes are then equal to
T(wh) = -y ' +t wh (2)
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Virtual income YV  amounts to y + y  , and defines the vertical intercept of 
a budgetary linear segment in the [h,N(zvh)] space. This is also illustrated in Figure 
1.6b. As we shall see in an example below, y  reflects tax on non-labour income 
y  and provides an index of departure of the tax system from pure proportionality 
of income tax to income. Reranking across the income space wh of individuals due 
to the application of the tax could then occur if and only if the derivative of T 
with respect to wh exceeded one, or if downward notches (discrete falls in the 
level of net income as wh rises) occurred.
As is customary, we define a progressive tax (benefit) system as one in 
which the average rate of tax (benefit) increases (decreases) w ith gross income [see 
Jakobsson (1976)]. Since the average tax rate, a(N), equals
a(N) = i\N )/x  = y ' + tw h  = , _ y '  + fy  (3)
X(wh) X(wh)
we note that, given t, a(N) will increase with gross income X(wh) only if there is 
a positive "net progressivity effect" in the second term of the previous equation, 
that is, if
It is equivalent to requiring that the effect on net income of a departure from pure 
proportionality be superior (more beneficial) than that of simply taxing all non­
labour income at a constant rate t.
We cannot help but refer readers to Hausman (1985) for an interesting and 
fuller discussion of the way in which the vectors (/i;, f;, YVj) may be built and of
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how they interact together. We provide one simple instance. If agents only face 
a segmentary linear income tax (thus, m=1) such that explicit marginal tax rates 
tj are applied to the brackets of taxable incomes [YL^ YLj], w ith YL0=0 and with 
corresponding hours-of-work intervals [h^hj], such that YL~hj*w+yT Vj 2, then 
net income N; w ith h falling within [h^,!^] equals
Nj = y  + w*h -  (yt+w*h -  YLh_x)  =  w *h*(l- tj)  + YVj (5)
*=1
with t0=0. w(l-tj) is the slope of the budget constraint in the (h,N) space, and YVj 
is its intercept and depends on the size of y  and yT, and on the characteristics of 
the segmentary income tax system:
YVj = y+y* = y- y r  + 5 1  C^ifc ^ - i )  ( )
k= 1
(6)
In practice, of course, the complexity of the income tax system is increased 
by, for instance, various additional tax deductions, surcharges or credits. The 
arguments of a more general tax function would also include a vector of income 
unit characteristics other than income. The analysis made below includes all of the 
significant components of the personal income tax system, and captures fully the 
effects of the major social security and state benefits in 1985 Britain. These 
components and those of other years are well described in the Tolley's Income 
Tax and Social Security and State Benefits yearly guides. Some benefits are not 
allocated by the model but are granted to the income unit when declared in the
2yT is taxable non-labour income.
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survey. They include widow 's benefits, various contributory and non-contributory 
injury and disablement pensions and allowances, and transfers under the training 
opportunities scheme: together they represent a proportion of 4.8% of gross family 
income3. The programme does not, however, encompass any of the benefits made 
"in kind" by the state, such as those provided by health and education 
expenditures or by "passport benefits" arising from the grant of cash benefits (e.g., 
that of supplementary benefits), nor does it incorporate general housing subsidies 
(mainly to council tenants), local authority taxes or indirect taxes.
The analysis takes advantage of the recursivity of the tax and benefit 
system in Britain (which also makes the administration of the programmes much 
simpler) and is illustrated in Table 1.2 and described in more details below. First, 
having computed a level of original or gross income and observed the receipt of 
various benefits (described in Appendix A), we allocate child and one-parent 
benefits (CB, OPB). Once this is done, we consider the module of those "means- 
tested" benefits for which entitlement depends solely on gross incomes and hours 
worked. These transfers include the unemployment (UNB) and the retirement 
pension (BP) contributory benefits. We then construct the independent effects of 
the taxation of personal incomes (which include the previous taxable contributory 
benefits), and eventually move on to the provision of supplementary benefits, 
which depend recursively on income net of income taxes, etc..
3 Unless specified, figures relate to calculations made on our FES sample. For 
many of the benefits modelled, the grossed-up number of recipients and levels of 
expenditures seem to agree very much with the published administrative aggregates. 
We discuss this further later in the chapter.
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3- The Building Blocks
The taxes and transfers modelled are as follows. All statements and figures 
refer to the 1985 sampling period defined above. The major changes to the British 
tax and benefit system between 1985 and 1992 are summarised in Appendix B.
(a) Child Benefit (CB) and One-Parent Benefit (OPB)
These are not means-tested, and amount to 2.7% of gross family income.
(b) Unemployment Benefits (UNB)
These are available to those income units whose adults are not susceptible 
of receiving (c) and include, when appropriate, additional benefits for dependants. 
UNB are also subject to "earnings rules" for own eligibility and for the eligibility 
to the increase for dependants. For some of our subsequent analysis in this and 
the following chapter, we would like to illustrate the changes in net income and 
in the progressivity of the tax and benefit system when hours of work and gross 
income vary. Because of this, we need assumptions on the grant of UNB to those 
currently working but who might end up unemployed once we vary their labour 
market behaviour. Similar assumptions are required for those unemployed who 
may (according to our simulations) enter the labour market. As we dispose of no 
FES contributory records, we will make the working assumptions that no UNB 
may be paid if the person is not currently receiving them. In other words, one may 
not choose to claim UNB by voluntarily ending one's current employment. 
However, if one has already suffered loss of employment (involuntarily) and has 
satisfied the contribution conditions, he is modelled as being able thereafter to 
hide a possible preference not to work at his prevailing wage. In the absence of 
necessary National Insurance contributory records and though recognising the
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important dynamic considerations involved in any decision to remain 
unemployed, these working assumptions appear to be the best ones we can 
devise. It is important to stress, however, that very few of the empirical results of 
this thesis would be affected by a change in these hypotheses, which are of use 
only in those circumstances where we wish to illustrate the effect of a change in 
the observed labour supply behaviour of an agent.
(c) National Insurance Basic Retirement Pension (BP)
Eligibility to BP requires that the recipient be of retirement age (65 for man, 
60 for woman) or above and also depends on National Insurance contribution 
records, of which we have, again, none. BP is also subject to a retirement 
condition (i.e., h<12) condition, after which earning rules apply4. To make this 
module operational, we assume that pension payments other than BP are received 
unconditionally as declared, and we suppose that all pensionable heads of income 
units fulfil the NI contributory condition for eligibility to BP5; a married woman 
will, however, receive only the increase for a dependant wife or child-minder. BP 
then represents a sizable proportion of 35% of all benefits modelled in 1985 
Britain, and no less than 7.0% of total gross income.
(d) The Personal Income Tax
We start by applying the 1985 rates of tax (which vary from a basic rate of 
30% to a maximum rate of 60%) on the relevant taxable incomes (made of labour
4 This rule has by now been removed. Again, see Appendix B for a brief survey 
of the changes in the British tax and benefit system between 1985 and 1992.
5 All reasonable efforts have, however, been made to screen the sample and to 
identify those for whom it was clearly possible to conclude that NI contributory 
conditions were not met.
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income from main and secondary employments, retirement pensions, 
unemployment benefits, investment incomes, statutory sick pay, etc.). This first 
exercise also incorporates the personal allowances (single, married, wife's earned 
income and age allowances) set against such taxable income. The resulting budget 
constraint may be termed that derived from applying the "elementary" tax rules. 
Computed taxes obtained from the "elementary" tax rules w ould exceed by 11.4% 
those calculated from the net income tax regime of our model. We then add the 
effect created by other tax provisions. These other provisions will either add to or 
decrease the "elementary" tax burden by shifting the loci of the tax kinks, 
changing the implicit marginal tax rates, or affecting the virtual income levels.
Four provisions are considered, and for each an independent set of (hir t{/ 
YV ) is constructed to show their effect on the global budget constraint and on the 
income tax system. First is the reduction (and ultimately the elimination) after a 
given income limit of the age allowance granted to a person if he or his wife is 
65 years or older. Second, we analyse the effect of the controversial MITR 
(Mortgage Interest Tax Relief) provision, which enables most owner-occupiers to 
deduct from their taxable income interest payments on mortgages up to £30,000 
6. Furthermore, borrowers not liable to pay tax on their income yet benefit from 
the relief at the basic tax rate. The relief is thus equivalent to a refundable tax 
credit whose value will increase with the individual's marginal income tax rate. 
It also implicitly extends the benefits of the tax exemption of the returns to owner- 
occupied housing to all those who may have less than £30,000 of savings. Third
6 This is still a prominent feature of the current personal income tax system, 
although limited to the basic rate of tax from 1991-92.
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is the deductibility of half of the class 4 National Insurance contributions, an 
empirically minor provision affecting the self-employed workers. Fourth, we look 
at the effect of the "composite rate scheme", through which recognised banks and 
many other deposit-takers (including Building Societies) ought to deduct taxes at 
a composite rate (slightly below the basic rate of 30%) on payments of interests 
and relevant dividends. Though they will be set against the overall tax liability 
of the individual, such basic rate tax payments cannot be refunded if the final tax 
liability is found to be smaller than the "composite rate" tax originally withheld. 
This makes this fourth provision a fully regressive one when concatenated onto 
the "elementary" income tax regime.
The presence of a spouse will affect the overall tax burden of the income 
unit: the 1985 British income tax system is neither a truly joint nor a separate 
taxation regime. The division of total income among two spouses will matter for 
two main reasons: the presence of the wife's non-transferable earned income 
relief7, and the availability for high income units of an embryo of a separate 
taxation regime8.
When building the income tax module in the presence of a spouse, we 
apply the procedure described above (i.e., the "elementary" and the four other tax 
provisions) on all of the income unit taxable income. The members of the income 
unit may also choose separate taxation of the wife's earned income; in such a case, 
the husband loses all of the excess (£1,450 in 1985) of the married allowance over
7 Equivalent in value to the normal single allowance.
8 Even if separate taxation is elected, all of the wife's non-earned income (for 
instance, all of her capital income) and much of the taxable benefits granted to her 
are taxed as her husband's income.
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the single one, but the wife's earned income may then be set against lower 
marginal tax rates. We thus construct along the joint taxation schedule one under 
which the spouses are taxed "separately" and finds the point at which a switch 
from the first schedule to the second is optimal. From this, we may derive the 
independent effect which the separate taxation option will have on the budget 
constraint of the income unit.
(e) National Insurance Contributions (NIC)
All workers below pensionable age are liable to pay NIC in addition to the 
income taxes described in the previous section. We apply to all self-employed 
workers the "flat-rate" and the Class 2 (6.3%) rate of contributions, and to all 
others the Class 1 ("not contracted out") regime, which specifies a 9% rate of 
contribution on all earned income9, until an upper earned income limit is reached 
at which point no more contributions are payable. This, we shall see, makes the 
contributions first progressive and then regressive, and thus a source of additional 
nonconvexities in the feasible budget set. Since the earned incomes of two spouses 
are separately assessed under the NIC provisions, these are an additional source 
of "independent" taxation. NIC contributions account for 26.2% of all taxes paid 
in the model. We do not therefore allow for contracting out of NIC, an 
opportunity which is not straightforward to model using the information available 
in the FES. It could in any case be argued that those contracted out of the NIC 
regime would be paying comparable contributions to occupational schemes.
9 As long as it is above a lower earned income limit; this thus creates a 
"nonconvexity" in that net income falls discretely at the specified earned income 
threshold. The income base also includes sick pay.
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(f) Family Income Supplement (FIS, now Family Credit)
This programme aims at supplementing the income of those units with 
children and of which at least one of the spouses works 30 weekly hours or more 
(24 in the case of single-parent families). The income base on which the 
supplement is assessed is made of most sources of incomes and includes UNB 
and BP when received, but does not take into account income taxes or NIC paid 
and CB and OPB received. When combined with the effect of other modules, this 
last feature makes possible overall implicit marginal tax rates exceeding one. The 
empirical importance of FIS is, however, small: in our model, it amounts to less 
than 0.4% of all benefits payable.
(g) Supplementary Benefits (SB, now Income Support)
This is the programme most directed to the non-working poor (those with 
sufficiently low incomes and whose insufficient weekly hours of work would 
prevent them from claiming FIS). Its marginal rate of withdrawal equals 1, but 
since the income base is made of income net of NIC and income tax (but includes 
BP and UNB) global implicit tax rates exceeding one will not occur in the hours 
intervals for which SB is available. In fact, because the availability of SB smooths 
the net income function by absorbing the irregularities of the taxes which enter 
SB's income base, it will in many cases level out nonconvexities introduced by the 
income tax and the NI contributions. This occurs, for instance, when passing 
through the NIC's lower earnings limit would increase by a discrete amount the 
size of NIC payable; a SB recipient would, however, receive back this discretely 
greater amount of contributions in the form of greater SB payments, thus 
preventing any fall in the level of net income enjoyed.
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12% of all transfers are paid in the form of SB. The size of the benefit 
depends on whether the recipients are deemed to be entitled to long-term (for 
people above the age of 59 or for those disabled in specified ways) or short-term 
requirements, and on the characteristics of the income unit. Additional 
requirements (and thus greater SB benefits) are also granted to those w ith housing 
requirements not covered by Housing Benefit [see section (h)]: these additional 
entitlements strictly cover the mortgage costs incurred by the poorer owner- 
occupiers.
(h) Housing Benefits (HB) and Supplementary Housing Benefits 
(HBS)
HB and HBS are means-tested benefits aimed at alleviating the burden of 
rents and domestic rates. Different HB rules apply according to whether the 
income unit is in receipt of supplementary benefits, and HBS may supplement the 
effect of HB when a "means-test" prevents the income unit from claiming 
supplementary benefits. The income for which the Housing Benefit is assessed 
includes BP, UNB and FIS, and is gross of income taxes and NIC paid.
In conjunction with MITR and the supplementary benefits granted in 
respect of housing requirements not covered by HB, HB and HBS summarise here 
the extent to which the availability of state support to an income unit depends on 
the unit's housing choice10. Such a dependence may be a clear source of 
"horizontal inequity", a matter w ith which we will concern ourselves in Chapter
10 The analysis of housing finance is very limited in this study. For example, 
general housing subsidies and capital grants to ease net housing costs are not 
included, just as we have not encompassed here the level of implicit subsidies arising 
from the non-taxation of owner-occupiers' imputed rent and capital gains. For more 
on this, see Hills (1991a).
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II. Furthermore, "housing-dependent" benefits jointly constitute a potentially 
distortive subsidy to housing that amounts in our model to no less than 6% of 
total gross income. The only ones not in receipt of such subsidy are those owner- 
occupiers without mortgages (whose returns to ownership are nevertheless tax- 
exempt and are thus implicitly subsidised) and not entitled to rate rebates, and 
those in rented accommodation but whose larger income prevents them from 
claiming HB and HBS.
B- Budget Sets and the Tax and Benefit System
1- The 1985 Budget Sets
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 illustrate the rules incorporated in the programmes 
briefly described above. In each table, we find under column h the hour values 
of the upper end of tax and benefit intervals, t shows the tax and withdrawal 
rates applicable to each of the interval, y  is the level of virtual income generated 
by the tax and benefit system and shown above to enter the definition of YV. T 
is the level of taxes ("minus the amount of benefits") payable for each h or interval 
end indicated. Table 1.3 thus shows the matrices [(hf i, YVjJ] for each of the i's 
pertaining to the income tax regime of an owner-occupier family of four, and also 
the values of T(wh) yielded by such vectors at the upper kinks hj4. Table 1.4 shows 
corresponding matrices for aggregates of the programmes described above and 
for a typical renting family of four. These relationships are also portrayed 
graphically on Figures 1.1 and 1.2, respectively. In each case, variations in hourly 
wages would (in most cases) shift proportionately the locus of the hours of work 
denoting the interval ends.
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We see on Table 1.3 that, for instance, an income tax rate of 30% applies to 
hours of work between 11.39 and 17.47 and, again, between 18.57 and 80.41; the 
presence of the zero income tax rate between hours of work 17.47 and 18.57 is, as 
we shall see, a feature of the Composite Rate scheme. The "elementary" marginal 
income tax rate increases from 0 to 0.45 in the range of hours of work considered. 
The presence of MITR introduces the equivalent of a lump-sum refundable tax 
credit of £8.91 for hours of work lower than 74.83 -- or until the value of the 
mortgage interest relief starts to increase when the tax payer enters tax brackets 
w ith higher applicable marginal tax rates. MITR also shifts out the location of the 
kinks of the elementary income tax (e.g., from h=74.33 to h=80.41, for the 
beginning of the 0.4 marginal tax band). Basic rate tax paid at source on interest 
and relevant dividends under the composite rate scheme is not refundable -- even 
when the interest or dividend recipient should be a non-tax payer -- and is 
therefore highly regressive. Such taxes paid at source can, however, be set to 
reduce those payable under the global income tax schedule. Between h=17.47 and 
h=18.57 in Table 1.3, no more income tax is due when labour income increases 
than the amount already paid under the composite rate scheme. This decreases 
the overall income tax rate on labour income from 0.3 to 0, thus inducing a 
possible nonconvexity in the budget set.
At low gross incomes, the net income tax effect on net income may be 
positive, due to the refundable MITR tax credit, unless this is outweighed by the 
negative effect of the non-refundable tax withheld by the composite rate 
scheme. In all cases, it is clear from the above tables and figures that — 
particularly so for low incomes and labour supply -- the elementary income tax
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system (of which the rules are probably among the easiest and most widely 
known of the tax and transfer system) does not approximate well the true income 
tax schedules, not to mention the complete tax and transfer regime. It also appears 
that the net income tax regime may well be less progressive than that which the 
elementary rules would suggest. Finally, a quick look at the overall budget 
constraint of Table 1.4 and Figure 1.2 suggests a large variability of the marginal 
tax rates and virtual incomes (of which y  is a component), due to the intricate 
combination of tax and benefit provisions and to the usual progressivity of the 
various programmes.
Figure 1.3 displays some of the variability of net budget sets in the 
dimension of income unit characteristics. It must be noted that these income unit 
characteristics also include varying wage rates, as displayed in Table 1.1. All 
income units (apart from the pensionable couple) face SB-imposed implicit 
marginal tax rates of one at low levels of hours of work. This would effectively 
discourage any low-hours, part- time jobs. Given the units' typical characteristics 
(e.g., their wage level and SB requirements), it can be seen in Figure 1.3 that the 
average pensionable couple would be better off (ignoring possible differences in 
needs) than other average income unit types for husbands' hours of work below 
30. The average "accommodation-renting" family of four would conversely (for 
hours up to 50) be worse off than all others.
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 shed some light on the important issue of work 
incentives. Budget sets based on the average wage of three hourly wage quintiles 
of families of four (tenants) are exhibited in Figure 1.4. The budget constraint of 
the lowest quintile displays by its particularly shallow slope the potential for a
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poverty trap induced by the tax and transfer system: indeed, between h=30 
(where a switch from SB to FIS causes a discrete shift upw ard of the budget 
constraint) and h=44, the combination of the marginal tax rates of personal income 
taxation (30%), NIC (9%), FIS (50%) and HB (19%) makes net income decrease 
continuously with hours of work.
The information shown on Figure 1.4 can also be portrayed on a three- 
dimensional graph: this is essentially done in Figure 1.5, and exposes the variation 
of net income as a function of the gross wage and hours of work. The resulting 
picture is one of cliffs, increasingly and decreasingly steep hill slopes, and 
plateaux11. The initial upw ard slope starting at zero hours of work flows from 
the deductibility of the first £4 of earnings of those on part-time work who wish 
to receive Supplementary Benefits. The availability of Supplementary Benefits, 
whose amount decreases one-for-one with the amount of family earnings, 
subsequently flattens the distribution of net income at about 95 pounds per week 
for low wages or low hours of work, and thus creates the lower plateau. When 
entitlement to Supplementary Benefits ends, net income starts to rise with hours 
of work and the hourly wage rate, but the slope varies with the withdrawal rates 
imposed on housing benefits and w ith the perception rates of National Insurance 
Contributions and income taxes. The cliff at 30 hours of work (and for wage rates 
up to about £3.22) is induced by the Family Income Supplement's availability 
limited to those working more than 30 hours a week (the benefit is also means-
11 An updated graph for the 1991 tax and benefit system -- along with a 
discussion of how the depiction of the system would be affected by the replacement 
of the various tax and benefit provisions by a "basic" or "citizen's" income — can be 
found in Duclos (1992a). The discussion there includes most of the tax and benefit 
changes that have occurred since 1985 and which are summarised in Appendix B.
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tested). Implicit tax rates vary from 39% to 108%. This latter rate causes anomalies 
that transcends the distribution of hours of work: for instance, a head working 30 
hours at a wage of £2.19 per hour would have a net weekly income greater (by 
£2.50) than that of a head providing the same number of hours but at a wage of 
£3.22; such features of real tax and benefit systems clearly raise questions about 
the fairness or equity of the system, which we discuss in the next chapter.
2- The Distribution of Marginal Tax Rates
Tables 1.5a and 1.6a indicate for each labour income decile group the 
distribution of implicit and explicit marginal tax rates for the head and the wife 
(if there is one) of the income units, respectively. "Heads" are as defined in the 
FES, and thus refer to the m an in the presence of a couple; income units are also 
as defined in the FES and will thus include many of the young adults living at 
home. Besides illustrating the structure of the tax and benefit system, tables 
displaying such marginal tax rates yield information on the marginal return to 
increased savings and investment and to greater labour market involvement (more 
hours of work or enhanced productivity and hourly wages). It would, however, 
be unwise to draw any strong incentive conclusions from statistics of this kind 
since work and savings behaviour often depends much on the average return 
(e.g., where the choice is between working full-time or not at all) and on the 
distribution of income unit characteristics (great grand-fathers, who earn no 
labour income and feature at the bottom of the labour income distribution, would 
probably earn no more even if their implicit and explicit marginal tax rates were 
to be decreased).
The information provided by Tables 1.5a and 1.6a reinforces some of the
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comments made earlier. Personal income tax is a bad indicator of the net budget 
sets; in fact, marginal explicit income tax rates are strongly negatively correlated 
w ith the net implicit tax rate over much of the decile distribution. Furthermore, 
for heads of income units, this net rate falls monotonically w ith labour income. 
Notwithstanding the comments just made in the previous paragraph, personal tax 
reform proposals explicitly concerned with work incentives could thus easily 
spring from a misinterpretation of the true distribution of marginal tax rates. 
Table 1.6a also suggests that wives face significantly lower marginal tax rates than 
their husbands' if, as is commonly assumed, their marginal labour supply 
decisions are made taking as given the labour supply of their spouse. Unlike those 
of Table 1.5a, net marginal tax rates do not fall monotonically, in line with the 
more predominant role of the marginal income tax rates.
How would these results, and the results derived from our model 
generally, be affected by a correction for departures of our sample from 
population characteristics? As indicated briefly in the "Statistical Notes on the Use 
of the 1985 Family Expenditure Survey Data" (Appendix A) the FES data may fail 
to represent accurately a micro picture of the true population due to, for instance, 
sampling practices and differential response rates among those income units 
selected. Atkinson, Gomulka and Sutherland (1988) attempted to lessen the effects 
of such irregularities by using UK population data on household composition, 
income ranges, housing tenure, age, employment status and regions to compute 
"grossing-up weights" that vary w ith income unit characteristics. These weights 
are positively correlated with the status of a pensioner, single person, owner- 
occupier, childless household, and an income in the upper ranges, reflecting the
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suspected under-representation of such groups in the FES sample.
We first note that the administrative aggregates amount to very close to our 
grossed-up results for those benefits which are most straightforwardly modelled. 
This can be checked in Table 1.7, where the grossed-up number of recipients and 
the grossed-up value of the receipts of CB are quite close to those registered in the 
Department of Social Security official statistics. Recipients and receipts of OPB 
differ rather more, as cohabitation rules must in principle be assessed before that 
benefit can be granted. The grossed figure of FIS receipts and recipients show 
surprising (and perhaps worrying) coincidence given the difficulties involved in 
evaluating FIS entitlement from the information found in the FES. We are only 
able to model current entitlement whereas actual receipt reflects eligibility at 
earlier dates. It must moreover be remembered that our grossed-up results in 
Table 1.7 assume full take-up of the benefits and that this necessarily favours the 
overestimation — and a possibly sizeable one — of the numbers that would have 
otherwise been predicted. Finally, and as we shall discuss much more in Chapter 
IV, aggregate FES figures of SB receipts and recipients look rather imprecise, 
especially if we were to reduce them by the incomplete take-up rates reported in 
previous studies (more on this in Chapter IV).
Tables 1.5b and 1.6b then indicate the distribution of marginal tax rates 
when such varying grossing-up weights are used, instead of the implicitly equal 
weights used in Tables 1.5a and 1.6a. The most significant changes occur in the 
lower labour income deciles, for which the increased proportions of childless, 
pensioner and one-adult units contribute to a fall in the average income support 
withdrawal rate, and subsequently to a fall in the net implicit marginal tax rate.
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By indicating the distribution of marginal tax rates of husbands when the 
full labour income of the spouse is recognised, Table 1.5d presents a better 
perspective of the labour choice made by income units at the margin and by 
husbands taking as given the labour supply of their wives. Moving from Tables 
1.5d to 1.5c, where the spouse is assumed to have no labour income, we note a 
tightening of marginal rates, effected by an increase in the implicit withdrawal 
rates of benefits but attenuated slightly by a fall in the marginal tax rates. 
Husbands who recognise the impact of their spouse's labour market behaviour 
upon their own tax and benefit schedule thus witness an increase in their income 
tax rate but also a substantial fall in their benefit withdrawal rate, the net result 
on their final implicit tax rate depending on the size of their labour income and 
other resources.
Comparing Tables 1.6a and 1.6c shows the effect of reversing the 
assumption previously made on the wife's perception of the labour income of her 
spouse. Bringing the husband's labour supply to zero greatly increases the wive's 
marginal benefit withdrawal rates but does not simultaneously decrease so much 
the marginal rate at which income taxes are paid. The net result is that the net 
marginal rates of Table 1.6c exceed everywhere those of Table 1.6a, where wives 
take into account their husband's earned income in assessing the marginal return 
to work. This runs contrary to the sometimes expressed view that the husband's 
work increases applicable marginal tax rates on the wive's labour income and thus 
decreases her incentive to work.
As suggested above, however, average tax rates on earned income may 
yield a better guide to work incentives than marginal ones; moreover, the debate
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on respective work incentives often revolves around the relative size of the 
husbands' and wives' marginal tax rates. Comparing Tables 1.5d and 1.6a, where 
both husbands and wives take full account of their spouse's earnings in assessing 
marginal tax rates, we note -- at the observed level of labour supply -- that the 
marginal tax and benefit incentive to the wife is relatively better than that to the 
husband. This holds with the exception of those in full-time work or with high 
earnings, where the joint taxation of income ensures that husbands and wives face 
broadly similar net marginal rates. The wives' separate earnings allowance grants 
to wives a degree of relief from income tax at low earnings which is not similarly 
given to husbands; this also guarantees that income tax rates for wives in Table 
1.6a are always no greater than those for their husbands in Table 1.5d.
3- Nonconvexities of the Budget Set
The presence of taxes and benefits may also introduce significant 
nonconvexities in the shape of the budget sets, examples of which are shown in 
Figure 1.6a. There are three types of such non-convexities, and all three are 
created by the tax and benefit regulations of the 1985 UK system:
(1) An increase in the net wage, produced by a fall in the net marginal tax 
rate between two linear segments. A similar nonconvexity would be 
generated by a gross or market wage that increased with hours supplied, 
which is empirically plausible.
(2) A discrete fall in net income, produced, say, by a sudden fall of 
entitlement to some benefit or by taxes (such as NIC) being levied 
suddenly on a discrete level of income or capital. This could further induce 
reranking among units situated on either side of the discrete fall in net
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income. Equivalently, as in Hausman (1980), falls in net income may occur 
at different levels of hours of work if there are fixed costs to participation 
in the labour market.
(3) A discrete increase in net income: this can easily arise from the 
dependency of the entitlement to some benefit on working a minimum 
level of hours (such as for FIS).
These nonconvexities can lead, among other things, to multiple tangencies of 
indifference curves with the non-concave budget curve and to large changes in 
desired labour supply following relatively minor disturbances to the budget 
constraint. Their presence also complicates sizeably the estimation and the 
interpretation of labour supply curves, as discussed for instance in Hausman 
(1985), Blomquist (1989) and Duclos (1990).
Such apparent irregularities may not, however, always be suboptimal. As 
discussed by Blinder and Rosen (1985), discrete falls or increases in the level of 
taxes or subsidies can yield more desirable outcomes than a continuous form of 
subsidisation or taxation that induces welfare costs (or deadweight losses) over 
a potentially wide interval of hours of work. Such "notches" will nevertheless 
generate sizeable welfare costs for those (but only for those) who will end up 
consuming or selling at the induced kinks. It then follows that "the aggregate 
excess burden depends on the distribution of individual tastes" [Blinder and 
Rosen (1985), p.738]. Blinder and Rosen then simulate the welfare and budget 
impact of favouring the consumption of a preferred good through the application 
of a standard price subsidy and of a notch one — i.e., agents receive some lump­
sum income if and only if they choose to consume more than a given quantity of
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the favoured good. Under the constraint of achieving a minimum aggregate 
consumption level of the favoured good, notches can, when properly designed, 
"induce individuals to self-select so that those who are most willing to change 
their behaviour are the ones who receive the subsidy (or avoid the tax)" [Blinder 
and Rosen (1985), p.745]. Deadweight losses are then kept under control and no 
price subsidies are wasted upon those little willing to increase (or decrease) their 
consumption of the preferred (or undesirable) good.
Some mental gymnastics is needed to adapt such insights to a world in 
which the desired achievement of some aggregate consumption is supplanted by 
considerations of income distribution. Figure 1.7 helps portray the issues involved. 
On both parts of the figure we find a graph of net against gross income (gross 
income being equal to earnings, for simplicity). On the top part of Figure 1.7 we 
find the presence of a negative income tax (NIT) which is terminated by an abrupt 
downwards notch at wh0: the programme is described by the line segments ACB. 
Units with conventional indifference curves Uf (such as U0 and U2) would not 
choose to work between points B and D bu t would rather remain at a point 
between A  and C and claim a level of benefits equal to the horizontal distance 
between such a point and the gross income (45°) line. Other units w ith a lower 
relative utility of leisure could also wish to earn more than at D, but they would 
not typically choose hours of work between B and D.
The notch at C thus perversely discourages some of the poor from earning 
more and keeps them dependent on state support. Filling the benefit gap between 
C and E by instituting a full NIT between A  and E and hence by removing the 
downward notch worsens no one's situation and could even possibly be done for
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a lower level of aggregate government expenditures. Removing the downwards 
notch improves the lot of those formerly at the kink C, who can then relocate to 
F, w ith lfj>U0/ with reduced benefit dependency and thus w ith a lower level of 
state expenditures. Some of those who used to be to the right of D and would not 
have been recipient of state support could also gain, potentially cutting down 
their level of labour supply and earnings and moving onto the segment CE, where 
their greater level of welfare springs from their receipt of state support. Whether 
aggregate government expenditures are lowered, unchanged or increased by such 
a policy change therefore depends on the relative size of these two groups of 
people and on the magnitude of their adjustment to the extended NIT.
Removing downward notches can thus be optimal, and will be necessarily 
so if the additional government expenditures incurred on those who reduce their 
earnings to the segment CE do not exceed the level of government savings 
achieved from the lesser benefit dependency of those who increase their labour 
supply from C to above it. Conventional social welfare concerns would then also 
be satisfied by such a policy change. Our argument is of course at best heuristic, 
and a proper treatment would require a full mathematical formulation or 
numerical simulations using some empirical labour supply estimates, which is 
outside the scope of this paper.
Could it also be better to go even more forward and generate upward 
notches? The bottom part of Figure 1.7 helps grasp the issues then involved. As 
before, we find the 45° gross income line in the net income, gross earnings space, but 
this time along with a dashed line KL depicting the effect of the SB (or poverty 
alleviation) regime found in Britain and a dotted one GHIJ showing the impact of
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the institution of a notch subsidy (of the FIS or "workfare" type) for those earning 
more than wht (at point H). As we shall see presently, the construction of these 
two lines can make them cost the same in aggregate expenditures to the state; for 
simplicity, also suppose that the distance IH is smaller than the one from the 
origin to K. Those agents w ith indifference curves U2 and U3 clearly lose from the 
move to the notch subsidy: their net income and benefit receipt falls from K to G, 
w ith no change in their gross earnings. Those agents w ith the indifference curve 
U4 could lose in welfare from the switch to the dotted line but can also avoid this 
by moving from K to L The level of benefits granted to such individuals also falls. 
For some with an even greater taste for work but who also are at K initially, 
utility will increase but receipt of state support will nevertheless also fall. For all 
those on the segment LJ initially, welfare will also increase but the state will then 
have to incur for them some additional subsidy expenditures. For a given 
distribution of utility functions, a suitable choice of the size of and of the 
length of HI could make the workfare programme GHIJ dem and the same level 
of government expenditures as that required by the SB-type programme KL.
It is clear from the above that even if aggregate deadweight losses were to 
fall (which is not guaranteed) after the switch to the notch subsidy for constant 
aggregate state transfers, the desirability of the reform would depend strongly on 
the distributional tastes of the state. It may be a matter of great concern that those 
ultimately at G will suffer from the switch and will be both absolutely and 
relatively worse off than w ith the SB type scheme. Alternatively, for political and 
efficiency reasons, the FIS or workfare scheme may prevail since it can make the 
redistribution of income towards at least some of the original poor more
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acceptable. Such arguments are also discussed theoretically in, for instance, Fortin 
et al.(1990). There, simulation results provided for the Quebec economy also 
suggest that a categorical combination of workfare and NIT programmes could 
optimally be devised, where such programmes would be made available in the 
spirit of Akerlof (1978) on the basis of observable categorical characteristics. 
Again, we must limit our own analysis to the above intuitive considerations, 
although the topic is clearly one worthy of a more detailed analytical and 
empirical enquiry.
Figures 1.8 and 1.9 throw some light on the empirical presence of such 
nonconvexities in the 1985 budget sets of those heads of income units w ith wages 
belonging to the middle quintile group. That is, we order hourly wages of the 
heads from the lowest to the highest, pick up the 20% in the middle, and vary the 
hours of work of each of these heads from 0 to 80. We then compute for each 
head the number of nonconvexities occurring in each of the 80 hourly ranges and 
express this number as an average number of nonconvexities in each hourly range 
over this subsample of heads of units.
Figure 1.8 indicates that, for these agents, most of the nonconvexities occur 
between h=0 and h=30, and come foremost from the NIC, Supplementary Benefits, 
Family Income Supplement and housing benefits rules. There is a discrete fall in 
net income at around 12 hours a week when agents start to pay NIC contributions 
on all of their labour income12. The ending of payments of further National 
Insurance Contributions also creates an additional nonconvexity at above h=80 for
12 This NIC feature has now been slightly altered, such that workers are liable to 
pay only up to 2% of their earnings below the Lower Earnings Limit, thus limiting 
the size of the nonconvexity and of the fall in net income.
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the third wage quintile. Jumps in the level of net income occur mostly below 
h=24, at the start of the applicability of Supplementary Housing Benefits, and at 
24 and 30 hours of work a week, where support from the state is shifted from 
Supplementary Benefits (now Income Support) to the normally more generous 
Family Income Supplement programme (now Family Credit). Housing benefits 
introduce nonconvexities throughout the hour range, mostly in the form of falls 
in the marginal implicit tax rates on labour income.
Figure 1.9 shows the type of the nonconvexities introduced in the net 
budget sets: that is, whether they stem from an increase in the net wage, or from 
a discrete fall or jump in net income. We note that most of them are in the form 
of increases in the marginal wage (from falls in the marginal net tax rate), and 
that such rises in the marginal return to working occur over the whole range of 
hours. The mode of the distribution of the discrete falls in net income is 12 hours, 
where NIC start to be payable, and peaks in the occurrence of upward notches in 
the level of net income take place at 24 and 30 hours, where entitlement to FIS 
becomes possible.
4- The Elasticity of the Virtual Wage
How sensitive is the net wage to changes in the gross wage or to changes 
in the supply of labour? In other words, how good an approximation of the 
budget set would linearisations of the budget constraint around the level of actual 
weekly hours of work h provide? To answer such questions we may compute the 
elasticity of the virtual (or net) wage with respect to the gross wage when hours 
of work are kept constant. This is defined as:
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Wdw ' wv
w ith wv -  (l-t)zv and f=Xtf.
In the presence of m taxes and benefits, we can decompose this into:
(7)
m
e = I + V
i=l
(diX-t) \w i - ' ,
dwV a - ' , )  ‘ J a - E o .
(8)
which is equivalent to a weighted sum of the individual l- t{ elasticities:
e  = 1 + E « i- t.
i=l i-E»«
(9)
Because the British tax and benefit system is essentially piece-wise linear at any 
point of the budget curve, this elasticity of the net wage w ith respect to the gross 
wage will typically be one, except of course at kink points where discrete changes 
in the net tax rate would yield infinite absolute values to the elasticity. This 
feature of the British system suggests that it may be more fruitful to assess the 
average elasticity of the marginal wage over a finite variation in the level of gross 
wages -- that is, by proportionately how much, on average, would the marginal 
wage wv of units change if their market wage were to vary by a given percentage, 
keeping the units' labour supply constant? Measuring in this fashion the impact 
of discrete percentage changes in the level of the gross wage implicitly implies the 
approximation of the potentially distinct linear tax and benefit segments over
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which an agent would move by only one continuously differentiable curve: 
finding, for instance, an elasticity of 10% for a 25% change in the level of the gross 
wage would indicate that the marginal wage would have changed by an average 
of 2.5% over the width of gross wage variation.
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 thus list the average of the square bracket elements of 
equation (8) for heads and wives of income units when Aw /w varies from 0.01 
to 0.25. These sum to the elasticity of the net wage w ith respect to hours supplied, 
to gross income, or, if added to 1, to the gross wage. In parentheses we show the 
proportion of individuals whose marginal wage remains unaffected by the 
proportional increase in the gross or market wage.
Two comments are first in order. First, decomposing the elasticity of the 
virtual wage as done above should reasonably require that taxes and benefits be 
additively separable, a feature which the 1985 British system does not possess. It 
is the case, for instance, that the level of eligibility to HB depends on the level of 
income net of FIS; implicit FIS tax rates are thus also felt through their impact on 
the HB marginal tax rates. Second, the results presented in Tables 1.8 and 1.9 are 
limited to averages of income unit elasticities whose distribution and variance 
across the sample of heads of units is very wide. Many heads and wives notice 
no change in their marginal tax rate as their labour supply or gross wage is 
proportionately increased, in part because many of these agents are not part of the 
labour force. An increase of 25% of everyone's labour supply will, for instance, 
change the virtual wage of fewer than 22% of the heads and 14% of the wives.
The income tax and NIC system generally contributes negatively to the 
overall elasticity, whereas the benefit side does so positively. This is
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understandable: as we saw earlier, moving up the earned income scale usually 
meant an increase in the average marginal income tax rate (a fall in the virtual 
wage) but a fall in the applicable benefit withdrawal rates (an increase in the 
virtual wage). The impact of the income tax system being relatively more 
significant on the wife's budget constraint, the wives' overall virtual wage 
elasticity thus ends up below one while that of their spouse is significantly above 
one for all checks of Aw/w. That is, a proportional change in the gross wage of 
the head (wife) will at the margin more (less) than proportionally increase the 
virtual wage faced by the individual. We also note that various taxes and benefits 
have various impacts upon the final marginal wage elasticity. Housing Benefits, 
however more limited in scope than SB and NIC for instance, exert a greater 
influence on the degree of non-linearity of the heads' budget curve than all other 
tax and benefit components. From Table 1.8, we thus find that a 1% increase in 
heads' gross wages will, at the average elasticity, increase the marginal wage by 
0.26%, from a sizeable positive HB contribution (withdrawal rates have fallen), a 
negligible NIC contribution, and a negative income tax element (marginal income 
tax rates are increasing).
Since the knowledge of the virtual wage elasticities could give us a crude 
appraisal of differential labour supply adjustments following changes in the gross 
wage or in the amount of gross income, we consider in Figures 1.9 and 1.10 the 
distribution of such elasticities (the elements in the squared brackets of the virtual 
wage elasticity equation) across labour income decile groups. For the 43% of 
heads and 52% of wives who did not work, such elasticities are always zero: no 
change in the marginal tax rates follows from a % change in their wage or labour
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supply level. Figure 1.10 indicates that, as we move from the 5th to the highest 
labour income decile of the heads, e1AfW increases from a low level (em;w could 
even be negative if marginal tax rates increased sufficiently rapidly as zv rises) as 
heads first make their way through and then leave the steep withdrawal rates of 
the transfer system. NIC first drives down as contributions start being 
deducted, but keep above one once the upper earned income limit for the 
payment of contributions is reached.
Wives (Figure 1.11) face a relationship inverse to that of the heads, for 
reasons mentioned above. As we move up the income deciles, the virtual wage 
first increases less than proportionally, then more so, following changes in the 
gross wage. All this also suggests that uniform labour supply adjustments to 
uniform wage shocks would be ruled out even in the presence of homogeneous 
elasticities of labour supply with respect to income and net wages. 
Conclusion
We recall that this chapter served as a stepping stone to the empirical 
applications offered in the rest of this thesis. We first describe rather succinctly the 
data and the structure of our underlying computer model; we then strive to 
illustrate the features of the 1985 British tax and benefit system. To this end, we 
portray the system's associated budget sets, we note the distribution of marginal 
tax rates, we discuss the concordance of our grossed-up statistics with 
administrative ones, we analyse the elasticity of the net wage with respect to 
changes in pre-tax earnings, and we disentangle the distribution of non­
convexities and notches in the tax and benefit system.
Our main conclusions in this chapter are mostly illustrative. We saw that
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what is widely regarded as the tax and benefit system's most prominent feature 
— the personal income tax -- describes poorly the shape of the budget sets 
available to family units. Besides displaying "cliffs" and "plateaux", the 1985 
British system exhibits a wide variation of marginal tax rates that generally 
decrease with labour income; these are usual features of systems where the 
targeting of benefits can only induce sizeable "poverty" and "unemployment 
traps". This also explains why wives of working husbands typically face lower 
marginal tax rates than if the husbands earned less or not at all. The withdrawal 
and substitution of benefits also creates numerous budget "nonconvexities", which 
occur mostly at lower levels of earnings and hours of work. We have also seen 
how these can be justifiable or unjustifiable in the context of an optimal tax or 
benefit design. A small change in hours of work, gross income, or the wage rate 
will usually not change the net wage to additional work effort, though if it does 
the effect will be very significant. Plotting the average of the net wage elasticities 
confirms the earlier observations that the net wage is a stable proportion of the 
gross wage only at relatively large levels of earnings, where the withdrawal of 
state benefits has ended.
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Table 1.1
Characteristics of Some Typical Income Units 1
Characteristic (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 38 36 69 36
Age of Spouse 36 33 68 34
Personal
Allowance
65.6 65.6 80.8 65.6
Wife's Allowance 41.9 41.9 41.9 41.9
Composite Tax 
Retained
1.62 0.21 5.52 0.3
Basic Pension 
Eligibility
0 0 57.3 o
Eligible Rates and Rents 7 .18 24.0 6.21 5.7
Supplementary Benefits 
Requi rement s
94.5 64.8 58.4 88.5
Hourly Wage 4.89 3.56 2.07 3.95
Hourly Wage of Spouse 2.70 2.33 1.86 2 .42
Mortgage Interest 
Payments
29.7 0 1.26 23.8
Non-labour Taxable Income 9.95 2 .24 55.23 6.25
Non-labour Income 30.2 30.1 59.35 35.6
(1) family of four, owner-occupiers;
(2) family of four, renters;
(3) pensioner couple, owner-occupier;
(4) family of four, of which the head is unemployed, owner- 
occupiers .
1 All monetary variables are in € per week.
Table 1.2 
Tax and Benefit Modelling
Sequence of income and 
modelled taxes and 
benefits
Income base for assessment of 
taxes and benefits include:
Original income2
Various observed benefits
(a) CB and OPB not income-dependent
(b) UNB earned income
(c) BP earned income
(d) Personal income tax UNB and BP (not CB and OPB)
(e) NIC labour income
(f) FIS UNB, BP (not CB, OPB, personal 
income tax and NIC)
(g) SB CB,OPB,BP,UNB, personal income 
tax, NIC
(h) HB, HBS CB, OPB, BP, UNB, FIS (but not 
personal income tax and SB)
2 The details of "original" or gross income and of "various 
observed benefits" are shown in Appendix A.
Table 1.3
(h,t,y*) Vectors of the Income Tax System 
Family of Four, Owner-Occupiers
h Income Tax "Elementary" Y tax MITR Composite Rate 
Scheme
t ★y T t
*
y T t
★
y T t
*
y T
0 0 7.29 -7.29 0 0 0 0 8.91 -8.91 0 -1.62 1.62
11.39 0 7.29 -7.29 0 0 0 0 8.91 -8.91 0 -1. 62 1. 62
17.47 0.3 24.00 1.62 0.3 16.71 8.92 0 8.91 -8.91 0 -1.62 1.62
18.57 0 -1.62 1.62 0.3 16.71 10.53 0 8.91 -8.91 -0.3 -27.2 0
74.33 0.3 25.62 83 .42 0.3 16.71 92.34 0 8.91 -8.91 0 0 0
80.41 0.3 25.62 92.34 0.4 53.06 104.2 -0.1 -27.44 -11.88 0 0 0
85.99 0.4 64.94 103.3 0.4 53.06 115.1 0 11.88 -11.88 0 0 0
92.07 0.4 64.94 115.1 0.45 74.08 128.5 -0.05 -9.14 -13.37 0 0 0
Table 1.4
(h,t,y*) Vectors of the Global Budget Constraint 
Family of Four, Renting
h Cumulative Vectors Income Tax and NIC FIS and SB HB and HBS
t hy T t
*
y T t y* T t
*
L y T
0 1.00 60.95 -61.0 0 -0.21 0.21 1.00 39.23 -39.2 0 21.93 -21.9
9.89 1.00 60.95 -25.8 0 -0.21 0 .21V 1.00 39.23 -4.02 0 21.93 -21.9
12.12 1.00 60.95 -17.8 0.09 -0.24 4.12 0.91 39.26 0 0 21.93 -21.9
12 .77 1.00 63.06 -17.6 0.09 -0.24 4.33 0 0 0 0.91 63.30 -21.9
14.02 0.09 21.69 -17.2 0.09 -0.24 4.73 0 0 0 0 21.93 -21.9
14.15 0.17 25.69 -17.1 0.09 -0.24 4.79 0 0 0 0.08 25.92 -21.9
18.01 0.42 38.28 -11.4 0.09 -0.24 6.00 0 0 0 0.33 38.51 -17.4
22.3 0.72 57.51 -0.34 0.39 19.00 11.97 0 0 0 0.33 38.51 -12.3
30.04 0.77 61.48 20.88 0.39 19.00 22.70 0 0 0 0.38 42.48 -1.84
31.82 0.68 51.85 25.19 0.39 19.00 25.18 0 0 0 0.29 32.86 0
74.36 0.39 19.00 84.24 0.39 19.00 84.24 0 0 0 0 0 0
104.3 0.30 -4.83 116.2 0.30 -4.83 116.2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 1.5a
Distribution of Implicit and Explicit Marginal Tax Rates
Head of Income Unit3
Deciles 
of heads' 
Labour 
Income4
Marginal Tax Rate
Income
Tax
NIC UNB & 
BP
Income
Support
Housing
Benefit
Net
Rate
1 0.103 0 0 0.376 0.102 0.580
2 0.103 0 0 0.376 0.102 0.580
3 0.103 0 0 0.376 0.102 0.580
4 0.103 0 0 0.376 0.102 0.580
5 0.178 0.053 0 0.133 0.181 0.545
6 0.295 0.088 0.007 0.036 0.090 0.516
7 0.298 0.090 0.002 0.006 0.042 0.438
8 0.302 0.090 0 0 0.005 0.397
9 0.302 0.089 0 0 0.001 0.392
10 0.333 0.035 0 0 '  0 0.367
3 Under the assumption that the spouse has no labour income.
4 Over 43% of the heads of the income units had no labour 
income.
Table 1.5b
Distribution of Implicit and Explicit Marginal Tax Rates
Head of Income Unit5 
Varying grossing-up weights
Deciles 
of heads' 
Labour 
Income6
Marginal Tax Rate
Income
Tax
NIC UNB &  
BP
Income
Support
Housing
Benefit
Net
Rate
1 0.102 0 0 0.360 0.102 0 .565
2 0.102 0 0 0.360 0.102 0 .565
3 0.102 0 0 0.360 0.102 0.565
4 0.102 0 0 0.360 0.102 0 .565
5 0.182 0.055 0 0.121 0.183 0 .541
6 0.296 0.089 0.006 0.030 0.086 0.506
7 0.299 0.090 0.001 0.009 0.038 0.437
8 0.302 0.090 0 0 0.004 0.396
9 0.302 0.089 0 0 0.001 0.392
10 0.337 0.034 0 0 0 0 .371
5 Under the assumption that the spouse has no labour income.
6 Over 43% of the heads of the income units had no labour 
income.
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Table 1.5c
Distribution of Implicit and Explicit Marginal Tax Rates
Husband7
Deciles
of
husbands' 
Labour 
Income8
Marginal Tax Rate
Income
Tax
NIC UNB & 
BP
Income
Support
Housing
Benefit
Net
Rate
1 0.074 0 0 0.487 0.083 0.644
2 0.074 0 0 0.487 0.083 0.644
3 0.074 0 0 0.487 0.083 0.644
4 0.179 0.054 0.007 0.248 0.251 0.739
5 0.296 0.089 0.004 0.033 0.119 0.542
6 0.300 0.090 0 0.004 0.023 0.418
7 0.304 0.090 0 0 0.002 0.395
8 0.302 0.088 0 0 0.002 0.392
9 0.301 0.083 0 0 0 0.384
10 0.361 0 0 0 0 0.361
7 Under the assumption that the spouse has no labour income.
8 Over 36% of the husbands (i.e., those heads who live with 
a spouse) of the income units had no labour income.
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Table 1.5d
Distribution of Implicit and Explicit Marginal Tax Rates
Husband9
Deciles
of
husbands' 
Labour 
Income10
Marginal Tax Rate
Income
Tax
NIC UNB Sc 
BP
Income
Support
Housing
Benefit
Net
Rate
1 0.157 0 0 0.207 0.079 0.443
2 0.157 0 0 0.207 0.079 0.443
3 0.157 0 0 0.207 0.079 0.443
4 0.204 0.054 0.007 0.125 0.165 0.554
5 0.299 0.089 0.004 0.015 0.055 0.463
6 0.302 0.090 0 0.004 0.013 0.409
7 0.304 0.090 0 0 0 0.394
8 0.303 0.088 0 0 0.001 0.392
9 0.308 0.083 0 0 0 0.391
10 0.376 0 0 0 0 0.376
9Taking the labour income of the spouse as given.
10 Over 3 6% of the husbands (i.e., those heads who live with 
a spouse) of the income units had no labour income.
Table 1♦6a
Distribution of Implicit and Explicit Marginal Tax Rates
Wife's Budget Constraint11
Deciles 
of wives' 
Labour 
Income12
Marginal Tax Rate
Income
Tax
NIC UNB & 
BP
Income
Support
Housing
Benefit
Net
Rate
1 0 0 0 0.145 0.054 0.201
2 0 0 0 0.145 0.054 0.201
3 0 0 0 0.145 0.054 0.201
4 0 0 0 0.145 0.054 0.201
5 0 0 0 0.145 0.054 0.201
6 0 0 0 0.055 0.017 0.072
7 0.022 0.033 0 0.021 0.028 0.104
8 0.284 0.086 0 0.004 0.018 0.393
9 0.295 0.088 0 0.002 0.006 0.391
10 0.312 0.086 0 0 0.001 0.399
11 Taking the labour income of the spouse as given.
12 52% of the wives had no labour income.
Table 1,6b
Distribution of Implicit and Explicit Marginal Tax Rates
Wife/s Budget Constraint13 
Varying grossing-up weights
Deciles 
of wives' 
Labour 
Income14
Marginal Tax Rate
Income
Tax
NIC UNB & 
BP
Income
Support
Housing
Benefit
Net
Rate
1 0.002 0 0 0.134 0.056 0.193
2 0.002 0 0 0.134 0.056 0.193
3 0.002 0 0 0.134 0.056 0.193
4 0.002 0 0 0.134 0.056 0.193
5 0.002 0 0 0.134 0.056 0 .193
6 0 0 0 0.051 0.017 0.068
7 0.021 0.033 0 0.018 0.030 0 .102
8 0.287 0.086 0 0.004 0.017 0.393
9 0.292 0.087 0 0.001 0.006 0.387
10 0.313 0.084 0 0 0.002 0.400
13 Taking the labour income of the spouse as given.
14 52% of the wives had no labour income.
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Table 1.6c
Distribution of Implicit and Explicit Marginal Tax Rates
Wife's Budget Constraint15
Deciles 
of wives' 
Labour 
Income16
Marginal Tax Rate
Income
Tax
NIC UNB & 
BP
Income
Support
Housing
Benefit
Net
Rate
1 0 0 0 0.631 0.055 0.687
2 0 0 0 0.631 0.055 0.687
3 0 0 0 0.631 0.055 0.687
4 0 0 0 0.631 0.055 0.687
5 0 0 0 0.631 0.055 0.687
6 0 0 0 0.843 0.041 0.884
7 0.008 0.033 0 0.704 0.076 0.822
8 0.036 0.086 0 0.380 0.212 0.714
9 0.122 0.088 0 0.057 0.169 0.437
10 0.296 0.086 0 0 0.019 0.401
15 Assuming no earned income from the husband.
16 52% of the wives had no labour income.
Table 1.7
Grossing-up Benefit Recipients and Receipts
Aggregate Number of Recipients and Aggregate Value of Receipts
Child Benefit One-Parent 
Benefit
Family Income 
Supplement
Supplementary
Benefits
Reci­
pients
(103)
Value 
(106£)17
Reci­
pients
(103)
Value 
(106£)
Reci­
pients
(103)
Value 
(106£)
Reci­
pients
(103)
Value 
(106£)
Administrative 
Official Data18
6819 4468 582 134 201 130 4390 5810
Model Values19, 
Grossed-up
6615 4429 738 163 239 121 4118 3982
17 Annual benefits, per annum.
18 Source: Department of Social Security (1990, 1989).
19 Model values are based on assumption of full take-up of the modelled value of benefits.
Table 1.8
Elements of the Elasticity of the 
Virtual Wage With Respect to the Gross Wage 20
Head of Unit's Budget Constraint21
Aw/w Income
Tax
NIC FIS and 
SB
UNB
and
BP
Housing
Benefits
All
Taxes
and
Benefits
0.01 -0.037 0.015 0 0 0.281 0.264
(99.9) (99.8) (100) (99.9) (99.3) (99.0)
0.05 -0.038 -0.17 0.037 -0.008 0.163 0.135
(98.7) (98.4) (99.7) (99.9) (97.9) (94,5)
0.10 -0.030 0.007 -0.033 -0.020 0.178 0.102
(97.0) (96.8) (99.6) (99.9) (95.3) (89.4)
0.25 -0.028 0.027 0.008 -0.009 0.134 0.133
(94.1) (92.3) (99.1) (99.9) (91.3) (78.6)
20 Table shows [e(1_t)#M (1-t)/(1-Xt)] . Those for whom (1- 
Et)=0 have necessarily been omitted. In parentheses, we show the 
proportion of the sample for which no change in the appropriate 
marginal rate occurs.
21 Assuming no earned income from the wife.
U
Table 1.9
Elements of the Elasticity of the 
Virtual Wage With Respect to the Gross Wage 22
Wife's Budget Constraint23
Aw/w Income
Tax
NIC Income
Support
Housing
Benefits
All taxes 
and 
Benefits
0.01 -0.115 -0.045 0 0.001 -0.151
(99.6) (99.6) (100) (100) (99.0)
0.05 -0.079 -0.031 0.036 0.012 -0.062
(98.2) (98.1) (99.9) (99.5) (95.7)
0.10 -0.061 -0.022 0.018 0.002 -0.063
(96.7) (96.8) (99.9) (99.1) (93.0)
0.25 -0.067 -0.012 0 0.015 -0.064
(92.0) (94.3) (99.9) (98.1) (86.9)
22 Table shows [e(1_t)fW (1-t) / (1-Et) ] . Those for whom (1-
£t)=0 have necessarily been omitted. In parentheses, we show the 
proportion of the sample for which no change in the appropriate 
marginal rate occurs.
23 Taking the labour income of the spouse as given.
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Figure 1.1
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Figure 1.2
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Figure 1.3
Global Budget Constraint 
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Figure 1.4
Budget Constraint and Wage Variability 
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Figure 1.6a
Budget Constraint Nonconvexities
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Chapter II: Progressivity, Redistribution and 
Equity, with Application to 1985 Britain
Introduction
We wish here to extend and use some of the measures proposed recently 
[see, for example, Kakwani (1977a, 1986), Pfahler (1987) and Lambert (1989)] to 
portray the progressivity and redistribution of tax and benefit systems. We have 
four main objectives.
Firstly, we analyse and apply indices of local progressivity. Through this, 
we also suggest ways in which the sole use of such indices of local progression 
can yield interesting insights on the impact of alternative tax and benefit systems 
upon the level of social welfare. Secondly, we derive a general class of horizontal 
inequity indices that also correct for biases to the class of indices of progressivity 
and redistribution proposed by Pfahler (1987). We see that in the absence of such 
corrective horizontal inequity indices, the above indices of progressivity and 
redistribution have no clear implications for the real redistributive impact of taxes 
and benefits. Thirdly, we emphasise the analytical separate contribution of various 
taxes and benefits to the overall progressivity, redistribution and equity of the 
complete tax and benefit system. To do this, we decompose our indices of 
progressivity, redistribution and equity into functions of the separate impact of 
individual taxes and benefits. Fourthly, we illustrate the use of the developed 
analytical tools by applying them to the 1985 British tax and benefit system. This 
reveals, inter alia, the extent to which actual individual tax and benefit provisions 
are progressive, horizontally and vertically equitable, and redistributive.
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The measures considered in this chapter thus fall into two categories. The 
first one regroups local measures of progression (ARP,RP,LP) for which we 
implicitly wish to consider representative income units whose labour income we 
then vary. The second category will extend the analysis to subsume the complete 
diversity of needs, incomes and characteristics which our sample portrays, and 
will thus enable us to discuss the issues of global progressivity and 
redistribution1.
We proceed in two main steps. The first part of the chapter introduces 
measures of local progression; for this, the notation and some of the initial 
definitions of our analysis are inspired by Lambert (1989). We derive the 
contribution of individual tax and benefit components to the overall local 
progression of the system, applying our results to the 1985 tax and benefit regime. 
We then indicate how the use of local progression can provide useful benchmarks 
for the comparative impact of taxation and transfers on social welfare. We develop 
in the second part a general class of indices of horizontal inequity that is a natural 
complement to general classes of indices of progressivity and vertical equity. This 
is followed by a detailed application of our general results to an important 
member of the classes of indices discussed in the preceding section. Having 
highlighted some of the features of previous enquiries into the progressive and 
redistributive impact of taxes and benefits and noted the methodological
1 The local measures of progression ARP, RP and LP are labelled measures of 
"structural progression" by Musgrave and Thin (1948), whereas our global measures 
would fit under their umbrella of "effective progression", where effective (or global) 
progression differs from "measures of structural progression in that it is useful 
primarily for measuring the degree of progression of the rate structure as a whole, 
whereas structural progression is applicable to specific points of income on income 
ranges only" [Musgrave and Thin (1948), p.511].
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limitations of applied and comparative analyses, we finally indicate how separate 
elements of the 1985 British tax and benefit system contribute empirically to the 
global progressivity, vertical and horizontal equity, and redistribution of the 
state's intervention.
A- Measures of Local Progression 
1- Definitions
We defined in Chapter I a progressive tax or benefit as one for which the 
average rate of tax (or minus the average rate of benefit) increased with gross 
income. Our first indicator, the average rate progression (ARP), is the derivative 
of the average rate of tax with respect to gross income2. Using the notation of 
Chapter I and taking one linear segment, ARP is defined by:
d
ARP = —
d  (wh) x 2 X
The average tax rate a(wh) will be monotonically increasing w ith wh only if ty>-y 
or t>a holds; if that condition holds for each of the /z vectors of programme 
(benefit or tax) i (viz, over the whole domain of incomes), programme i may be 
said to be progressive at all income levels, given the socio-economic characteristics 
of the particular income unit. In other words, in a society w ith income units 
identical in all things except in the income they derive from supplying labour, 
programme i will be progressive over all such distributions of labour income if
T(N(wh))
X(wh) = ty + y* = Arv_^ ( i )
2 ARP is termed "effective rate progression" by Slitor (1948).
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and only if y > - 1 y  or t>a for all linear segments j,
A second measure, residual progression (RP), yields the elasticity of net 
income to gross income:
KP  s  d  N(wh) X(wh) = ( 1 - f )  (wh + y) = J -t_ ^
d  X(wh)  N(wh) ( 1 - f )  wh + y  + y* 1 - f l
For net income N  to progress less quickly than gross income X, RP needs 
to be below 1; for this to hold, or for d(RP)/d(zvh) > 0 over the linear segment, we 
require that
( 1 - f )  y  < y + y (3)
which is equivalent to the ARP condition for progressivity defined above. Given 
a net wage xv(l-t), this condition states that for the relevant linear segment to 
exhibit progressivity, the virtual income (l-t)y  of a proportional regime must be 
lower than the full virtual income of the non-proportional system, y+y*. 
Alternatively, we can illustrate this condition using Figure 1.6b. We extend the 
gross income line to the horizontal axis and meet the point -y/w; the intercept of 
the net income line above point -y/w is A, w ith a value of y+y*-w(y/w)(l-t) = y +ty. 
Condition (3), which can be rewritten as y  +ty>0, then simply requires that, for a 
linear segment to exhibit progressivity, the intercept A  must lie above the point - 
y/w  on the horizontal axis.
We also make use of the elasticity of taxes (or benefits) with respect to 
gross income, which is termed liability progression (LP), and which is described 
as
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^  ^ d  \ l\N(wh)) j X(wh) _ t  _ t
d(X (w h))  ‘ 7gV(wft)) a t wh -y* <4)
f wh +t y
It is defined only if a*0, where 0  is the average tax rate. From the definition of 
ARP  and RP and for positive t and a, we note that the following are equivalent: 
IP  < (>) 1, f < (>) a, RP > (<) 1, and ARP < (>) 0. We also see that ARP=1/X2[T(LP- 
1)] and RP=l/(l-a) - aLP. These last expressions will be useful below when we 
wish to show the distinct impact of taxes and benefits upon the ARP and RP 
progressivity of the global tax and benefit system.
Empirical labour supply studies whose net wage and virtual income are 
constant implicitly assume that global RP and LP are equal to one for all linear 
segments. We also note that there is no straightforward correspondence between 
the concept of marginal wage elasticity introduced in the previous chapter and the 
RP and LP measures of progression used in this one. A system with a constant 
marginal tax rate (and thus a constant marginal wage elasticity) may yet be 
progressive if the average tax rate "a" is smaller than the marginal one, t. 
Conversely, a decreasing marginal wage as wh increases does not necessarily 
imply progression of the tax and benefit system if the marginal tax rate is then 
still below the average one.
2- The 1985 Tax/Benefit System
We may now illustrate the local progressivity of the 1985 tax and benefit 
system. We recall that wherever ARP is positive, or RP is below one, the relevant 
scheme is said to be locally progressive. These, however, are simple qualitative 
rules for the presence or absence of progressivity and it remains not always clear
83
how to expect the quantitative values of ARP, RP and LP to evolve for a 
tax/benefit system that satisfies the qualitative progressivity conditions- In other 
words, having established that a system is progressive or not, can we then 
establish from the numerical values of ARP, RP and LP how progressive (or 
regressive) it is over the whole of gross income? As can be seen from the 
definitions of ARP, RP and LP, all three measures summarise in various ways the 
relationship between the marginal (t) and the average (a) tax rates. ARP appears 
the less useful of the measures when one must compare progressivity at different 
levels of gross income since t-a is divided by X, which makes ARP falls inexorably 
to 0 regardless of any (reasonably) evolving relationship between t and a [see for 
instance Slitor (1948)]. It is easier to conceive of relatively unchanging RP and LP; 
for an average tax of 20% and a marginal one of 40%, RP would equal 0.75 and 
LP, 2.0. To keep such RP and LP roughly constant over the whole range of gross 
income when marginal tax rates in excess of average rates inevitably raise the 
latter, a progressive system would need to impose continuously greater marginal 
tax rates. This would be particularly difficult for a constant degree of LP since 
required marginal tax rates would sooner or later need to surpass 100% -- a 
relative weakness noted by Musgrave and Thin (1948). Because of this, there is 
also in the case of LP a natural tendency for the measure to become closer to 1 as 
we measure it over an increasing level of gross income. RP is less susceptible of 
being affected by the constraint of marginal tax rates not exceeding 100% and 
therefore shows the greatest potential for it not to indicate an inevitable gradual 
loss of structural or local progressivity as income increases.
With these remarks in mind, we may then use Table 2.1 to compare the
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progressivity of personal income taxation with that of the net tax/benefit system 
for an "average" owner-occupier family of four, whose main characteristics are 
displayed on Table 1.1. The net tax/benefit effect appears to be always more 
progressive than the income tax one, except for gross incomes in the area of £360 
or above per week. It is also clear that (judging from the variations in RP) both 
the personal taxation and the net tax/benefit systems lose (as somewhat expected) 
their progressive bite as we move up the gross income scale. Further analysis 
reveals that all components of the benefits modelled are progressive over the 
whole space of incomes but that NIC, the composite tax scheme, MITR, the 
deductibility of half the class 4 National Insurance contributions, and the separate 
taxation provision can all exhibit regressivity over at least some range of the space 
of gross incomes, depending on the chosen household characteristics.
To grasp the extent to which individual elements contribute to overall 
progressivity (or regressivity), we may split net ARP into a weighted sum of LPj
Total ARP = —  
X2
£  r,
i=1
*rt r
d{wh) ' Tt/
m
£ r ,
i=l
= ± 2 [ £  W  -  D]
(5)
where LPj is the liability progression of the individual tax or benefit i. Similarly, 
total RP can be disaggregated into a sum of LPj as follows:
Total RP = —  -  £,*11 . *  =  J _  -  . l p  (6)
N U  d(wh) N 1-a %  N
with a=LT/X .
Table 2.2 displays the contribution of various income tax provisions to
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overall local income tax progressivity as defined in equations (5) and (6), and this, 
for the same typical owner-occupier family of four. Net RP appears as a sum of 
TLPj [itself a transformation of LPir defined as TtLP/N ], and net ARP as a sum of 
TLPlj [a transformation of (LPr l), defined as Tt(LPr l)*Hf/X2\. TLP{ and TLP2,- are 
thus intended to summarise the individual progressive impact of taxes and 
benefits upon the overall average rate progression or residual progression of the 
system. Thus, for X=160 for instance, we find that global ARP equals 13.55 and 
represents the sum of the elementary income tax TLP1 (10.07) and the TLP1 for 
the Mortgage Interest Tax Relief provision (3.48). RP can similarly be traced back 
to l/(l-a) minus the sum of individual TLP. In the dimension of gross incomes, we 
can conclude that net income taxation shows a monotonic loss of progressivity as 
measured by RP and LP (RP increases and LP falls, towards one) except in the 
area of X=£120, where income tax is regressive. This last feature is caused by the 
composite rate scheme rules. In the dimension of the elements adding up to net 
income taxation, we may say that (for this particular income unit) net income tax 
progressivity is superior to that of the "elementary" income taxation (viz, 
reinforced by other tax provisions), except for the case of X=£120 already 
mentioned and for X=£400, where MITR effectively begins to allow the deduction 
of mortgage interest payments against income belonging to higher tax brackets.
Net tax/benefit progressivity for a family of four (tenants) is similarly 
shown in Table 2.3. The contribution of income tax to overall progressivity is less 
than half for gross incomes at or below £120 a week. NIC contributes regressively 
for X=£320 and above, and thereby attenuates the already low progressivity of 
personal income taxation at high income levels.
86
3- R esidual Progression and Social W elfare
We have already discussed the difficulties involved in interpreting the size 
and the quantitative attributes of local progression introduced at the beginning of 
this chapter. We have said that quantitative uses of ARP did not appear to be 
potentially useful, and that we did not expect RP and especially LP to increase or 
even to stay relatively constant as gross incomes increased in a sensible tax and 
benefit system -- this limitation being due to the practical problems inherent in 
setting very high marginal tax rates. A related difficulty in the comparative use 
of local measures of progression is that a system may exhibit strong progressivity 
at some income levels but not at others, while the converse holds for another 
system to which we would like to compare the first one. One way of sidestepping 
these difficulties and of indeed characterising the quantitative and comparative 
merit and impact of variously progressive tax and benefit systems is through the 
adoption of an explicit social welfare function as a measuring rod. This would 
also bring us closer to the analytical framework of the next section, where we 
concern ourselves w ith aggregate or global measures of progressivity and 
redistribution.
We thus pause for a moment to illustrate the quantitative redistributive 
gains that might be achieved when switching from a proportional tax system 
N=(1-X)X, with average and marginal tax rates equal to X, to a system, N=AXe, 
with a constant residual progression RP=0 throughout the gross income 
distribution3. To do this we adopt the following definition for M(<x), the mean of
3 X and N  are not "equivalent" or "equivalised" incomes, but simply the unsealed 
original and net incomes of the various income units. For an early use of this function 
and a critical and encompassing discussion of the principles and application of
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order a:
M(o) =
— f  X" flX ) dx , i f  a  * 0  
o XB
XU
f  in(X)AX) dx , i f  a  = 0
(7)
XB
where XB and XU  are respectively the lower and upper limits of the gross income 
distribution of X, and M(l) is nothing but the mean. Under a constant RP regime, 
the average tax rate t will equal:
j  A  6 M (8 ) (8)
M( 1)
We make use of the social welfare functions of the type:
SWF = Af(l - e )
Such social welfare functions imply a marginal social utility of individual 
income equal to X'e. A rich person with twice the income of a poor one would 
thus exhibit a social marginal utility of his income 0.6 time that of the poor for 
e=0.75, and 0.84 times for e=0.25. According to this criterion, for e=0.75, it would 
thus be socially acceptable (at the margin) in the redistributive process to waste 
up to 40% of the resources reallocated from the rich to the person with half his
progressive taxation, see Vickrey (1947). Jakobsson (1976) implicitly encourages the 
use of such a function by indicating that "as soon as the context chosen is income 
redistribution judged by the Lorenz criterion, there is just one logical measure of 
progression" (p.161), that is, RP.
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income (16% when 8=0.25): at the margin, the cost in "wasted" resources would 
then just equal the welfare gain in redistributing income to the less well off.
Substituting the definition of the above tax systems into that of social 
welfare, we note that social welfare equals:
curn = /  (1_^)10 M (l-e), proportional system (10)
\  0 M((l-e)0), constant RP
where, again, N=(1-X)X for proportional taxation and N=AXe for the constant RP 
system. The social welfare function of the constant RP system differs from that of 
the proportional system by the constant term (1-X)(1'e) and A (1~e)Q, and by the fact 
that it deals with a mean of order (1-8)0 rather than (1-e), the additional 0 being 
generated by taxation with a constant level of residual progression.
We can then compare the social welfare attained under a purely 
proportional tax system (with the net average tax/benefit rate, A,=7.1%, equal to 
that calculated by our computer model of the 1985 British tax and benefit system) 
with that of a constant RP system. It is possible to identify the value of the 
constant A  in N=AX® for which such social welfare will be equal, given a 
particular pair of (0,e):
A = (1-A) [ l 1^  (ID
6 M((l-e)0)
It is the case that, for equal social welfare and for all e>0, a lower value of 
0 (viz, stronger residual progressivity and redistribution) will yield a higher 
average tax rate t of the constant RP system. In other words, in achieving the
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same level of social welfare as that of a purely proportional system, we can 
augment (or lower) the progressive bite of a constant RP system to make it 
generate more (or less) tax revenues. The difference between the average tax rate 
of a purely proportional system with that of the progressive constant RP system 
for the same "social welfare" and for various 0 will then indicate the potential for 
additional tax revenue which the progressive regime would allow, for a given 
SWF; it represents:
(t -  X) = (1-A ) j _ M(0) g-e/(i-e) ( M( 1-e) V” -0 
M( 1) (,M(0(l-e))J
(12)
It can be seen that such a "RP gain" will equal 0 in the case of 0=2 (no residual 
progressivity) or e=0 (income-utilitarian social welfare function).
Figure 2.1 shows the value t-X of such differences for various inequality 
aversion parameters e and RP values 0.The computations include the gross or 
original income of all the units of our sample and make no allowance for 
differences in needs or unit size and composition. The greater the value of 0, the 
lesser the excess average tax revenues t-X which RP can extort for the same SWF 
as that of a purely proportional system; equivalently, the greater the degree of 
progressiveness (viz, the lower 0), the greater the average tax revenue that can be 
allocated for the same SWF. For a value of e equal to 0.75, a conversion from a 
proportional to a RP progressive system could lead to an additional tax collection 
of up to 47% of gross incomes without a fall in the level of social welfare. We note 
a discrete fall in the value of t-X at 0=0 since all are then assigned an identical net 
income, even those who reported no original income at all.
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Wielding the above tools also allows us to compare the "revenue efficiency" 
of the 1985 tax and benefit system to that of a purely proportional one. More 
precisely, we wish to calculate the percentage gain in state revenue which a 
hypothetical switch from a proportional system to the 1985 system would have 
allowed, given the level of social welfare attained under the proportional regime. 
We thus wish to equate ( l - s ^ N fQ - z ) ,  the adjusted level of the 1985 social 
welfare, to (l-X)(1'e)M(l-e), the social welfare of a proportional system with tax rate 
equal to X. s is the additional proportional tax necessary to equate the level of 
social welfare in the two regimes. M* is the level of social welfare achieved under 
the 1985 tax and benefit rules. The total average tax rate under the "welfare- 
equivalent" 1985 system thus equals l-(l-X)*(l-s) = X+s-Xs. The difference between 
the average tax rates of the two regimes is then X+s-Xs-A, = s(l-X). Solving for the 
value of s that equals the social welfare under the proportional system to that of 
the 1985 regime, we find:
1 - (l-v ' M (l-e) '
1/(1-e)'
Calculating the values of the difference s(l-X) in average tax rates for the 
1985 system and data yields for the 1985 system and data s(l-X)=7.2% for e=0.25, 
s(l-X)=17A% for 6=0.50, and s(l-X)=35.0% for e=0.75. Hence, the application of the 
non-proportional 1985 (as opposed to a proportional one, for the same social 
welfare) can be seen to yield additional (yet only potential) tax revenues ranging 
from 7% to 35% of gross incomes, depending on the choice of e. The greater the 
e, and therefore the more sensitive is the social welfare function to inequalities in
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net incomes, the better is thus the performance of the 1985 system relative to a 
purely proportional one.
We have, up to now, compared the yields of a constant RP system relative 
to that of a proportional one, and the yield of the 1985 tax and benefit system 
compared to a proportional one, for a constant level of SWF in both 
circumstances. We can also compare the "gain" made under the 1985 system to 
that made under an hypothetical constant RP system, w ith varying levels of 0, 
always with reference to the level of social welfare obtained under a proportional 
regime. Looking at Figure 2.1, we search for the value of 0 which would yield a 
similar tax bonus to that of the 1985 system, for a given value of e. If e equals 
0.25, the "yield" of the 1985 regime is comparable to that of a constant RP system 
with 0=0.38; that value drops to 0=0.30, with a consequent increase in residual 
progressivity, if e=0.50. This suggests that, for a SWF more sensitive to inequalities 
in net incomes (greater e), the lower is the equivalent value of 0 (the greater is the 
equivalent value of constant progressivity). For relatively large values of e (such 
as e=0.75 on the figure), the 1985 system dominates all forms of constant RP 
regimes — except that for where 0=0, for which net incomes are identical -- since 
such regimes fail to redistribute sufficiently large amounts to those with very low 
(or no) incomes. More precisely, those with no (recorded) original income in the 
FES do not benefit from any degree of redistribution achieved under N=AXQ since 
N  is always zero when Y=0, except when 0=0 where our computer package 
attaches a value of 1 to X9 for all real X. An immediate lesson from this exercise 
-- which could easily be extended to the consideration of single tax or benefit 
elements, or of various combinations of them -- is thus that trying to approximate
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the degree of overall residual progression of an existing tax and benefit system is 
likely to depend strongly on the choice of the parameter e and on the distribution 
of original incomes.
B- Measures of Global Progressivity and Redistribution
1- Introduction
The way in which we have defined the term "progressivity" up to now is 
not generally sufficient to grasp the extent to which various taxes and transfers 
are redistributive. Contrary to what was assumed in most of the previous analysis, 
income units differ by more than their labour income: their taxable and non- 
taxable non-labour income also vary, and so do their needs and characteristics. 
Income units are also distinguished in ways which the tax and benefit rules make 
relevant: in their ability to elude taxes or their failure to claim entitlements to 
admissible benefits, in their housing decisions, their consumption patterns, their 
employment status, their age and sex, etc... For the net tax and benefit system to 
be progressive for all possible distributions of incomes and characteristics, we 
would need ARP to be positive, RP to be below one, and LP to be above one over 
the domain of all such distributions, a feature which the 1985 tax and benefit 
system obviously does not possess4. To say something on the actual redistributive 
impact, we will now integrate the particular sample distributions of income unit 
differences. To deal with differences in needs across units and to allow for the 
analysis to be made over all individuals (instead of income units), we will use
4 Lambert (1988) analyses the conditions for which a tax or benefit system which 
is locally progressive over the whole range of incomes of separate groups of units 
also decreases income inequality of the combined distribution of such different 
groups.
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throughout the equivalence scale implicit in the 1985 Supplementary Benefit scale 
5. This procedure is disputable but will nevertheless help to focus our attention 
on the points most relevant to our study.
Concentration curves can be defined as6
CY2 = C ipX riZ ))  (14)
They indicate the cumulative total of the first p% of the observations of variable 
Y (expressed as a proportion of the overall sum of Y) when such observations are 
ranked in increasing order of corresponding variable Z=Z(Y). Thus, for a 
continuous distribution of Z, w ith p0 = F(Z), F being the cumulative density 
function of Z and pY the mean of Y, we find that Y(p^=T1(F1(p^) and that
1 p
C ( p ,  r ,  r(Z) )  = —  ■ /  r(Pf) dp0 (15)
0
The ordinary Lorenz curve, LY(p), is a special case of (15) occurring when 
r(Z)=r(Y), i.e., LY(p) = C(p,Y,r(Y)). In particular, the Lorenz curve for a continuous 
distribution of gross incomes X may be usefully seen as
5 Excluding from such a scale the element of supplementary benefit springing 
from the payment of mortgage interest by owner-occupiers. On the use and 
derivation of equivalence scales, see -- for a survey -- Buhman et al. (1988) and 
Coulter et al. (1992).
6 See Mahanalobis (1960) and, more recently, Kakwani (1977a,b). Here we adopt 
part of the notation of Atkinson (1979), p.9.
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1 Pr
Lx Op) = —  • / x (Pa> 4Po 
0
(16)
The Lorenz curve Lx(p) thus shows the percentage of total income X which the 
poorest p% of the population receives. Hence, "the distance L(XrT)(p)-Lx(p) is that 
fraction of total post-tax income shifted from high incomes [the top lOO(l-p) 
percent] to low incomes (the bottom lOOp percent) by the presence of progression 
in the tax" [Lambert (1989), p.179].
To each concentration curve Cyz we may also assign an index IYZ of 
inequality in the distribution of Y, defined as
l YZ = 2  f  [ (p -  C (p,YA Zm  ] dp  = 1 -  2  f  c w  dp (17)
When r(Y)=r(Z), IYZ simply becomes the Gini coefficient:
G y  —  l y y
The Kakwani (1977a) index of progressivity is then defined by
n *  = 2  /  ( Lx -  c TJC )dp = / „  -  Gs (18)
It indicates the size of twice the area between the Lorenz curve for X and the 
concentration curve for T using r(X). We will see later that it enters nicely into the 
decomposition of an overall index of redistribution, the Reynolds-Smolensky 
(1977) index, itself known as
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n" - 2 /  ( c x.w  ~ Lx )dp -  Gx -  Ix_ (19)TJC
and which is a measure of the redistribution of resources from X to X-T. 
shows the value of twice the area between the Lorenz curve for X and the 
concentration curve for X-T. "In the absence of reranking, this is the reduction in 
the Gini coefficient achieved by the tax — a measure of redistributive effect" 
[Lambert (1989), p.180].
2- A General Class of Measures and Indices of Horizontal Inequity
Kakwani(1986,1987) and Pfahler(1987) have shown that n K and n 1^  are 
particular members of a general class of indices of progression and redistribution. 
Using Pfahler's framework but incorporating our notation, this "general class of 
scale invariant aggregate measures of the after-tax redistribution effect (AIR) 
which satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers" [Pfahler(1987), p. 12] is 
obtained from 7
j .
AIR= —  f  [N(F;'(p)) -  (l-g)F^(p)] W(p) dp 
PN 0
where Fz(Z) is the cumulative distribution function of Z and Z=Fz~1(p) is the
7 Where g  is here the average "equivalent tax" rate, that is, the average rate of 
equivalent tax applied to the equivalent income X.
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inverse of such a distribution, and where W(p) is a monotonic weight depending 
on p. AIR is thus a weighted sum of the differences between net income obtained 
from the actual tax and transfer system and net income that would follow from 
a purely proportional system. For weights monotonically decreasing, the more 
redistributive is the tax system, the greater will AIR be. The converse holds true 
for monotonically increasing weights. is a special case of AIR and is obtained 
when W(p)=-2p. 8
The above AIR definition can be rewritten as
1 1
AIR = J -  W [fx (N'\Fn'(p )))] dp fF xl(p) W(p) dp <21>
Pn 0 ^  0
with N'1(N)=X. The weight attached to N=FN1(p) is thus directly dependent upon 
the pre-tax income distribution Fx. Unless [as Pfahler(1987) assumes throughout 
his analysis] Fx(X)=Fn(N(X)), viz, the ranking of pre- and post-tax incomes are 
identical, it can be coherently argued that, for all members which the class AIR 
purports to encompass and which obey the axiom of anonymity in the treatment 
of post-tax incomes, it is not appropriate to weight N  w ith weights that depend 
on the pre-tax cumulative distribution of X.
This is nevertheless w hat happens when the AIR class of measures is used 
in the presence of reranking. AIR will therefore be an inexact index of 
redistribution for all those measures for which it would be more appropriate to 
use W(p) instead of W(FX(N'2( F 2N(p)))) in (21). We can shed further light on the
8 Similarly, the often used Hainsworth-Suits index (see, e.g., Hainsworth(1964)) 
follows from W(p)=-2LX.
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size of the bias introduced. The true redistributive index corresponding to the 
class defined by AIR may be given by 9
AIR* = —  />„*(?) W(p) dp - i - £  fFx (p) W(p) dp 02)
PN 0 *»Af 0
This form of AIR* suggests that it might be helpful to think of the tax 
system as operating a movement from Fx to FN of the cumulative distribution 
rather than a shift of X to N  of the income distribution. Thinking in terms of Fx 
to Fn instead of X to N  leads one to move from a dual definition of AIR* (one 
based on the integration over a probability distribution p) to a primal one (one 
based on the integration over a range of incomes Y). The "primal" analogue of the 
definitions of AIR is
AIR = —  f y  WCF/N ' c m  fpfiY) fY  W(Fx{Yj) fJ Y ) dY <23)
I1# 0 ^  0
Similarly,
AIR' = —  f r  W(F„(Y)) f^Y) dY -^ S - [Y  W(F/Y)) f /Y )  dY 04) 
Pn o Pn  0
A comparison of the primal definitions above thus confirms that AIR* is a more 
natural index of the redistributive shift from X to N; this is because in AIR the
Equation (22) simplifies to (21) when Fn(N(X))=Fx(X), and thus when r(X)=r(N).
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redistributive and implicit welfare weight granted to the post-tax income 
distributive f N(Y) depends on the pre-tax distribution Fx. In fact, this feature 
makes it possible that a tax and benefit system believed to be redistributive (or 
progressive) under the definition AIR may generate a more unequal distribution 
than the original one. A proposal that would, for instance, redistribute income 
(using a simple zero-sum transfer) from an initially richer individual to an initially 
poorer one would be diagnosed, using the AIR  class of measures, as being 
redistributive; if, however, the transfer makes the initially poor individual richer 
after the transfer than the initially richer individual was at the beginning, the 
proposal would, under all reasonable measures of redistribution and income 
inequality, be judged as having made less equally distributed the distribution of 
post-transfer incomes.
It can then be deduced that the bias introduced by the class of measures 
AIR equals
that is, it represents a sum (weighted by N) of the reranking-induced errors in W. 
Equivalently, through an appropriate change of variables, the bias (AIR-AIR*) can 
be conveniently expressed as
withN(p)=FN'1(p)/ X(p)=Fx 1(p). Thus, the greater (in absolute value) the correlation 
between the weights W(p) and the reranking "adjustments" N(Fx 1(p))-N(p)/ the
AIR-AIR* = —  fN(p) -  W(p)] dp
0
(26)
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larger the difference AIR-AIR*.
(AIR-AIR*) will indicate a positive (negative) bias for all monotonically 
decreasing (increasing) weights W(p). In both cases the bias will suggest an 
exaggeration (by an appropriately interpreted index of redistribution AIR) of the 
extent to which redistribution from X to N  has taken place. This bias occurs, for 
instance, for the above 11^ and for the Hainsworth-Suits index, and more 
generally for all those measures for which it is inappropriate to weigh N  with 
weights that depend on the pre-tax cumulative distribution of X. Such systematic 
biases being caused by a failure of the tax and transfer rules to preserve relative 
pre-tax positions, (AIR-AIR*) clearly suggests itself as an index of horizontal 
inequity for the general class of vertical equity measures encompassed by (21).10 
The class of "correct" redistributive indices AIR’ can then be adequately 
interpreted as a sum of "vertical equity" and corresponding "horizontal inequity" 
measures: AIR*= AIR+ (AIR*-AIR).
Horizontal inequity as defined and reranking of income units clearly matter 
as an index of the departure of AIR from a more accurate depiction of the 
redistributive effect of taxes and benefits. They also will matter for other reasons. 
Typical income-utilitarian and individualistic social welfare orderings are typically 
functions of the distribution of final incomes and do not depend on the 
distribution of "pre-tax" or original incomes. This may be a serious omission since 
processes and means, rather than just the ultimate outcome, will generally reveal
10 For a discussion of a wider concept of horizontal inequity, see, for instance, 
Jenkins(1988).
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the desirability of proposed reforms11. Some principles, such as equal taxation 
and equal state support to those units "identical in all relevant respects", should 
not be broken unduly. Similarly, in presenting the results of simulated reforms, 
significant emphasis is usually put on the distribution of absolute and relative 
"gainers" and "losers". Political or social processes may, in fact, prevent the 
occurrence of reforms which cause (or, equivalently, favour the emergence of 
reforms which eliminate) sizeable turbulences in the absolute and relative living 
standards of individuals or groups of individuals. A clear example of such 
"turbulence" will be analysed in subsequent chapters -- the case of incomplete 
take-up of state benefits, by which some in a group of otherwise similar units are 
deterred from claiming or are simply not awarded a state benefit. Reranking of 
individuals and horizontal inequity can also additionally reveal the extent of the 
state's control of and interference in the ways of the free market and in the 
original distribution of income — interference to which many [e.g., Nozick (1974)] 
would strongly object.
It should be noted, however, that AIR* as a measure of redistribution is 
neutral with respect to pure swaps of incomes across the population. Hence, if a 
transformation X to N  were described by the following permutation of incomes 
between individual i and /,
11 King (1983), for instance, introduces a measure of horizontal inequity derived 
from the use of social welfare functions in which the reranking of units features 
explicitly.
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X N
i 10 15
i 15 10
AIR would show a redistributive gain since the grant of £5 to individual i would 
register a "more significant" impact than the reduction of £5 in individual j's 
income. AIR* would nevertheless record no redistributive impact, in such a way 
that the index of the horizontal inequity of changing the income position of i 
versus /  would just equal the redistributive impact recorded by AIR. It can, of 
course, be argued that distributions X and N  are not equivalent in social welfare, 
due to the presence of reranking; when this is so, the sole use of AIR* as an 
indicator of welfare would not be appropriate since it would then generally 
exaggerate the desirability and the effectiveness of the government's redistributive 
plans. In other words, some redistributive programmes might be very effective in 
levelling the distribution of income but, by causing substantial disturbances in the 
reranking and the relative positions of units, may not prove socially acceptable. 
A possibly appropriate index of the desirability of such redistribution, might then 
be:
AIR* + (l-p)*(AIR*-AIR) 
where the first term incorporates the net redistributive gains of proposed or 
existing tax and benefit rules, and where (l-p)*(AIR*-AIR) carries their cost in 
horizontal equity, p, which lies between 0 and 1, indicates the weight of 
redistribution vertical equity (redistribution) relative to that of horizontal equity
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in assessing the desirability of various state programmes. The greater p, the more 
weight to pure redistributional aims and the less concern about the preservation 
of relative income positions. For p close to 0, no tax and benefit system that 
changes the ranking of units would be acceptable.
3- Progression, Redistribution and Horizontal Inequity for the Revnolds- 
Smolenskv Index
We illustrate the analysis of the previous section by developing further the 
particular case of AIR which leads to the indices n K and n 1^  described above.12 
This will then help "explain why the tax system is less progressive than it 
appears" [Atkinson(1979), p.18]. The index of redistribution T P  of equation (19) 
can be further decomposed into
n*5 Gx Ix-TJC ~ ~ + X-T ~ Ix-TJt)
The first parentheses indicate the net redistributive effect from X to X-T as 
measured by the change in the Gini coefficient (vertical equity) and the terms in 
the second set of parentheses display the extent to which the Reynolds-Smolensky 
measure of redistribution is biased upwards by the reranking of households 
between X and X-T (horizontal inequity). The net effect of the terms in this second 
set of parentheses is always positive [since WRS(p)=-2p is monotonically 
decreasing].
We may generalise all of the above indices of redistribution and
12 It should be noted that IIK and n 1^  have all the inconvenience and some of the 
advantages of the widely used Gini index of inequality: among the latter, Pfahler 
[(1987),p.l8] points out that they share "their well-understood and intensively 
investigated descriptive and implicit normative properties."
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progression to the case in which m taxes or benefits Ti (with global average tax 
rate g,) enter the final distribution of net income N. Define N  for each income unit 
as
N = X -  £  Tt (28>
i=l
It follows that
m
(29)iv = M 1 - E ft)i=l
where ]iY is the mean of the distribution of Y. The concentration curves are 
defined as before, viz,
Cv  = C(p, Tt ,r(X)) (30)
with
p
C( p, Tt, riX) ) =—  . /  T f t f  dp0 <31)
&i 0
Then, using the definition of net income N  and equations (29) and (30), we see 
that
p  m
CNJC =  i^ r—  /  -  E  r-)(Po) (32)
^  ( 1 - E f t ) 0
i=1
is the concentration curve for N  with r(X), and thus that
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1 m
m E  &i ^TlyXi=1 (33)
! " E  £i=i
We recall that CNX captures the accurate picture of the after tax (and 
benefit) distribution only if rankings r(X) and r(N) are identical, which is 
implausible given our discussion of the 1985 tax and benefit system. The correct 
redistributional picture, yielded by the switch of the pre-tax Lorenz curve to the 
post-tax one, is given by:
We can analyse total redistribution as given by the above equation by
"departure from proportionality" effects of the set of taxes T;. Further 
decomposition yields for the "departure from proportionality" terms:
(34)
decomposing the terms in the two sets of parentheses into "reranking" and
C -  L (35)
and for the "reranking" terms:
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CNyX (CNtX-Tl CNJ() +^ NJC-Tr Tz CnJ - t) +'”+(C
N X -Y ,^  N J -Y , T(
m _L m-1
1 1 (36)m
= y  r c  * -  c  *-i
U. N*-Y,Tt NJC-YT,
where T0 = 0. LN will always lie strictly below CNX whenever principles of relative 
position maintenance are violated. Because of this, welfare (or equality) 
dominance results based on the comparison of CNX with Lx instead of LN and Lx 
will only yield sufficient conditions for LN to be dominated by Lx and necessary 
conditions for LN to dominate Lx.
We may transform the above results on the disaggregation of concentration 
and Lorenz curves into corresponding inequality indices of the type described 
earlier. Proceeding to the integration of (34) from 0 to 1 and rearranging, we find 
that the change in the Gini coefficient from distribution X to distribution N  is
equal to
G x  ~  g n  -  +
- I  M ) <37)
w - E 1)
Since the Kakwani indices for T, are
(38)
we see that the terms within the first set of square brackets form a sum (weighted 
by g/d-Ig i))  of the m indices of departures from proportionality. The extent to
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which programme i exerts redistributive power (as measured by GX-GN) is thus 
related to its intrinsic progressivity bite (IIK) and to its importance g( relative to 
net income. As put by Kakwani (1977a), this can help "distinguish between the 
effects of changes in average tax rates and in progressivity" (p.71) on the 
redistribution of income. The terms in the second set of brackets sum  to one 
element of the class of horizontal inequity measures (AIR-AIR*). They indicate the 
extent to which separate taxes and benefits may be individually responsible for 
the reranking of family units and individuals and thus exhibit their bearing on the 
overall index of horizontal inequity.
4- Redistribution and the 1985 Tax/Benefit System
(a) Methodological Issues and Inter-Study Comparisons 
Equation (37) above provides a useful basis on which to discuss the global 
redistributive impact of the various programmes discussed in Chapters I and II. 
Applying the methodological tools developed here is not, however, empirically 
straightforward. Defining a proper income base on which to assess the original 
position of units is both quite difficult and highly subjective. In particular, a 
crucial issue in judging horizontal inequity caused by housing subsidies and tax 
concessions lies in being able to define income correctly, allowing, say, for 
owners' imputed rents and for economic subsidies to various tenants13. The 
results obtained here also depend, of course, on the nature of the equivalence 
scale adopted and on many of the modelling assumptions made. Furthermore, 
most of the benefits are categorical and were devised to treat differently people 
who might otherwise appear to the analyst as similar in all observed respects.
13 For such a tighter definition of income, see Hills (1991b).
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Granting retirement pension to those who have paid National Insurance 
Contributions and refusing it to those who have not might, for example, provide 
to the cross-section analyst a misleading case of horizontal inequity; a more 
proper consideration of horizontal inequity would in those circumstances deal 
w ith lifetime redistribution and reranking. Even more fundamentally, there are the 
important questions of whether income reranking is a good index of welfare 
reranking14, and of how units really would behave absolutely and relatively in 
a world of "original" opportunities, with corresponding levels of original incomes. 
Since we have neglected much of all those important issues, the results presented 
here should be considered mostly for illustrative purposes.
There are similarly several reasons for which it is difficult to contrast our 
empirical results on progressivity and redistribution with those reported in 
previous redistributive studies. Lambert and Pfahler (1990) highlight a 
fundamental factor for which such intertemporal and intercommunity 
comparisons are difficult: The perceived progressive and redistributive nature of 
a tax or benefit system typically depends both on the structure of the tax or 
benefit scheme under study and on the pre-tax or pre-benefit distribution. That 
is, identical tax or benefit systems will be attributed a progressive and 
redistributive impact that will vary along with the distribution of original income 
across time and communities. When contrasting the effect of different tax and 
benefit regimes across populations, we therefore cannot straightforwardly tell
14 Jenkins (1988) attempts to circumvent the recurrent difficulty of making welfare 
comparisons across units that may differ substantially in characteristics other than 
original income by focusing on the measurement and aggregation of reranking within 
relatively homogeneous population subgroups.
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whether observed redistributive and progressive differences are due to the nature 
of the regimes or to the varying nature of the pre-tax and pre-benefit 
distributions. Accordingly, conclusions draw n ought typically not to apply to the 
intrinsic progressive or redistributive features of tax and benefit regimes but to 
how much they appear to contribute to redistribution and progressivity on 
particular income distributions.
Apart from this fundamental caveat, there are of course a number of 
methodological and empirical considerations which make inter-study comparisons 
difficult, if not impossible. We illustrate this and previous results by a 
parsimonious reference to a few previous enquiries, both British and international. 
In contrast to our study, Dilnot, Kay and Norris (1984) included in their study of 
tax progressivity in Britain the incidence of most indirect taxes (VAT, excise 
duties, etc...) and looked at the evolution of such progressivity between 1948 and 
1982. They report that tax progressivity rose between 1948 and 1953, fell in the 
years to 1968, and rose again between 1968 and 1982. Their findings, however, are 
based on the simple evaluation of the local measures of progression LP and RP 
at average earnings each year, and cannot therefore be representative of the global 
progressive and redistributive impact of the tax system (benefits are excluded) 
over the years. O'Higgins and Ruggles (1981) distributes all taxes and public 
expenditures in the UK using a 1971 FES sample by making necessary incidence 
assumptions. They then compare their results to those of a previous study of the 
US [Ruggles and O'Higgins (1981)], and conclude that "although the details of tax 
and expenditure programs in the U.S. and the U.K. differ considerably, their 
overall redistributive impact appears to be remarkably similar" (p.322). Their
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study relies on descriptive comparisons of decile groups and various tabulations 
of impacts across large sections of the population and no attempt is made to 
summarise the progressive and redistibutive impact of the tax and benefit system 
in the form of global indices.
Kakwani (1977a) contrasts tax progressivity and redistribution across four 
countries (Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.) and reports that among these 
countries, Britain had both the most progressive and the least redistributive 
personal income tax system. Kakwani uses highly aggregated data and does not 
attempt to account for the impact of varying household sizes and characteristics 
on the distribution and redistribution of equivalent net incomes. Only tax payers 
and income as defined by the tax gathering authorities are relevant to the enquiry, 
and the latest years for which British results are shown are 1966-7. Income tax, 
however, does not redistribute income towards those poor who are not tax payers 
but who form an important segment of the population, and non-taxable income 
is a significant element of original income inequality; the inclusion of either of 
these features would reduce Kakwani's estimated progressivity of the British tax 
system. Such data and methodological differences can thus well explain w hy his 
index value of income tax progressivity for Britain (0.25) is very significantly 
above the one we will find below (-0.10). Norregaard (1990) pushes forward such 
inter-community comparisons by looking at the variation in the progressivity and 
income redistribution of direct taxes (excluding transfers and most forms of social 
security contributions) across a set of OECD countries. Using data provided 
mostly by national tax agencies and focusing on some of the "concentration" or 
global measures described above, he finds that UK direct taxes are more
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progressive than those of Sweden as well as being almost unambiguously more 
progressive and redistributive than those of the US, Germany and France. As for 
Kakwani, however, his definition of income is very limited and the data exclude 
in almost all cases those units who are not tax payers.
(b) Equity and Redistribution in  1985 Britain
With the contributions and the difficulties of these earlier studies in mind, 
we may now present the results of our own enquiry. We grant a random initial 
order to those units with the same initial gross income (this applies almost 
exclusively to those income units with zero recorded gross income). The Gini 
coefficient for the distribution of original (gross) income X then equals 0.489 but 
is "reduced" to 0.479 when the SB equivalence scale is applied to assign resources 
to all individuals, adults and children alike. This feature, typical of studies of this 
kind, is mostly due to the positive correlation of income with the size of the 
income units.
Table 2.4 summarises the contribution to global redistribution of the broad 
groups of state intervention which our computer model encompasses. It therefore 
illustrates the effect of the application of principles of vertical equity upon the 
change in the Gini coefficient predicted by (36). Because the values of Table 2.4 
are not corrected for reranking, they overestimate the extent of redistribution, just 
as other members of the class AIR also would. n x, the Kakwani index of 
progressivity and the one on which we focus here, is equal to the difference 
between the index of inequality in the distribution of some tax or benefit and the 
Gini coefficient of the distribution of gross income, i.e., IT/X-GX• The inequality 
index ITX of the distribution of some progressive or redistributive tax will always
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be lower than the Gini coefficient of the original income (X) distribution, but the 
Gini coefficient of the distribution of a progressive or redistributive benefit will 
exceed Gx15. Because of this, II* for either a tax or a benefit will have possible 
values of between 1-GX=0.521 and -1-GX=-1.479. When II* is assessed for some 
combination of both taxes and benefits, its possible range becomes effectively 
infinite since the concentration curve for such a bundle of both taxes and benefits 
is not bounded in any directions. For instance, the net benefit share of the bottom 
10% of units of some net benefit system will exceed 100% if the subsequent 90% 
of the population are net tax payers.
From Table 2.4, we note that global progressivity, as measured by the value 
of n K (minus the value of II* for transfers), is highest for the FIS and SB 
programmes combined but lowest for the combination of income tax and NIC. 
"Various observed FES benefits" and housing transfers appear quite progressive. 
As indicated above, the II* of the combination of all taxes and benefits is not 
bounded either by 1-GX or by -1-GX since units may be allocated a cumulative 
share of some net taxes or benefits that exceeds 1 or that is negative. Actual 
redistribution (as measured by IIRS) is, however, also related to the size gif which 
makes the group "various benefits" by far the most redistributive, but nevertheless 
leaves income tax and NIC close to the bottom of the redistributive scale, 
contributing as they do to no more than 12% of the fall of 0.208 in the Gini
15 Note that the converse is not true. A Kakwani index of tax (or benefit) 
progressivity for which IT/X<GX (or IT/X>GX) does not necessarily imply a redistribution 
of income as measured by the Gini coefficient of net incomes. Indeed, because of the 
possible reranking of individuals and as noted above, the finding of a n* (or AIR) 
index that appears to suggest progressivity or redistribution may in fact be followed 
by the discovery that net incomes, once appropriately reranked, are in fact less 
equally distributed than in the absence of the tax or benefit.
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coefficient. Housing transfers, w ith an average benefit rate five times smaller than 
the average income tax and NIC rate, manages to generate almost twice the 
vertical equity power of the combined income taxes and National Insurance 
contributions. 16
A proposal that would (unrealistically?) abolish all transfers, leave constant 
the progressivity of income taxation and NIC but decrease their average rate of 
taxation to leave constant the net tax/benefit yield to the state would in fact lead 
to no more than a 0.006 fall in the Gx level. Trying to achieve the model's fall in 
the Gini coefficient by abolishing all transfers bu t instituting a ’basic income" 
scheme (or negative income tax system with a single rate throughout the gross 
income range) would require a uniform tax rate of 43% on all incomes (ignoring 
of course the effects of any behavioural change in, say, labour supply).
Vertical equity in 1985 Britain (as assessed by n RS) is thus mostly a matter 
of the benefit system. Table 2.5 splits the broad elements of Table 2.4 into some 
of their components. Such decomposition shows that, whilst the transfer system 
remains the most potently progressive (with FIS and SB again ranking the highest, 
just above housing benefits), several components of personal income taxation are 
globally regressive. Such is the case of the decrease in the age allowance, the 
composite rate scheme and the independent taxation of spouses' earned incomes. 
When weighted by the average tax/benefit rate, such measures show that (1) 
various observed FES benefits -- including several disability and injury benefits
16 Not attempting to correct for some FES sample irregularities by failing to 
incorporate the varying grossing-up weights introduced earlier changes the results 
very little.
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(2) the National Insurance basic pensions, (3) FIS and SB, and (4) housing 
benefits are all individually more redistributive than personal income taxation. 
NIC and MITR had no overall redistributive effect, as measured of course by the 
Reynolds-Smolensky index. The composite rate scheme described above 
counteracts completely the minor redistributive impact of Supplementary Housing 
Benefits.
How much of the redistribution suggested by Tables 2.4 and 2.5 is in fact 
"undone" by the violation of principles of horizontal inequity? That is, by how 
much does AIR differ from AIR* when we consider the element of the class AIR* 
for which W(p)=-2p? Table 2.6 displays the elements of the second set of brackets 
of equation (37). It indicates the value of IN/X-it as the T's are cumulated along the 
roots of the tree diagram. In parentheses, we indicate the % change in IKX-u as we 
move down one root, measured relative to the total fall in Gx suggested in Table 
2.4 17. The classes of taxes and benefits are as in Table 2.4 :
1= CB+OPB+UNB+BP+various observed FES benefits, among which feature
many disability and injury transfers
II=NIC+income tax, net of MITR
III=FIS+SB, net of housing component
IV=A11 housing dependent benefits
For instance, noting that INX=0.271, we see that adding the class of 
programmes I to X yields INX+I=0.282 and causes an increase of 0.011 towards GN, 
this increase representing 5.3% of the fall of 0.208 predicted by Tables 2.4 and 2.5. 
We first note that horizontal inequity introduces a total bias of 0.018
17 That is, relative to GX-INX =0.208.
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between INN=GN=0.289 and 7NX=0.271. Hence, the reranking of individuals leads 
to an index of horizontal inequity equal to 8.7% of the index value of total vertical 
equity. This amounts to almost the degree of vertical equity exerted by personal 
income taxation and NIC combined, and to the size of the redistribution originally 
effected by CB and OPB.
A closer look at Table 2.6 also reveals that NIC and personal income taxes 
appear to contribute very little to total horizontal inequity, and so to some extent 
do FIS and SB18. The chief culprits of horizontal inequity seem to be those of 
class I (various transfers, including CB, OPB, UNB, BP) and class IV (housing- 
dependent benefits), regardless of the order in which the classes of taxes and 
benefits are combined. This is not surprising, of course, since the class I and IV 
benefits are mostly made of categorical grants, i.e., ones for which the state 
professes to have sufficient independent efficiency or social reasons to make their 
allocation dependent on factors other than the current equivalent incomes of units. 
It is also the case that the class I and IV benefits are those that appear to achieve 
the greatest level of vertical equity, and one would therefore also expect them to 
generate in the process a more considerable degree of horizontal inequity. 
Conclusion
We have, in this chapter, presented tools that may help depict the 
individual effect of taxes and benefits on the level of progressivity, redistribution 
and equity exerted by existing or proposed tax and benefit systems. We 
introduced measures of local progression and showed how we might split total
18 That SB does not appear to rerank individuals would strongly depend on the 
type of equivalence scale adopted.
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progressivity into the contribution of individual tax and benefit elements. Some 
elements are regressive over some ranges of gross incomes, and net income tax 
generally shows a monotonic loss of progressivity. Using a social welfare function 
with a constant degree of "inequality aversion", we are able to provide an estimate 
of the extent to which additional government revenues may be collected by a 
progressive system without a change in the level of social welfare. By such 
standards and for "middle" values of inequality aversion parameters, the relatively 
progressive 1985 system could thus have implicitly yielded revenues of between 
7% and 35% in excess of those generated by a purely proportional system. 
Through a similar procedure, it is also possible to produce parameter values of 
a constant residual progression system that approximates the unequally 
progressive real systems.
We finally turned to measures of global progressivity and redistribution. 
We focused our analysis on a general class of indices of redistribution AIR* which 
obey, among other principles, the axiom of anonymity in the treatment of post-tax 
incomes. We noted how the difference between AIR* and a class of indices of 
vertical equity, AIR, can lead to a class of indices of horizontal inequity. 
Combining indices of true redistribution, AIR*, and indices of horizontal inequity, 
AIR*-AIR, can make it possible to judge the desirability of redistributive plans. 
Choosing an element of the classes AIR* and AIR, we show how the separate 
contribution of taxes and benefits to redistribution and equity may be highlighted. 
An illustration using the 1985 British system reveals that, as expected, benefits 
targeted to the worse off are the most progressive, whereas income taxes and 
social security contributions contribute very little to the total vertical redistribution
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exerted by the tax and benefit system. The reranking of individuals produces an 
index of horizontal inequity equal to about 9% of the index value of total vertical 
equity. Housing benefits and categorical transfers roughly appear to be the main 
causes of such horizontal inequity, although a more definite empirical conclusion 
would require, among other things, a more comprehensive definition of original 
and final income.
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Table 2.1
Progressivity of the Income Tax and of the Global Budget
Constraint
Family of Four, Owner-Occupiers
Gross
incomes
ARP 1 
Y tax
ARP
Net
RP
Y tax
RP
Net
LP
Y tax
LP
Net
40 45.58 641.94 0.85 0 0 -0.64
120 -1.13 9.84 1.01 0.87 0 2 .91
200 8.67 9.30 0.80 0.77 2.37 1.91
280 4.43 4.74 0.85 0.82 1.70 1.52
360 2.68 0.84 0.88 0.96 1.47 1.11
1 ARP is inflated by a factor of 104 in all tables.
I I T
Table 2.2
Elements of Income Tax Progressivity
Family of Four, Owner-Occupiers
X Net Income Tax Elementary Income 
Tax
MITR Composite Rate 
Scheme
a ARP RP LP T TLPI TLP T TLPI TLP T TLPI TLP
40 -0.18 45.58 0.85 0 0 0 0 -8.91 55.7 0 1.62 -10.13 0
80 -0.09 11.40 0.92 0 0 0 0 -8.91 13.9 0 1. 62 -2 . 53 0
120 0.014 -1.13 1.01 0 10.22 17.90 0.33 -8.91 6.19 0 0.31 -25.22 -0.30
160 0. 083 13.55 0.76 3.61 22.21 10.07 0.35 -8.91 3 .48 0 0 0 0
200 0.127 8. 67 0.80 2.37 34.22 6.44 0.36 -8.91 2.22 0 0 0 0
240 0.155 6.02 0.83 1.93 46.20 4.48 0.37 -8.91 1.55 0 0 0 0
280 0.176 4.42 0.85 1.70 58.21 3.29 0.38 -8.91 1.13 0 0 0 0
320 0.192 3.39 0.87 1.57 70.22 2.52 0.38 -8.91 0.87 0 0 0 0
360 0.204 2.68 0.88 1.47 82 .22 1.99 0.39 -8.91 0.69 0 0 0 0
400 0.213 2.17 0.89 1.41 94.85 4.07 0.52 -9.54 -1.9 -0.1 0 0 0
O -
TLPi = Ti LPi / N
TLPli = Ti (LPi - 1) * 104 / X2
Net ARP = X TLPli
Net RP = 1/(1-a) - X TLPi
Table 2.3 
Elements of Net Progressivity 
Family of Four, Renting
X a ARP RP LP Income Tax NIC HB and HBS FIS and SB
TLPI TLP TLPI TLP TLPI TLP TLPI TLP
40 -1.28 568.9 0 -0.78 -1.31 0 0 0 137.1 0 433.1 0.44
80 -0.21 48.12 0.68 -0.79 -0.32 0 4.19 0.07 44.26 0.07 0 0
120 0.06 58.77 0.25 11.90 19.47 0.32 1.86 0.10 37.44 0.41 0 0
160 0.20 12.00 0.76 1.97 10.95 0.37 1.05 0.11 0 0 0 0
200 0.24 7.68 0.80 1.65 . 7.01 0.39 0.67 0.12 0 0 0 0
240 0.26 5.33 0.83 1.49 4.87 0.41 0.47 0.12 0 0 0 0
280 0.28 3.92 0.85 1.39 3.58 0.42 0.34 0.13 0 0 0 0
320 0.29 0.41 0.98 1.05 2.74 0.42 -2.33 0 0 0 0 0
360 0.29 0.32 0.98 1.04 2.16 0.42 -1.84 0 0 0 0 0
400 0.29 0.26 0.99 1.04 1.75 0.42 -1.49 0 0 0 0 0
TLPi = ^  LPi /  N
TLPli = ^  (LPi - 1) * 104 / X2
Net ARP = X TLPli
Net RP = 1/(1-a) - X TLPt
Table 2.4
Kakwani Indices and Redistribution
Main Tax and Benefit Groups 
Varying grossing-up weights
Various
Bene­
fits2
Income 
Tax 
and NIC3
FIS
and
SB4
Housing
Trans­
fers5
All taxes 
and 
Transfers6
rr - 0 . 8 8 6 0 . 0 8 5 - 1 . 3 2 5 - 0 . 6 8 4 2 . 7 7 9
Q i - 0 . 1 3 2 0 . 2 7 5 - 0 . 0 1 7 - 0 . 0 5 6 0 . 0 7 0
g i / d -  
Xgi) *IT
0 . 1 1 9 0 . 0 2 5 0 . 0 2 4 0 . 0 4 1 0 . 2 0 8
2 Include CB, OPB, UNB, BP, and various observed FES 
benefits.
3 Net of MITR.
4 Net of housing-dependent components.
5 Includes MITR and supplementary benefits dependent on 
housing requirements.
6 The Gini coefficient of gross (original) income (using the 
varying grossing-up weights specified in the text) equals 0.479.
Table 2.5
Kakwani Indices and Redistribution
Detail of Tax and Benefit Elements
Varying grossing-up weights
Elementary 
Income Tax
Fall in 
Age 
allowance
MITR Composite 
Rate Scheme
Independent
Taxation
National
Insurance
Contributions
Various
benefits7
IT 0 . 1 1 8 - 0 . 0 6 7 - 0 . 0 0 6 - 0 . 7 5 5 0 . 4 8 8 0 . 0 0 9 - 0 . 8 4 4
STi 0 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 2 4 0 . 0 0 2 - 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 6 5 - 0 . 0 5 3
gi/d-
£gi )  *rr
0 . 0 2 7 0 0 - 0 . 0 0 2 - 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 4 8
CB and 
OPB
Unemploy­
ment
Benefits
Basic
Pension
FIS and 
SB
Housing 
Benefits: 
Rents
Housing 
Benefits: 
Rates
Supplementary
Housing
Benefits
rr -0.539 -0.674 -1.034 -1.314 -1.188 -1.171 -1.109
9i -0.031 -0.002 -0.046 -0.022 -0.019 -0.008 -0.001
gi /(i- 
Sgi) *rr
0.018 0.001 0.051 0.031 0.024 0.010 0.001
7 Various observed FES benefits.
Table 2.6
Horizontal Inequity and the British Tax and Benefit System
Varying grossing-up weights
Gx= 0.479 
IN,x= 0.271
I
0 .282 
(5.3)
II
0.271
( 0 . 0 )
III
0.272
(0.5)
IV
0.274
(1.4)
II III IV
0.284 0.282 0.285 
(1.0) (0.0) (1.4)
IV
0.288
(1.9)
III
0.284
( 0 . 0 )
II
0.284
IV 
0.287 
(2.4)
II 
0.288
I
0.284
(6.3)
( 1 . 0 )
III 
0.287 
( 1 . 0 )
III 
0.284
III
0.272
(0.5)
IV
0.288
(1.9)
IV
0.274
(1.4)
IV
0.274
( 1 . 0 )
I
0.282
(4.8)
(1.4) ( 0 )
I
0.284
(5.8)
I
0.288
III 
0.274 
( 0 . 0 )
II 
0.284
IV
0.287
(2.4)
(6.7) ( 1 . 0 )
II
0.272
( 0 . 0 )
IV
0.274
( 1 . 0 )
I
0.284
IV 
0.274 
( 1 . 0 )
I
0.287
1
I
0.285
(6.3)
(5.8) (6.3)
II 
0.274 
( 0 . 0 )
II 
0.288 
(1.4)
II
0.274
( 0 . 0 )
III 
0.287 
( 1 . 0 )
I
0.288 
(6.7)
III
0.274
( 0 . 0 )
III 
0.274 
( 0 . 0 )
I
0.287 
(6.3)
II
0.274
( 0 . 0 )
III II II
0.289 0.289 0.289
(0.5) (1.0) (1.0)
IV IV III IV
0.289 0.289 0.289 0.289
(2.4) (2.4) (0.5) (2.4)
III
0.289
(0.5)
I
0.289 
(7.2)
IV III 
0.289 0.289 
(2.4) (0.5)
I II I I II
0.289 0.289 0.289 0.289 0.289
(7.2) (1.0) (7.2) (7.2) (1.0)
IV IV II III
0.289 0.289 0.289 0.289
(2.4) (2.4) (1.0) (0.5)
I
0.289 
(7.2) 
III 
0.289
I
0.289 
(7.2) 
II
0.289
(0.5) (1.0)
1= CB+OPB+UNB+BP+various observed FES benefits II=NIC+income tax, net of MITR
III=FIS+SB, net of housing component IV=A11 housing dependent benefits
The table indicates I NiX- i t  where the T t are cumulated down along the tree roots; parentheses show the 
% change in IN<x-zT relative to (GX-IN#X) =0.208, as one moves downwards. G^O.289.
Figure 2.1
Proportional vs constant RP tax/ben system 
For equivalent social welfare
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Chapter III: Understanding the Take-up of State
Benefits
Introduction
There are three major justifications for attempting to further our 
understanding of the take-up of state benefits.
First, the institution of "safety nets" is at the centre of policy discussions, 
especially in the context of the liberalisation of former command economies. As 
Atkinson (1992) points out, these safety nets are usually described as forming 
essential elements of "transition" processes, both in order to reduce the harsh blow 
of liberalisation on the newly poor and unemployed and to maintain the political 
and social will to reform. The nature of such safety nets is, however, rarely 
discussed, and the social and economic effectiveness of state benefits is normally 
taken for granted.
Second, the empirical analysis of the effect of taxes and benefits on the 
microeconomy and, in particular, on households and consumers is now a 
widespread aid of economic policy1. Indeed, it is now unimaginable to consider 
major tax and benefit reforms in most developed economies w ithout detailed 
microsimulation exercises. As we have seen, the general aim of the exercises is to 
convey useful information on the efficacy of government intervention, the 
inferences relying particularly on the use of micro data and on the more or less 
uniform application of alternative sets of tax and benefit regulations across a
1 We have already suggested in the first two chapters some methodological and 
empirical features of such tax and benefit analysis.
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sample. It should, however, be recognised that the government's discretion in 
applying such rules will be limited, on the one hand, by tax evasion and 
avoidance and, on the other hand, by a less than full take-up of state support. The 
risk therefore exists that an unsuspicious tax/benefit analyst will overstate the 
plausible effects of any policy simulation (including the value of indices of tax and 
benefit progressivity and redistribution), for not all targeted agents will in practice 
be as affected by policies as proposals would otherwise intend. That tax and 
benefit policy does not in practice generate the results originally intended can also 
provide clear cases of horizontal inequity, in addition to those measured in the 
previous chapter. Moreover, even if all did receive the intended support and none 
did try to dodge the imposition of taxes, the imperfection of micro data -- in the 
form of errors and biases inherent to the use of micro data -- would still raise the 
issues of the validity and accuracy of the normative and positive observations 
flowing from the tax and benefit analyses.
Third, the intervention of the government always comes at some cost, some 
of which may not easily emerge from the comparative analysis of competing tax 
and benefit proposals. Among the various costs involved figure: the expenses of 
implementing and administering the proposed reforms; the opportunity costs of 
not using resources to other ends (e.g, substituting social security payments for 
the provision of public goods); and the deadweight welfare losses stemming from 
the distortion of prices by all reasonable tax and benefit packages, as reviewed for 
instance by Hausman (1985) in the case of the effect of taxes on the choice of 
labour supply. Less documented than the latter, but probably no less important, 
are the costs willingly incurred by units to avoid the imposition of taxes or to
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avail themselves of the government's support. These latter costs may usefully be 
seen as contracting costs between the government agency wishing to distribute 
help -- in order, say, to maximise a social welfare function or to provide a social 
safety net -- and the population units, about whom  the government agency has 
imperfect information, who face uncertainty of benefit entitlement, and who must 
usually bear at least some of the contracting costs of claiming a state benefit.
We divide our investigation of the take-up of state benefits into two 
chapters. In this one, we present some of the concepts and the possible structure 
of an analysis of the take-up of state benefits. We first review some previous work 
on the topic and we discuss the role of imperfect information and uncertainty in 
the modelling of benefit take-up. We then impose some simplifying assumptions 
to make our analysis more easily implementable, and we consider an application 
to the take-up of Supplementary Benefits in Britain, pondering in the process 
some of the computational challenges.
The second part of our study is presented in Chapter IV and applies the 
work of Chapter III to some Family Expenditure Survey data gathered on the 
take-up of Supplementary Benefits in 1985 Britain. We discuss and model some 
of the suspected deficiencies of such survey data. We also consider the grossing- 
up of our sample and the effect of differential sampling upon the validity of our 
econometric exercise. We then present the results of our estimation over the 
sample, examining in particular the estimated "modelling" and administrative 
entitlement errors and "costs to claiming". An enquiry into the statistics of benefit 
take-up follows.
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A- The Concepts
I -  A Review
Our enquiry is not, of course, the first to consider the determinants and the 
consequences of the imperfect take-up of state support or -- in the American 
terminology -- the less than full rate of participation in welfare programmes. We 
start by reviewing the economic and econometric contributions and weaknesses 
of some of these studies, using these as a preamble to many of the issues that will 
come up in the course of our own enquiry. For instance and except for the 
American investigations, all of the studies reviewed here acknowledged, in  one 
way or another, the empirical difficulties of assessing the apparent failures to 
claim the support to which units are apparently entitled. We begin by reviewing 
quickly some features of studies of benefit take-up in "continental" Europe, then 
note in more detail the econometric contributions (mainly on labour market 
behaviour) of American enquiries on the availability of welfare programmes, and 
finally examine the evolution of and the state of take-up research in the U.K..
Dick (1986) reports a less than 50% take-up rate of German housing 
allowances in the early 1970's. His estimate depends on the combination of data 
from two fairly different sources, one comprising official statistics on aggregate 
receipts of housing allowances, and the other providing sample data on the 
population that are then used to predict the size of the set of those eligible to such 
allowances. A number of approximations are necessary to predict eligibility, and 
grossing-up variations add to the uncertainty surrounding the final value of the 
take-up estimate.
Nyman and Schwarz (1991) report similar data difficulties in assessing the
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take-up of Swedish housing allowances, which they do also by combining 
information from two different data sources. A rather indirect benefit of using 
such complementary data sets is, however, that the temptation of making the 
'relevance' of official receipts dependent on eligibility as computed by the take-up 
analyst is lesser since the eligibility of actual recipients either cannot be assessed 
(only their total number is known) or such eligibility is simply then taken as that 
appraised by the agency responsible for the administration of the state benefit 
(viz, given by the administrative data source). As we will shall see in this and the 
following chapter, this methodological subtlety can make a large difference in the 
nature of the final take-up results and influence greatly the positive and 
normative conclusions reached on the efficiency and efficacy of state support. 
Among other things, Nyman and Schwarz also report that take-up naturally 
seems to increase as the particular benefit becomes better known and better 
accepted.
In a 1989 report the Centre d'Etudes des Revenus et des Couts discusses 
the claims of French widows' pensions and finds that a strong increase in the 
proportion of those in receipt of such pensions could be noted between the 
periods of 7 and 19 months following widowhood. The ultimate widows' pensions 
take-up rate of 84% was computed very carefully on the basis of a special enquiry 
which allowed the inclusion in the sample of the apparently eligible bu t not in 
receipt only those for which a positive entitlement could be established -- for all 
purposes -- as certain. Hence, contrary to the presumption applicable to many of 
the British enquiries reviewed below, this take-up estimate, if anything, probably 
overestimates the actual one. Remaining failures to claim could typically be traced
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to a lack of ready information on claiming conditions and procedures. On 
precisely this, Strauss (1977) finds unsurprisingly "that the availability of 
information on eligibility determination affects participation in a social welfare 
programme" (p.395). He bases his empirical findings on the analysis of the receipts 
of Supplemental Security Income in North Carolina in 1974, for which he runs 
simple linear regressions on total enrolment data of a sample of 100 counties.
Ashenfelter (1983), as for the following American investigations, treats 
"participation" in welfare programmes and labour supply behaviour as jointly 
determined. With the availability, say, of a welfare programme for which 
eligibility requires that earnings fall below a particular level, some units will not 
take up the offer of state support and therefore not change their supply of labour, 
others will "participate" in the programme without having first to become entitled 
to it (and will therefore not necessarily have to change their level of labour market 
earnings), and others will change their labour supply in order to take up the offer 
of state support. One can therefore see that in determining welfare programme 
participation and expenses, labour market behaviour and incentives will matter 
not only for those who would be eligible to the programme in the first place, but 
also for those who would find it suitable to change their labour supply in order 
to receive state support. Using data from the Seattle and Denver Income 
Maintenance Experiments and modelling the presence of participation costs, 
Ashenfelter's results "suggest that differences in participation across negative 
income tax plans are due primarily to differences in program breakevens or 
generosity. Tax rate variations [and thus marginal labour supply incentives] have 
only small additional effects on participation" (p.524). In particular, compensated
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labour supply wage elasticities are found to be statistically insignificant. More 
importantly (and more surprisingly), the receipt of welfare seems not to be 
affected by the presence of costs to claiming welfare or to participating in the 
programme; this, however, is a purely suggestive finding since no test statistics 
on such an hypothesis is provided that can be interpreted unambiguously. It is 
moreover no easier to find a suitable economic interpretation of the error term in 
the Probit estimations: is it that income and entitlement are not measured 
accurately? Are there participating units with income that is apparently too large 
to be consistent with programme eligibility?
The explicit consideration of take-up costs and welfare stigma where 
earnings and programme eligibility are treated as endogenous is also a feature of 
Moffit (1983). The agents' utility function is discounted by the size of the fixed 
and variable (with the benefit level) costs that are incurred with the receipt of 
state support. It follows that, in such a context, "the labour supply response to 
welfare programmes depends upon the stigma of welfare benefits" (p.1024). Using 
observed labour supply behaviour and receipts by lone mothers of the American 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and estimating the value of 
some tax and benefit parameters, Moffit reports values of participation burdens 
that suggest a strong level of fixed cost (or stigma) but estimates a variable 
burden to claiming that is not significantly different from zero. Falls in marginal 
rates of benefit withdrawal would generate some increase in labour supply by 
those already eligible to the programme but they would also encourage a 
substantial fall in hours of work by those who would then wish to become 
entitled to the state's offer of support. Finally, by decreasing the utility value of
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welfare, stigma and other participation costs naturally decrease the labour supply 
disincentives of such welfare programmes.
One of the most elaborate American econometric enquiries on the links 
between labour market behaviour and applications to and receipts of state support 
is that of Halpern and Hausman (1986). They study the choice of applying for 
Disability Insurance (DI) in the U.S. when there is uncertainty about the outcome 
of the application process and when labour supply is also endogenous. There are 
three possibilities: an agent does not find it worthwhile to apply for DI and 
continues working or not working as he used to; an agent applies for and is 
awarded DI (and can then retire); an agent applies for but is not granted DI, and 
m ust subsequently face a lower wage if he then chooses to participate in the 
labour market. Agents base their decision in the maximisation of their expected 
utility. An application for DI is made when the expected utility benefit of a 
successful request outweighs the expected utility cost of the fall in the market 
wage when a DI application is unsuccessful. Their analysis will thus shortly show 
to be conceptually similar to our own. A sophisticated stochastic specification is 
adopted [inspired partly by Burtless and Hausman (1978)] which leads to the 
identification of various distributional parameters through the joint observation 
of labour supply behaviour and application choice (both revealing information on 
the w ork/leisure preferences of agents). Their "estimates indicate that the 
applications decision is a good deal more sensitive to benefit levels than to the 
probability of acceptance" (p. 158), suggesting that the lower wage following an 
application rejection is not a strong deterrent to applying. They do not detect a 
significant empirical presence of fixed costs to applying for DI, although
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application rules and receipt delays clearly suggest that there are ought to be 
some.
Empirical British studies do not unfortunately fare very well in comparison 
to such rather elaborate American work on the take-up of state support. A review 
of British work on the subject, belonging to various social sciences, can be found 
in Craig (1991), who also provides a useful discussion of some of the important 
methodological and conceptual issues inherent to the study of the take-up of state 
benefits. Apart from the scarcity of studies relating the choice of claiming state 
support to labour market participation, British enquiries have also often neglected 
some important methodological issues, the most important of which being 
whether the use of imperfect data to predict eligibility may explain the 
computation of less than full benefit take-up rates.
One of the earliest econometric studies (in the United Kingdom at least) 
appears to be that of Altmann (1981), who maximises a simple logit likelihood 
function of the take-up of SB among male pensioners, using FES data of several 
years (thus making possible a comparison of the results across time). She finds 
that, "contrary to results of all previous studies", "the amount of SB to which one 
is entitled does not influence take-up" (p.19). More recent studies are those of Fry 
and Stark (1987) and Blundell, Fry and Walker (1987). The first one investigates 
the claims of SB, while the second examines the take-up of housing benefits in the 
UK. Fry and Stark (1992) have applied the same framework to monitor the 
evolution of take-up in a period (the late 1980's) in which the British system of 
state benefits underwent some important changes. All studies are based on a 
probit model with one source of randomness. They exclude or provide separate
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analyses for substantial subsamples, such as those of the self-employed and the
pensioners. The likely presence of modelling errors and entitlement discrepancies
is mentioned but it does not feature in the analysis. It is not obvious how to
extend their use of the logarithm of the calculated entitlement level to yield
estimates of the costs that may be involved in taking up a benefit.
Dorsett and Heady (1991) have recently extended the above analysis to try
modelling the interaction between the take-up of benefits, focusing on the link
between the claims of Family Income Supplement and those of Housing Benefits.
The computation by the take-up analyst of entitlement levels to such benefits is,
however, even more uncertain and subject to errors than the assessment of
eligibility to Supplementary Benefits or Income Support (say), although again no
account is taken of the presence of such errors in the derivation of take-up
estimates and determinants. On this, Craig (1991) particularly suggests that a
"priority" for further research should be "the refinement of strategies for
identifying eligible non-recipients" (p.559). This is so since, as he notes,
"Even where calculation of income and eligibility is based on very carefully 
designed research instruments, the divergence between research and 
administrative assessments means that the first cannot be taken at face 
value" (p.560).
As we shall see below, this necessary refinement shall be one of the features of 
our own enquiry.
2- Incomplete Take-up and the Costs of Claiming
Various reasons can thus be given to explain the observed incompleteness 
of the take-up of state benefits. The first one is that the deficiency of claims may 
be simply a consequence of using and computing imperfect data on benefit
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entitlement. Figure 3.1 illustrates this point. There we display an imaginary 
population set for which those receiving a state benefit are indicated by a "c" and 
those not receiving, by a "nc". Two sets of eligibility are shown, the "true" one and 
the "calculated" one. For simplicity, the truly eligible can be for now understood 
as those from whom a benefit request to the government agency would have been 
honoured2. Calculated eligibility is assessed on the basis of an analyst's micro 
data and on his understanding of the benefit regulations. Figure 3.1 shows that 
for both sets of eligibility the number of eligible is 10, and that the true take-up 
rate in this example would equal 100%: everyone of the 10 truly eligible agents 
receives the benefit. An assessment of take-up on the basis of calculated eligibility, 
excluding those not thought to be eligible, would, however, suggest a 70% take-up 
rate. Imperfect data and errors of computations have indirectly led to the rejection 
of three truly entitled units from take-up calculations, and we have wrongly 
included three ineligible units. Alternatively, an aggregate take-up estimate based 
on the number of observed claimants divided by the number of those computed 
to be eligible would be equal to 100%. The take-up rate is thus only 
underestimated if one discards those are in receipt in spite of not being thought 
to be eligible. This suggests that a failure to beware the imperfect use of imperfect 
data may lead to significant biases in the estimation of the efficacy of state 
benefits.
A second factor pu t forward to explain incomplete take-up rates is that 
non-claimants behave irrationally. Alternatively, agents refuse to claim their 
benefit entitlement for social and psychological reasons which apparently fall
2 We will discuss this and related issues in detail later.
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outside the domain of economics. Notwithstanding this, we shall maintain that 
utility theory and rational behaviour alone are perfectly able to explain decisions 
not to claim a state benefit. Information about the application procedure and the 
administration of the state benefit may not be freely and perfectly available. The 
material costs (in time, transportation, correspondence, etc.) of claiming may 
simply outweigh the value of the state support. The perceived non-monetary 
disutility of receiving state support might not be compensated by the size of the 
benefit. This disutility may stem from a sense of personal guilt for being a 
"burden" to society. It may also arise from an analogous loss of pride and self­
esteem, from social stigma, or from the potential revelation to others (e.g., to 
potential employers) of undesirable "signals" and characteristics. There may be 
uncertainty about the value of one's entitlement, which, in the presence of risk 
aversion, could tend to make it less worthwhile to request an uncertain level of 
state support. All this is summarised in the following quote from a report by the 
Supplementary Benefits Commission (1978) taken from Craig (1991, p.543):
"All we can say is that this reluctance to claim appears to come from some 
mixture of pride, ignorance, a sense of stigma, reluctance to make the 
efforts a claim calls for, a desire for self-sufficiency on the part of an 
individual or family, an unwillingness to become involved w ith a 
government agency and a feeling that the whole business is not 
worthwhile."
3- Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Unobservabilitv
There are at least three "participants" appearing in any endeavour to 
analyse the take-up of a state benefit. They are the set of population units (e.g., 
families or households who may or may not receive the benefit), the government 
agency responsible for the administration of the state benefit, and the take-up
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analyst The government institutes a set of rules which establish the true 
entitlement of the population units to some state support. We may or may not 
wish to believe that the government, in establishing these rules, has been able to 
legislate the set of entitlements leading to its preferred social optimum. The units 
then consider whether it is worth their while to request the benefit. The 
government agency has imperfect information on the characteristics of the units 
and therefore on their true entitlement to the benefit. It is also liable to make 
administrative errors. The units have imperfect information and feel uncertain 
both about their entitlement as established by the set of benefit regulations and 
about the ability of the government agency to establish that true (legislated) 
entitlement. Units may also feel uncertain about the "hassle" involved in 
requesting the state benefit. Through forming opinions about each other these first 
two participants thus determine one of the following four outcomes: a successful 
benefit request by a unit, an unsuccessful one, a benefit request that would have 
been successful had it been made (it w as not), and a benefit request that was not 
made and that would not have been granted even if it had been made.
The take-up analyst may not be able to observe separately each of these 
four outcomes; he (or she!) might, for instance, only know whether or not a 
successful claim is registered by a unit. Besides, the analyst does not observe with 
perfection the characteristics of the population units. He cannot assess with 
complete accuracy the costs involved in  requesting a state benefit and he generally 
cannot monitor directly the ex ante private perception of the state benefit. Neither 
can he ascertain exactly the units' true entitlement, nor is it always possible to 
observe the value of the units' benefit entitlement as assessed by the government
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agency.
We now try to characterise these concepts a bit more formally. We define 
B* as the true entitlement of a unit to some state support. B* may not designate the 
socially optimal level of entitlement on which all social policy makers agree, but 
it is by construction the one which the government wishes to establish and which 
it officially publicises. Because of imperfect information on potential state benefit 
recipients and due to administrative errors, the actual level of entitlement as 
assessed by the administrative agency will, however, generally differ from B* and 
will equal
B. = B* + e„ (D8 8
eg is a stochastic error term whose mean does not have to be zero. It subsumes the 
structural and random deviations of Bg from B\ Because of the presence of 
imperfect information and administrative lapses, the evaluation of eligibility based 
on B* may differ from that made on Bg. This will cause what are known as type 
I and II errors on the part of the government agency. A type I error occurs when 
the application of a truly eligible unit is wrongly rejected; the probability of this 
happening, given that a unit is truly entitled, is given by
Type I error: P( Bgz0 | £*>0 )
Conversely, a type II error results when a unit which is not truly entitled 
nevertheless fruitfully requests the state's support. The conditional probability of 
this arising is:
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Type II error: P( B >0 | B*z0 ) (3)
In deciding whether to ask for the benefit, units make their own private 
assessment of the Bg that would be attributed to them if they were to make the 
request. This assessment is described by Bp:
(4)
An important link between Bg and Bp can be expected. It is in the best interest of 
the population units to seek to pinpoint the distribution of Bg as exactly as 
possible, for some given level of search costs. In choosing whether to request the 
benefit, ceteris paribus, a unit will find it desirable to reduce the uncertainty of Bp 
(unless one is a risk lover) and to keep it as closely as possible to the government 
valuation Bg. This will generally control the chance of one's application being 
rejected if a request is made3, the chance of one's application not being made 
when the availability of better information would have made it worthwhile, and 
the chance of an application being made when it was in fact not worthwhile ex 
ante to do so. Ideally, ought to be a constant known to the unit such that it 
makes Bp equal with certainty to the particular Bg that is draw n from the 
distribution of B*+eg. 4
For now, however, we allow for the possibility that private agents may
3 The possibility that a reassessment of Bg be performed if a unit feels that its 
benefit request was unfairly rejected would influence the distribution of Bg but would 
not otherwise affect the discussion here.
4 This is what we shall assume later for the purposes of our empirical 
investigation.
139
have a view Bp of Bg that be very different from the entitlement value assessed by 
the government agency. Units may, for instance, systematically overestimate or 
underestimate the average of Bg/ or exaggerate or not its variability. The 
probability that some type I and II errors (defined above) may result once a 
benefit request is made will influence the wish of the units to seek the state 
benefit, unless of course the units have no previous knowledge or suspicion that 
such faults may occur.
4- Requesting a State Benefit
Our income units are faced with a discrete choice of requesting or not 
requesting a benefit which is offered by the state. We model that choice as a 
problem of maximising expected utility: if the expected utility of requesting the 
state's support is greater than that of not doing so, a unit will choose to ask for 
the benefit, otherwise it will not. The utility function is U(N,Q), where N  is net 
income and Q is "quietness", "tranquillity", or absence of "hassle". If the unit 
chooses to claim, it enjoys utility U(N°+Bpb,Q'-Ep-Ea), w ith Q'-Ep-Ea the "tranquillity" 
enjoyed if a claim is made. If it chooses not to claim, the unit has utility U(N°,Q°) 
with complete certainty. N° and Q° are the levels of net income and "quietness" 
when no state support is requested. Thus Q'-Ep-Ea and Q° differ by the extent to 
which a unit suffers a loss of quietness and tranquillity from the act of claiming 
a state benefit5. B b -- where the b superscript distinguishes perceived benefit
5 The choice of applying or not for state support offers clear similarities w ith the 
decision to evade tax or not, where such evasion generates a probability of detection 
by the state and the payment by the evader of an expected fine. Evasion will this 
occur when the expected utility of "cheating" the government exceeds that of 
remaining perfectly "honest". Empirical and theoretical work on such tax evasion is 
reviewed in Cowell (1990).
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payable Bp from perceived entitlem ent Bp — is defined as follows:
(5)
This says that no perceived benefit, Bp/ is associated with a perceived non-positive
entitlement when the latter is positive. We assume that Q'-Ep-Ea is always lower 
than Q°: net gains in utility from requesting the state's support can only come 
from the grant of a benefit. There may exist positive feelings of "fulfilment of 
duty" or other benevolent sensations in requesting a state benefit, bu t these would 
plausibly never prevail on the negative ones and on the contracting costs of 
making the request. Ep is the level of the loss of Q which units may not know in 
advance of seeking the benefit, reflecting among other things the uncertainty of 
potential claimants about the hassle of the claiming procedures. Finally, Ea, 
although known to the units, is unknown to the take-up analyst and exhibits the 
extent to which there may be unobservable individual "cost" characteristics.
Thus, in deciding whether to seek a state benefit and for a given B* and Ea/ 
a unit must compare the expected utility of a request w ith that of the status quo:
with Bp as defined above and /(ep,£^ being the distribution of ep and Ep as 
assessed by the unit. We characterise the decision to apply for the benefit by D, 
such that, given B* and Ea,
entitlement, and that privately perceived benefit equals privately perceived
/  /  U(Na+Bhp,Q>-Ep-Ei)  dep dEp * tf(N°,<?°) (6)
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(D\B*yEc)=l, i / f f  U(N° +Bp,Q'-Ep-EJflepJZp\eaJLJ depdEp >U(N°,Q°)
E p * r
(D\B*,Ea)=0, otherwise
(7)
Neither B* nor Ea is directly observable. Indirect information on B* can,
however, be gathered by the analyst by computing Ba w ith
(8)
ea shows the discrepancy between the analyst's appraisal of units' entitlement and 
the true measure B*. Such errors will stem from sampling defects (e.g., incomplete 
data, presence of measurement and reporting errors), from faults in using the 
sample data, from changing family circumstances between the period of a benefit 
request and that of the survey, and from other inaccuracies in the assignment by 
our computer model of benefit entitlement.
One of the other likely constraints to the analyst is that, besides not being 
able to observe B* and Ea directly, he is only aware of the records of successful 
claims. We denote the grant of a benefit to an applicant unit by A, such that A - l  
if eligibility is granted (Bg>0) by the government agency, and A=0 otherwise. For 
a receipt to be recorded, we must then have:
(D=l)fXA=l) (9)
Given B* and Ea/ the probability of such a receipt is:
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« o-i n« i «•*, - ^  »»
1 l o, (D |n * jy = o
Hence, the record of rather few receipts of a state benefit can be due to two 
factors. Firstly, units may consider it not worthwhile to request the benefit. They 
may, for instance, have an overly dismal view of the offer of state support, they 
may face large inconveniences to claiming, or they may be strongly risk averse in 
the presence of entitlement uncertainty. Secondly, those requesting the benefit 
may not be deemed (wrongly or rightly) to be eligible by the government 
agency6. In the absence of inconveniences to seeking the benefit, the closer to and 
the less variable around Bg Bp is, the better the match between benefit requests and 
successful receipts.
Were one of the government's aims be to increase the rate of take-up 
without changing the entitlement rules or the administration of the benefit, the 
only option left would then be to maximise the number of valid (to the agency) 
applicants. This could be achieved in two ways. Costs to claiming might first be 
decreased. Second, the government could generate a more positive perception 
among the units of the benefit's generosity, though an unreasonably positive view 
would distort the units' decision, would decrease their expected welfare, would 
result in an overly high level of application rejections, and would probably not be 
sustainable for very long. It must also be said that regardless of benefit 
expectations and as long as B is not perfectly known ex ante to the units, there
6 Another factor, which will pop up later, may be that units sometimes fail to
report faithfully to an interviewer their receipt of a state benefit.
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will always exist some units seeking the benefit whose application is rejected by 
the agency, as well as others who do not make a request but who would 
nonetheless be deemed eligible. This is in addition to the presence of the type I 
and II errors discussed previously, which concern the position of Bg around the 
true level of entitlement B*.
Understanding the take-up of state benefit then raises the econometric 
problem of evaluating the probability that a unit successfully claims the benefit 
when Ea and B* are not directly observable, but when only Ba=B*+ea is known (i.e., 
can be calculated). That probability can be expressed as:
with B* = Bn -  ea a
As mentioned previously, to be in receipt of a state benefit involves the passing 
of a "double hurdle". First, a unit m ust consider it worthwhile to seek the state's 
support and, second, the requesting unit m ust also be deemed eligible by the 
government agency. Equation (11) simply computes the expected value — over the 
unobservable Ea and efl -- of the probability that such a double hurdle is 
successfully passed, given the value of the parameters of the model and that of 
the analyst's calculation of entitlement, Ba.
Even in the context of this general model of the take-up of state benefits, 
it must be said that a few analytical simplifications have already implicitly and 
inevitably appeared. The only decision modelled in this discussion is that of 
requesting a state benefit or not. We have ignored, for example, the potentially
P(successful claim) = J  f  P( D=1 f\ A=1 \ B*yEa ) ftea,Ea) dea dEt
(11)
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interesting links of the likelihood to take up a state benefit with the choice of 
one's labour supply or savings. It is in principle plausible that the unobservable 
distribution of inconveniences from claiming be not independent of the stochastic 
variation in labour supply and original incomes and thus of potential state benefit 
recipients, since state benefits are often means-tested. An agent who might be 
more likely to work or to save in excess of what his observable characteristics 
might predict might also face unusually large costs to taking up government 
support.
B- An Applied Structure
1- A Simplified Model
There are two major problems with the econometric model as developed 
up to now. The first one, a parameter identification problem, will remain partly 
with us throughout the following empirical application. A close look at equation 
(11) reveals that it is not easy to discern statistically the presence of ea from that 
of ep/ and the role of efl from that of eg, from the pure observations of receipts and 
non-receipts of state benefits. This is mostly because we are not able to observe 
B* directly and thus cannot ascertain independently the extent of the presence of 
the analyst's own errors in measuring the units' entitlement. Hence, it is difficult 
to determine whether variations of Bg from Ba are due to variations in ep or efl. 
When possible, a discrimination of the presence of efl from that of ep will rely 
rather heavily on the specification and nonlinearity of the functional form of the 
utility function. Similarly, Ea and Ep are not easily statistically distinguishable from 
each other, and, when distinguishable, the estimated relative parameters of their 
distribution will depend largely on the specification of the utility function.
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The second problem with the present model has to do w ith the 
computational difficulty of handling (11) as a basic equation for empirical work. 
Equation (11) involves the computation of the level of expected utility over the 
range of two stochastic variables, Ep and ep, in order to determine (D /B*,Ea); what 
is more, we ought to do this for the whole ranges of Ea and efl. In simplifying our 
model we will focus our attention on the identification of "modelling errors" in 
assessing the level of family units' entitlement to state support, while neglecting 
uncertainty of entitlement and of costs to claiming on the part of units. An 
important feature of the present study will then be to recognise explicitly the 
presence of modelling inaccuracies in the calculation of the value of some 
economic variables of interest, and to appraise the role which these errors may 
have in normative and positive analyses. Hence, we shall make three 
simplifications, trying at each stage to discuss their implications.
(a) E n title m e n t C e rta in ty
We first impose the strong restriction that units know Bgh — where, again, 
the superscript b denotes the value of benefit payable by the government and is 
defined similarly to Bpb — with certainty before deciding whether it is worthwhile 
to request the state benefit. To achieve this, units will plausibly need some 
awareness of the benefit regulations, a knowledge of the experience of other 
applicants, and an understanding of the characteristics they could successfully 
convey to the agency in the event of a benefit request. By this assumption we do 
not imply that the population units can separately identify B* and eg: we only 
assume that the level of benefit that would be granted to a unit by the 
government agency can be reasonably well assessed, ex ante, by the relevant unit.
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This also indicates that, even if units know Bg in advance, they may not be able 
to suspect whether a type I or II error is made in the evaluation of their eligibility 
to the benefit. Concern about the true level of entitlement B* -- as opposed to 
concern about Bg only — is directly relevant solely to the government agency and 
to the take-up analyst (and to social policy makers).
In our notation, assumption (a) says that e=Ep and, furthermore, that there 
is no uncertainty about Bph. Because of this ep and ea are now observationally 
equivalent, and we can define and work with e, where e=ep-efl (=eg-sj. We call e 
a "modelling error" or "entitlement discrepancy", that is, it embodies the difference 
between entitlement as assessed by the government agency and that as appraised 
by the analyst: e=Bg-Ba. We also note that in these circumstances B*+ep= B*+eg= B -  
£„+£*= B„+e.
This assumption also automatically removes the second hurdle of the 
claiming procedure, since anyone choosing to seek a benefit will do so only if he 
knows that Bg>0. That is, all those finding it reasonably profitable to make a 
benefit application will be granted eligibility by the government agency: whenever 
D=l, we have A=l. Since, in reality, not everyone who requests a state benefit is 
conceded eligibility, making this assumption will tend to attribute to high costs 
and low perceived entitlement Bp too much of the weight for not receiving a state 
benefit. Thus, ceteris paribus, our estimates may tend to undervalue the perceived 
level of entitlement and overvalue the real costs of having made a request for 
successful claimants.
Not allowing for application refusals may not, however, overestimate the 
level of aggregate costs incurred in the benefit application process since in
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estimating such aggregate deadweight costs the analyst also ought to account for 
the costs incurred by those who make a request but are judged ineligible. In other 
words, the aggregate inconvenience caused by the claiming process m ust be the 
sum of the inconvenience experienced both by those who have requested the 
benefit successfully and by those who have been refused it. Our "entitlement 
certainty" assumption may overestimate the former inconvenience but it neglects 
the latter, and we thus cannot tell here whether it leads to an important bias in 
the estimation of the burden created by the benefit application process.
Assumption (a) has at least one other effect, which tends to counteract the 
bias just outlined. In the absence of overly strong risk aversion, and other things 
being the same, feeling uncertain about the value of Bg tends to yield an expected 
monetary benefit to claiming that is larger than the benefit one would enjoy from 
the certainty of the mean value of entitlement. This is because if negative values 
of Bg were to arise in the application process a unit would only derive a zero, non­
negative, benefit Bg (thus acting analogously to an insurance contract), but there 
are no such limits on the upper value of the benefit Bg payable for positive 
entitlements. This therefore yields an expected benefit to claiming larger than that 
which would be obtained from using w ith certainty the expected level of 
entitlement. Because, in our applied econometric analysis, we neglect uncertainty 
of entitlement on the part of the units and therefore underestimate the 
corresponding expected benefit to seeking a state benefit, our parameter estimates 
will, ceteris paribus, tend to overestimate the average Bg and underestimate the 
true cost of requesting a state benefit.
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(b) Cost Certainty
Ep is known ex ante to the units but remains unobservable to the analyst. 
Thus, units are presumed to know well beforehand the inconvenience they would 
incur from seeking the state's support. Because of assumption (b), Ea and Ep 
become observationally equivalent and we may define E such that E=Ea+Ep. The 
combination of assumptions (a) and (b) removes all uncertainty in the choice of 
units to request or not the state benefit. It does not, however, alleviate the 
imperfection of information which the analyst has on the characteristics of the 
units and on the agency's rating of entitlement.
Assumptions (a) and (b) considerably reduce the burden of evaluating the 
probability that a unit is observed to receive a benefit. Assessing this probability 
now reduces to cumulating the density of e and E along the range of e and £ over 
which a unit finds that the certain utility from requesting the benefit exceeds that 
of not requesting it. The conditional probability of observing a receipt, given Bg 7 
and E, becomes:
P(D-irU-l\B',E>=P(D=1  |V D  = (  *  U(.N°+b!,Q'-E) > t/(iV»,Q») (12)
8 8 [ 0, otherwise
with:
7 We switch to the conditional probability given Bg instead of B* since the 
observational equivalence of efl and renders it impossible to say anything on B* — 
unless we are to make the special assumptions that either ea or eg is equal to zero, as 
we shall do for some illustrative purposes later.
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„» r-  nN = /°*  (= B “+e) S°
* l " p> “ » /« , (= Ba+e) >0
(13)
(c) Linear Utility Function
We finally work with a linear approximation of the general utility function 
U(N,Q). Although not essential, this approximation is computationally useful, and 
the adoption of more elaborate specifications of U could quickly render the 
computational process impracticable. Calling UN and UQ the first-order derivatives 
of U w ith respect to N  and Q, choosing to request the state benefit given Bg and 
E then reduces to verifying that:
UKi N ° ^ - N ° )  + Uq<Q'-E-QP) = UNB bg * U ^ Q '-E -Q h  >0
. (14) 
or Bg > [ Xa + E ], with Xa = ~ ^ iQ °  -  Q )
where we have redefined £ as Uq/Un9E. It is this inequality which will underlie 
much of our econometric analysis. In the square brackets is the monetary 
equivalent of the loss in utility — or the informational, transactional, psychological 
or other costs, expressed in the same unit as Bgb — induced by the act of 
requesting the benefit. We denote the non-negative (monetary equivalent) costs 
to claiming by Xa+£, where X is a vector of income unit characteristics, a  is a 
vector of parameters conformable w ith X, and £ represents any unobservable 
individual cost components.
This linearisation of the utility function prevents, among other things, a 
structural estimation of risk aversion in the form of the utility function, although 
the presence of risk aversion will influence the level of reduced-form cost
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parameters. That is, if the linearisation does not approximate well the true utility 
function, lig/lZN will vary over Q and N  and this will then affect the estimated 
value of a.
We may now summarise the formalisation of the simplified model we shall 
adopt for our empirical investigation. The combination of our three assumptions 
reduces the computation of the probability of a receipt to:
Thus, the probability of a successful claim being registered equals the cumulative 
distribution over the ranges of e and E of the event that the state benefit exceeds 
the claiming cost, when the cost to claiming varies with E and when Bg is Ba+e. 
In other words, P(successful receipt observed) is the probability that the net benefit 
to requesting a state benefit be non-negative, given that the analyst cannot observe 
with perfect accuracy the level of benefit to which a unit is entitled, and given 
that it is not possible either to use observable characteristics to measure with 
certainty the degree of inconvenience Xa+E incurred in seeking state support.
Figure 3.2 can help further our understanding of the structure of the 
simplified model which we intend to develop and apply in this and the next 
chapter. On the horizontal axis we feature the size of the cost of claiming the state 
benefit, which we can assess up to a stochastic and unobservable term E. On the 
vertical axis, we find the size of the entitlement, which is determined up to a 
stochastic term e; above the horizontal axis, the value of the benefit is positive and
P(successful receipt observed) = J  J(D \ BgyE)f{E,e) de dE
E e (15)
l,ifB°>Xa+E 
0, otherwise
where (D \Bg,E)
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equals the value of entitlement, but below it no benefit is payable for the unit is 
then not deemed entitled to receive the particular state support. Area A of Figure 
3.2 denotes the region of the cost and entitlement space where a unit will choose 
to claim: the unit is then positively entitled to the state's support and the size of 
the benefit exceeds the level of the costs to claiming it. Hence, the likelihood that 
a claim will be made will equal the likelihood that the unit finds itself in area A 
rather than in area B (where costs exceed the value of the benefit) or C (where the 
unit is not entitled):
P(successful receipt) = P(A)/[P(A)+P(B)+P(C)]
This is equivalent to the previous equation. Conversely, the probability that no 
benefit receipt will be recorded equals the sum of the probability that the unit 
does not find it worthwhile to make a benefit application (region B) or that it is 
not deemed to be eligible (area C). Thus,
P(no successful receipt) = [P(B)+P(C)]/[P(A)+P(B)+P(C)]
(d) The Simplified M odel and the Previous Studies 
The derivation of the above model has demanded considerable analytical 
simplifications, but these have to be seen in the context of the much stronger 
restrictions implicit in the preceding empirical work. It is for this reason that we 
pause for a moment to reexamine briefly some of the analytical features of 
previous inquiries on the take-up of state benefits, particularly for those British 
studies reviewed above.
In all these studies, those not calculated or m odelled to be eligible to the 
benefit are simply omitted from the investigation. Ignoring these observations in 
our econometric model would, in general, thwart a proper incorporation of
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entitlement as a determinant of the net benefit to taking up and, in particular, 
make it difficult to incorporate soundly the presence of errors of modelling, both 
random  and systematic. This is because deleting from our sample all observations 
for which (calculated) entitlement is non-positive would censor those units for 
whom entitlement is more likely to have been overestimated, potentially 
generating well-known biases in the resulting parameter estimates of the 
distribution of e. As importantly, this sample truncation plausibly generates biased 
evidence on the probabilities of claiming a state benefit. Removing from the 
sample those not calculated to be eligible to receive state support would -- in the 
presence of purely random modelling errors e8 -- bias upwards the estimate of 
the costs involved in taking up and bias downwards the individual probability 
of claiming. Furthermore, even if no random errors of modelling were made in 
the process of calculating entitlement, biases on the cost estimates would of course 
still occur in the presence of systematic biases in measuring entitlement, or, for 
that matter, when a failure to account for features that affect the likelihood of 
observing a claim — such as units' confusion of benefits — can impart a spurious 
effect to costs characteristics.
2- Identifying Modelling Errors
The recognition of modelling errors is probably of importance in all areas 
of applied economic analysis, but it is particularly so in the use of micro survey 
data for which systematic as well as random measurement errors are suspected. 
A main issue is whether we can identify the empirical importance of such errors
8 That is, e has mean zero.
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without resorting to the use of information gathered in other surveys, surveys 
which incidentally may also suffer from similar defects. The analysis presented 
below suggests that we can, as long as there exists an assessable relationship 
between the economic variable subject to measurement errors and some other data 
(from the survey) for which such errors are either unlikely or are of negligible 
magnitude.
Take a variable y, sampled accurately, which is a function /(z+e) of z+e, 
where e is an error in measuring the "true" z. An obvious case in which e is 
clearly identifiable is w h e n /is  both fully observed and bijective, viz, when there 
exists a known one-to-one relationship between z+e and y. e can then be found for 
every observation of y  and z. Even i f / i s  not bijective (e.g., y  is a binary variable 
taking values of 0 and 1 for respective ranges of z+e and therefore there does not 
exist a one-to-one relationship between z+e and y) we will normally be able to 
identify at least some of the parameters of the distribution of e. If the functional 
relationship between z and y  is unknown or depends on unobserved parameters, 
then less information on the distribution of e may generally be gathered.
y  may, of course, also depend upon other observed factors X or additional 
random terms such as E, yielding the relationship:
y = flz+e  , X , E) <1 6 >
In some instances it may yet be possible to segregate the individual effects of z+e, 
X and E, and thus to identify at least some of the parameters of the separate 
distributions of e and E.
The identification problem which will occupy us here relates the claims of
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state benefits reported in a survey to an analyst's calculated distribution of 
entitlement. The two variables are clearly related and there is a suspicion that, on 
the one hand, entitlement data (based, for instance, on weekly household incomes) 
may exhibit various sampling inaccuracies, while, on the other hand, the report 
of whether an income unit has successfully claimed a state benefit would not be 
subject to substantial errors.9
As already seen, there is, however, a complication that turns out to yield 
additional benefits: the take-up of a state benefit also depends on the various 
inconveniences associated with the act of claiming. Some of these "costs" will 
depend on observed socio-economic characteristics X, but others will be strictly 
non-observable, that is, they may be subsumed under an additional random  term 
E. The imperfectly (because of e) observable value of entitlement determines 
whether a unit is at all entitled to a state benefit; if so entitled, the imperfectly 
observable value of claiming costs then resolves whether it is profitable for the 
unit to request the available benefit. We shall see even more clearly later that 
because e and E have such crucially different effects on the likelihood of observing 
a particular value of y, we will be able to identify the relative parameters of their 
distribution.
C- An Application to the Take-up of Supplementary Benefits in
9 Note that we shall not consider the am ount (although, for our empirical 
application, it happens to be available in our survey data) of the state benefit receipt, 
which would not necessarily be more accurate than our calculations of entitlement, 
but simply the (0,1) report of whether a state benefit was taken up. As we shall see 
later on, however, even this (0,1) variable may be subject to survey errors.
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Britain
1-  Derivation of the Model
Our computer model of the 1985 British tax and benefit10 system allows 
us to compute for each unit of a sample of Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 
income units a level of entitlement to various state benefits. We choose to apply 
our analysis to the claims of Supplementary Benefit (SB)11. This is the 
programme most directed to the non-working poor. The size of the benefit 
depends on whether the recipients are deemed to be entitled to long-term (for 
people above the age of 59 or for those disabled in specified ways) or short-term 
requirements, and on the characteristics of the income unit. Additional 
requirements (and thus greater SB benefits) are also granted to those w ith housing 
requirements not covered by Housing Benefits and they strictly cover the 
mortgage costs incurred by the poorer owner-occupiers. The level of a unit's 
entitlement to SB then equals its level of requirements minus an assessed amount 
of resources or income, which, as the SB rules specify, is net of the basic pensions 
and unemployment benefits received and of the National Insurance Contributions 
and income taxes paid. Units w ith savings and capital in excess of £3000 or in 
full-time work cannot qualify. The benefit is payable for as long as the eligibility
10 See Chapter I.
11 The Supplementary Benefits scheme was replaced in 1988 by a new Income 
Support programme (see Appendix B). The entitlement and paym ent rules were 
somewhat simplified, and standards common to the administration of Family Credit 
(which replaced Family Income Supplement) and Housing Benefits were established 
regarding capital and income limits. The calculation of rates (or "requirements" in 
1985) was also eased. Notwithstanding these changes, the structure of Income 
Support remains broadly that of SB, and the results presented here are therefore still 
relevant to UK policy.
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conditions are fulfilled and changes in circumstances must, in principle, be 
notified to the government agency.
Thus, Ba shall be the calculated entitlement to supplementary benefits 
calculated by our computer model of the 1985 British tax and benefit system. This 
assessed benefit entitlement will be negative for those income units, say, reporting 
relatively large non-labour and labour income. This degree of entitlement may 
not, however, correspond to that as appraised by the government agency (Bg) such 
that errors of various sorts will lead to a divergence e between Ba and Bg:
w ith pj set to 1 later in the estimation process. Actual benefits payable Bgb are as 
follows:
We follow the suggestion of Atkinson (1989) and model explicitly the 
interdependence that may exist between one's entitlements to various benefits. A 
recipient of SB would receive Housing Benefits (HB) at the level of a "certified 
claimant", while those not in receipt of SB would be entitled to a generally lower 
level of HB, viz, that of a "standard claimant". We call BHCS the non-negative 
difference between these two HB levels. We may then integrate the impact of the 
decision to claim SB upon the level of HB payable. In estimating the parameters 
of our model we will construct an index p2 of whether units, in  choosing to take 
up SB, make their choice taking as unambivalent their accrued HB level. p2BHCS
B g  =  B < fii + e
(17)
(18)
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will accordingly represent the perceived increased housing payment from which 
a potential SB recipient will benefit by claiming his positive supplementary benefit 
entitlement12.
Keeping in mind that claiming a benefit also involves non-negative costs 
(Xa+E, which we may consider as being the average weekly costs of requesting 
and being in receipt of SB) we may now define "net benefit" NB as the 
supplementary benefit's net value to a unit thinking about requesting it:
Net benefit=NB =
-Xa -  E, i f  Ba-pj + e<0 
-Xa -  E + 5 a P1 + P^H CS  + e, i f  Ba'px + e^O
(19)
An income unit will claim the benefit if its net value, given in the above equation, 
is positive.
Hence, respectively grouping those income units observed to claim and not 
to claim into the sets C and NC, we note that the log-likelihood function In L of 
the vector of independently13 sampled observed decisions D to claim or not to 
claim is given by
In L(D;parameters) = In Pr(NB >0) + In Pr(NB ^0) (20)
c NC
To develop further this log-likelihood function we wish to specify the 
working distributions of e and E and to derive that of NB. We assume that e has
12 We measure the value of BHCS at the point at which entitlement to SB is 
calculated to end.
13 For an evaluation of this explicit "independence" assumption, see the discussion 
below.
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a normal distribution/e with mean ]iz and variance Ge2, and that E has a truncated 
(from below, at -Xa, such that costs Xa+E are always non-negative) normal 
distribution/E w ith untruncated zero mean and variance aE2. E and e are assumed 
to be independently distributed./eNB is the joint p.d.f. of NB and e: the distribution 
of NB is truncated upwards from Bg +$2BHCS, viz, NB can never exceed 
Bgb+$2BHCS for costs are non-negative.
We can integrate for each observation over the entire range of possible 
modelling errors e and over the appropriate set of net benefits NB to yield the 
likelihood function of our sample:
-  o
In L = £  In f f  dNB de + £  In f  f  f^J.eJfB) dNB de <21>
C -ooO iVC
To obtain the explicit form o f/eNB(e,NB) we perform a transformation of the joint 
p .d .f./e/E(e,E):14
1
$
<t>
O-\  E J
E A , E>-Xa
(22)
0, elsewhere
Hence, keeping in mind the definition of NB and through appropriate 
substitution, we find that the p.d.f. f G/NB(E'NB) is defined by
14 $(•) and <!>(•) are the probability and cumulative density functions of the 
standard normal distributions; <()(•,■-;p) and 0(-,*;p) are analogous for the standard 
bivariate normal distribution with correlation coefficient p.
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CTe°*
4>
t e-p, ^
f  eJfB ~
0,
V ° e  /
4>
(NB+Xa) if g < -BaPv NBzO
(X a\
a e°N B
■*
i / e  < -Bapj,A^>0
f e -^c NB+Xa-K_ )
„ » „ »Pe^B
(23)
'JVB
0,
,if  ez-B aPv NBzK+e-\Lf
if e^-B{f i v NB>K+e-\Lt
with
/ 2 2 Og G E
K  = 5a’Pl + Pe + &2^HCS (24)
Pe'A* ONB
It is possible to check that f eNB(e,NB) is an appropriate p.d.f. by confirming 
that its integration over its whole domain equals 1. For values of e<-Bap2 SB are 
always zero and the net benefit to a request is both negative and independent of 
the error e made in modelling the unit's entitlement: the bivariate distribution can 
then be expressed as a product of univariate normals. For values of e above 
modelling errors e do affect and are therefore correlated with net benefit NB, 
which can be no greater than Bgb+p2BHCS.
After substituting (23) in (21), the log-likelihood function In L becomes:
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- £  ]n® * a
CJiC ^ ° e ,
(«)
e~K  NB+Xa-K
-*Jh  — < « l  \  «
e“Pe NB+Xa-K
NB+Xa
'*  P . j o r  d e  ( iv )
dA® de
/
! PeJVB ^  d e  ( “ )
(i«0
(25)
The areas of integration corresponding to the (lower case) roman numbers 
are shown on Figure 3.3. On the vertical axis is plotted the value of entitlement 
as assessed by the government agency: Ba$1+E=Bg. This is equivalent to Figure 3.2, 
which we have already discussed, w ith the following differences:
(1) on the horizontal axis we plot instead of Xa+E the value of NB, which 
is the derived random variable that appears in the final likelihood function 
and whose appearance simplifies the interpretation and the analytical 
derivation of In L;
(2) we include in Figure 3.3 the impact of f^ETCS, which adds to the 
likelihood that a unit will find it worthwhile to request SB when it finds 
itself entitled to it.
On the horizontal axis of Figure 3.3 we thus show the level of net benefit NB 
enjoyed from the receipt of SB. Since net benefit NB cannot exceed the level of 
benefit eligibility Bg/ plus BHCS*$2 — an allowance for the level of benefits 
dependent on eligibility to SB -- we w ould not observe units in the shadowed area 
and the terms in (i) account for this truncation. The (ii) summation sign 
encompasses the truncated log-likelihood that one w ith a non-negative entitlement
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Bg to SB will take up the benefit despite the presence of burdens to claiming. The 
area of (ii) is limited on the left by the vertical line above NB=0 — at which point 
a unit would be indifferent between claiming and not claiming a benefit whose 
value Bg would be exactly cancelled by the burden of requesting it. (ii) is also 
limited on the right by the maximum value of NB which may flow from a grant 
of Bg, that is, by Bg+BHCS*$2. The (iii) and (iv) terms account for the likelihood 
of not choosing to request the state benefit, (iii) shows the area in which a non­
positive agency entitlement Bg necessarily leads to a non-positive net benefit to a 
SB request; (iv) indicates the region for which a positive agency entitlement is 
nevertheless outweighed by costs to claiming and for which NB is thus negative.
The computational and analytical difficulty of Ln L varies with its terms. 
The (i) elements are straightforward: they account for the truncation from below 
of the normal distribution of claiming costs, such that these be negative with 
probability zero. The elements (iii) lead to a direct integration of the respective 
univariate density functions and therefore cause no numerical optimisation 
problem: over the domain for which e is smaller than -Bap2, errors of modelling 
e and net benefits NB are indeed independent since Bg is then always zero. 
Calling OeNB the bivariate cumulative distribution function of e and NB and 
omitting the correlation coefficient peNB, we find that the (iv) elements, which 
account for the presence of a negative net benefit when a positive SB entitlement 
is observed, simplify to:
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-S„Pl
NB+Xa-K
= ®
a « 'NB
dWBde
(26)
Xa-ATl
MB
'mb y
<&e,MB
'MB
The most difficult to disentangle are the (ii) terms, of which (iv) is simply 
a special and easier case. Splitting the domain of integration, we find:
Ec
«  K+e-\i f
/ / - ! — *
-*aPl -  ° eCTj
0
NB+Xa-K)
'MB
<#VB de
-  f  / — ♦* J n n
- B ^  -«• e NB
( e ~ K  NB+Xa-K)
9 dNB de
K °NB °NB ,
(27)
The last part of (27) then flows directly from the derivation of (26). After 
proceeding to a change of stochastic variables, viz, from (e,NB) to (e,NB-e), it 
occurs that:
B+e-n,
/  /  — ** * n n-21 B, -«  u eu iVB
f e - | i e NB+Xa-K)
9 dNB de =
(Xa\
 ^ ° e  °N B  j J1°J (28)
The log-likelihood function thus finally simplifies to:
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<x>fXa'j +® Xa-.*:'! m°« J v ° e  °KB , +(iv)
It may be worthwhile to examine some of the interesting features exhibited 
by our econometric analysis. Firstly, the recognition of the link between benefits 
adds here to the likelihood that one will be observed to claim SB, since the grant 
of additional housing benefits and of passport benefits enlarges the area of 
integration for which NB is positive. In different circumstances, it might be that 
the receipt of a benefit is decreased by the claim of another; in that case the region 
of integration for the take-up of the second benefit would look like Figure 3.4, 
decreasing (given the value of the parameters) the likelihood of a unit taking it 
up.
Secondly, because NB is linear in costs (Xa+E) but, though linear in Bgb, is 
nonlinear in e, it is possible to have an estimate of the relative variance of costs 
and modelling errors. Furthermore, the availability of this estimate does not 
depend on the distributional assumptions made, nor is it a consequence of the 
adoption of a particular functional form. The identification of the relative 
distributional parameters of e and E is an intrinsic feature of the sample 
distribution of claims and non-claims. Varying the variance of e relative to that of 
E will fundamentally alter the distribution and likelihood functions of net benefits 
to claiming, as can be seen from a close look at the log-likelihood function (29). 
For instance, and more intuitively, the probability of observing an income unit
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claim when it is calculated to be entitled will often be maximised by a relatively 
low variance of modelling errors -- the same applies to a unit observed not to 
claim when it is not thought to be allowed to receive a benefit. Conversely, the 
observation that a unit not thought to be entitled claims a benefit tends to suggest 
a variance of modelling errors large relative to that of claiming costs. The 
asymmetry can be summarised as follows: explaining the non-receipt of SB of a 
unit w ith positive calculated entitlement can be done through appealing either to 
errors of modelling or large costs (unobservable or not) to claiming, but 
accounting for the claim of a unit with a seemingly negative entitlement to the 
benefit can only imply the recognition of the presence of "errors of modelling".
Thirdly, using the calculated value of entitlements further allows the 
transformation of the estimate of the relative variances into estimates of the 
respective absolute variances. This additional result is obtained by bringing in the 
constraint that (3j=2. This also enables us to derive direct estimates of the costs 
involved in claiming state support, estimates that are consistent w ith the presence 
of entitlement inaccuracies.
2- The Numerical Optimisation15
The log-likelihood function derived above is a menacing one, and, since we 
cannot rely on standard statistical and econometric packages to perform the 
optimisation, its numerical maximisation can be difficult and resource-consuming. 
We therefore indicate in this section some of the methods used to find the values 
of the parameters a, p2, p2, and a E that yield the maximum of In L for a sample
15 This section owes much to the patient and kind advice of Joanna Gomulka.
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of observations fC,NCJ.
(a) Identification and Simplification of Ltt L
We m ust first notice that, as In L presently stands, none of the parameters 
of the likelihood function can be identified; to see this, we note that to multiply 
all parameters by a factor k would leave the value of In L unchanged. An 
identifying constraint is thus required, and it is later provided by setting p2 to one. 
For the numerical optimisation, however, it is more convenient to let p2 vary and 
to set oNB=1, and subsequently to redefine ae=cos t, and a£=sin \  for simplicity. 
Moreover, we shall see that many of the results obtained do not require setting 
p2 to one. Finding the estimated standard errors 6e and dE then reduces to 
optimising over the domain of which ranges from 0 to rc/2; the ratio of the 
standard error of costs over that of calculated entitlements is simply sin fycos 
l=tan We can then simplify greatly the numerical optimisation for In L by 
making appropriate changes of variables:
" E  In *(*“ ) (0
inLJ +E ^  («'*■)
NC v y
+ (30)
where
a = ——  ; p, = ;n_ =
sinS cos£ cos£
X=Xasin£ -J5apjCOs^ -  pecosj; -  P2BHCS ;
p = cos£
(31)
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We therefore maximise In L w ith respect to the new parameters a , p, ji, P2 and 
making the optimisation process less costly and much more likely to converge. 
Once we have found the estimates of these transformed parameters, we can then 
substitute them and obtain the estimated values of the underlying parameters of 
our distribution.
(b) Assessing In L and its Gradient
We make use of the Newton algorithm E04KDF of the NAG Fortran library, 
for which we provide the vector of In L's analytical gradient. The derivative of a 
univariate cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) is the relevant univariate 
probability density function (p.d.f.), while the derivative of a bivariate c.d.f.
with respect to one of its random variables r1 or r2 is the product of a 
conditional c.d.f. and a univariate p.d.f., e.g,
«&(/-,,r2;p) . . . .  . . .
8r,
This product is easily computed. When a gradient involves the derivative of a 
(normal) bivariate c.d.f. with respect to its correlation coefficient, we make use of 
the fact that
<*»
We also need to compute In L itself and thus the values of the normal 
bivariate c.d.f. <&eNB ; no NAG subroutines are directly available for this purpose, 
and we thus compile two routines. The first one cheaply yields results accurate
167
to about four decimals over a limited range of the bivariate distribution; the 
second makes use of numerical integration to generate results to any desired level 
of accuracy over the whole range of rv r2 and p.
Because we have chosen not to discard any of the relevant sample 
observations, it is not entirely surprising that the optimisation process will need 
to cope with some "extreme" values; for instance, there are in our sample a few 
income units with very low negative (large in absolute value) calculated 
entitlements which still declare that they are taking up SB. Other examples occur 
when peNB tends to zero, when calculated entitlement is large for some 
observations for which no SB receipt is recorded, or when costs are estimated to 
be particularly low or large. The numerical value of the gradient of such extreme 
observations may be difficult to evaluate on a computer since it is often derived 
from a ratio of small numbers; that is, if L, is small, so may bL/bO) be, and 
b(lnLi}/b(-) = (bL/b(-)) /  L; will then be difficult to calculate accurately on a 
computer. We will then resort to using asymptotic gradient values, which is 
analogous to the use of Mills' ratio for the univariate ratio §(r)/®(r) ~-r when r is 
small.
To find these asymptotic bivariate ratios we apply l'Hopital's rule, taking 
the derivative of the numerator bL/bO) and of the denominator L- with respect to 
the variable (cost, entitlement or peNB) whose value is causing bL/bO) and L, to be 
small, and making appropriate simplifications and approximations. We use these 
asymptotic ratios whenever in the optimisation procedures In L, happens to be no 
greater than 10'10. Similarly, the value of lnL{ m ust be approximated to its 
asymptotic level when costs to claiming Xa are estimated to be especially low.
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Conclusion
We have seen in this chapter how to justify and conduct the analysis of 
benefit take-up in the presence of divergences and errors in modelling entitlement, 
made both by the take-up analyst and by the administrative agency responsible 
for the allocation of state benefits. Our methodology, which may be extended to 
analogous microeconometric applications, makes use of the existence of an 
assessable economic relationship between data subject to random  and systematic 
errors and other data for which such errors are a priori thought to be unlikely. 
The presence of an additional source of unobservable random errors does not 
prevent the relative parametric identification of the relevant distributions since the 
two sources of randomness commonly generate unambiguously distinguishable 
effects. We also noted that an application of our methodology to the take-up of 
Supplementary Benefits in Britain would yield absolute estimates of the 
distributions of modelling errors and of unobservable costs, as well as direct 
estimates of the monetary equivalents to the burden of claiming. It is to such 
estimation that we turn in the next chapter.
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Chapter IV: On the Determinants of the Take-up 
of Supplementary Benefits in 1985 Britain
A- Modelling of Entitlement Divergences and Some Survey 
Deficiencies
1- On Divergences in the Computation of Entitlements
We have already extensively discussed in chapter III the role and the 
econometric characterisation of "modelling errors" in understanding the take-up 
of state benefits. Administrative, data and computing imperfections will lead to 
random  and systematic divergences in the computation of entitlement which may 
well be important for normative and positive purposes. In our applied work we 
will consider three classes of suspected systematic deficiencies, all three prompted 
by our use of the FES data and by the analysis that documents the expected 
accuracy of the survey's information. The first two speculated flaws will simply 
help shape the specification of but the third will demand a deeper 
restructuring of our econometric analysis:
(1) Systematic differences in entitlement calculations by the government 
agency and by the analyst, stemming, for example, from general 
misreporting of income data and characteristics of units;
(2) Systematic differences in entitlement calculations by the government 
agency and by the analyst, for specific groups;
(3) Failure of pensioners to report accurately their receipt of supplementary 
benefits.
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We will analyse the third (survey) deficiency in the next subsection. We 
intend to account for the first two discrepancies by providing a simple 
specification of //e:
He = (1)
where RB is a vector of entitlement indicators and p3 is a conformable vector of 
parameters showing the importance of RB in explaining the structural discrepancy 
e between Bg and Ba. It is worthwhile remembering that "modelling errors" always 
refer here to the gap between the analyst's calculation of entitlement and the norm 
set by the government institution responsible for the administration of the benefit 
-- an institution which itself may not impute entitlement accurately and may not 
have correct information on the unit's income and other characteristics either. 
Hence, were units to conceal successfully part of their income both to the survey 
and to the administrators of the benefit, our entitlement indicator would fail to 
pick up any entitlement "biases". We also note that parameters p3 will generally 
be separately identifiable even if they correspond to variables in RB that are also 
found in the vector of cost characteristics X. The identification of such parameters 
is possible for the same reasons that the standard deviations of E and e are also 
separately identifiable.
We shall allow for systematic and general divergences e in the computation 
of entitlements by including a unit vector into RB. For discrepancies in the 
computation of the entitlement value of the members of specific groups, 
appropriate binary (dummy) variables may be provided. In particular, there is a 
suspicion that self-employment income is particularly prone to under-reporting
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in the FES1: we rely on the analytical simplicity of the procedure on which the 
award of SB is based to take explicit account of this plausible survey deficiency 
in our econometric analysis. We describe the method chosen in the following 
paragraphs.
The government agency's assessment of self-employed's entitlement to SB
is
B. = NEEDS -  YGROS.  + n (2)g g lg
where NEEDS are assessed by the government agency using the SB rules, is a 
random error term, and YGROS is the level of pre-SB income which the self- 
employed would reasonably declare (though not necessarily his real income) to 
the Department of Social Security (DSS) staff. Bg is thus (in the context of this 
study) the level of entitlement which we would ideally like to use in our 
econometric investigation to assess the level of costs incurred in the process of 
claiming SB. It may be, however, that for several reasons the information on self- 
employment income in the survey data leads to the computation of a different 
pre-SB income, viz, YGROS ^  with:
YGROS.  = b YGROS„ + a -  ti (3)g a *a
If b*l or if «*0, then YGROSg and YGROSa will generally differ, leading to 
systematic discrepancies between Bg and Ba. In particular, for a>0 and b>l, pre-SB
1 On the reliability of FES data, see for instance Kemsley et al. (1980), Atkinson 
and Micklewright (1983), and Atkinson, Micklewright and Stern (1988).
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income will be relatively and systematically underreported in the survey data: a 
allows for a fixed effect and b for underreporting that is proportional to the level 
of self-employment income. Combining the last two equations, we find that an 
appropriate or revised modelling of entitlement would take the form:
V
= NEEDS -  b-YGROS„ -  a  + t), + i\
= NEEDS -  YGROS + (1 -b)-YGRQSa -  a  + 11 + i\a <4>
= Ba + (1 -b) YGROSa -  a  +  T ) ,  +  t , ,
As before, Ba is the value of entitlement calculated using the survey information 
available. To comply with the above formulation, the vector of entitlement 
indicators RB will thus need to include YGROSa and a dummy variable for self- 
employment.
2 - On Pensioners
"The number of pensioners reporting receipt of supplementary benefit in 
FES falls short of the number shown in the department's statistical enquiries by 
about 500 thousand, about a third of the total. The shortfall probably results from 
pensioners reporting their supplementary benefit as part of their retirement 
pension." [DSS(1989), p.6 ] This, as we will see, does not prevent the DSS from 
attempting to assess the rate of take-up for pensioners in 1985, although their 
method is rather crude. Instead of estimating what the underlying distributions 
of entitlements and claims are (as we shall attempt to do here), the DSS uses only 
the FES set of declared receipts of SB and then endeavours to determine the size 
of the limited set of eligible recipients that have not mistakenly declared receipt 
of a pension instead of SB payment.
This approach may well be fine as a ready way of finding a rough estimate
177
of take-up rates, but it is of no benefit to our econometric analysis. Alternatively, 
we might want simply to forsake the subsample of pensioners, to provide a 
separate analysis [e.g., Fry and Stark (1987)], or to make ad hoc adjustments for 
pensioners; these options, however, would not provide suitable and unbiased 
estimates of the structural parameters of the cost and net benefit distributions for 
the subsample of pensioners. This is because ignoring the likelihood of benefit 
confusion among pensioners would, everything else being the same, misleadingly 
swell the estimate of the apparent trouble to claiming and likewise suggest that 
the calculation of their entitlement Ba was biased upwards. Allowing for an 
explicit modelling of pensioner behaviour may enable us to reconcile the 
underlying distribution of take-up with that recorded in the survey, and may 
make it possible to highlight some pertinent consequences.
As for all other income units, a pensioner unit will choose to claim a state 
benefit if the net benefit NB to doing so is non-negative; that is, if D represents 
the decision to claim (D - l ) and not to claim (D=0), we have:
NB > 0 <=> D = 1 (5)
NB z 0 <=> D = 0
We are nonetheless restricted to observing the event D* of whether the 
income unit declares its receipt of SB. For many groups of our sample units, we 
implicitly assume D and D* are equivalent in likelihood: a unit taking up SB will 
reveal this in the survey, and if the unit does declare SB receipt, it is because it 
is receiving the benefit. For pensioners, however, we allow for the probability that 
a SB payment can be confused by a SB recipient with the receipt of a state
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retirement pension. In what follows we neglect all other possible types of benefit 
confusion and concealment among our sample units. We represent the behaviour 
of pensioners as follows:
if D - l  (or NBXS) then ( ^  f
[D  =0 with probability 1 -P  (6)
if  D - 0 (or NBz0) then D *-0 with probability 1
That is, pensioners who take up SB will correctly reveal it to the surveyors with 
probability P, but mistakenly confound receipt of SB with that of another benefit 
(i.e., retirement pension) with probability 1-P. We define P as P=l-BPROB»\]f. For 
those units who declare no receipt of retirement pensions and for those pensioners 
for whom it is possible to be reasonably certain that a benefit confusion has not 
occurred2, we define BPROB=0 and thus assume that P=l. For all other 
pensioners, BPROB=l and there then remains to find the estimate of \|t. The 
likelihood of observing a recipient of retirement pension declare (D*=l) or not 
declare (D*=0) a claim of SB is thus:
2 SB is allocated to the income unit as a whole and not to individual unit 
members, whereas extra retirement pension payments can be paid for dependant 
children or for a spouse and can be declared as such in the survey. Flowever 
imprecise, this feature can make it possible to identify pensioner units not likely to 
have confused a SB receipt for a National Insurance retirement pension one. To 
ascertain the presence of such units, we use (if applicable) the declared receipt of a 
spouse's National Insurance pension, model it as a basic pension increase for a 
spouse, and find the corresponding minimum level of the total receipt of National 
Insurance retirement pension. If this minimum equals or exceeds the declared receipt 
of National Insurance retirement pension, we specify BPROB=0.
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I(/r=1) = PP{NB> 0)
L(D*= 0) = (1-F)P(A®>0) + P(NB*0)
(7)
There is, however, an additional difficulty in identifying the correct 
distribution of pensioners' entitlement and net benefit to claiming SB. If a 
pensioner unit mistakenly reports in the survey a receipt of SB, our calculation of 
its SB entitlement will be biased downwards since we will have entered into such 
the calculation of entitlement a misreported amount of (retirement) pre-SB income. 
That is, because retirement pensions enter the gross income base on which SB is 
awarded, the confusion of receipts of retirement pension and SB will not only 
affect the probability of observing a claim given that an SB award is received but 
it will also hamper our ability to calculate SB entitlements from the sample data.
Fortunately, however, we can calculate the entitlement to SB which would 
be computed if some of the amount of retirement pension declared in the FES was 
in fact a hidden SB receipt. We call this new calculated entitlement B2a (to which 
also corresponds the vector of entitlement indicators RB2). The difference between 
Ba and B2a is thus that Ba is calculated on the assumption that pensioners have not 
misreported SB as retirement pension, and that B2a is computed on the 
assumption that at least some of the declared receipt of retirement pension is not 
genuine. The amount of the possibly incorrect declaration of National Insurance 
retirement pension is determined by the difference between a derived minimum 
level of received National Insurance retirement pension and the declared receipt
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of National Insurance retirement pension3. B2a is then found by attributing to the 
unit that minimum level of National Insurance pension, not the declared one.
Let's call T the ability of a pensioner unit to divulge correctly (T=l, else 
T=0) its receipt of SB when it does take it up. Then, whenever a pensioner 
receives SB,
j, _ 1 1, with probability P  (g)
\  0, with probability (1 -P )
Hence, the disclosure D* of a pensioner's SB claim is found as:
n* = {  if NB^O , or if NB>0 and T=0  (9)
U ~ \ l ,  if NB>0 and T=l
The likelihood of observing D*=l is as before:
£(/)*=1) = P(MB>0,r=l) = PP(NB>0) (10)
where we assume that the probability of claiming SB is independent of that of 
correctly revealing a claim. Similarly, the likelihood of observing D*=0 (no claim 
reported) equals:
L(D*=0) = P(NBz 0) + P(NB>0,T=0) =_P(NB<l 0) + P(NB>0) \ T=0) i>(r=0)(11)
= P(NBiO) + P(NB2>0)il-P)
NB2 is the net benefit corresponding to the use of the measure of entitlement B2a
3 See the last footnote for more details. The imputation of the levels of National 
Insurance retirement pensions from the use of the FES is discussed in Appendix A.
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and RB2.
If it does appear that there exists a positive probability of misreporting the 
grant of a SB payment, we ought not to use Ba and RB alone as satisfactory 
measures of calculated entitlement over which to assess, say, expected claims or 
the rate of benefit take-up. Instead, we must then appraise the distribution of 
entitlement as a function of both (Ba/RB) and (B2a/RB2) since we are then uncertain 
about w hat we defined to be our own (viz, the analyst's) calculation of entitlement 
ought to be. Figure 4.1 might be helpful in seeing how we may do this. Its top 
part shows the way true take-up for pensioners is reflected into disclosures of SB 
claims in the survey. Our econometric analysis will enable both the estimation of 
the parameters describing the true taking up D of SB and the estimation of P, thus 
making it possible to explain and recreate the distribution of data for pensioners. 
That is, once we find the estimated values of the parameters p2, P2, P3, oc, Gg, a e 
and the value of \j/ in l-BPROB*\j/, we will then be in a position to predict both 
the true receipts of SB and the expected declarations of such receipts in the FES 
data. The weight we shall then attach to (Ba/RB) and (B2a/RB2) as indicators of the 
correct entitlement figure for pensioners will depend on a unit's value of D*, as 
is suggested by the bottom part of Figure 4.1. If D*=l, viz, if a unit reveals its 
claim of SB, (Ba/RB) is the correct entitlement vector w ith probability 1: P(RB is 
expected entitlement I D*=l)=1.0. For D*=0, that is, for those who do not report a 
SB receipt and for whom  there is therefore a suspicion that a benefit confusion 
might have occurred, we ought to construct a more elaborate conditional 
distribution of entitlement. What is desired are the respective probabilities that 
(Ba,RB) or (B2a,RB2) be the correct expected entitlement figures given that we
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know that the unit alleges not to claim SB. We note first that:
L((BayRB) is correct entitlement vector andD * =0) = P(NB<S))
L((B2ayRB2) is correct entitlementvector andD * =0) = (1 -P )  -P{NB2> 0 )
Then, since P(r1 lr2)=P(r1/r2)/P(r2), we see that given that we observe D*=0 
we expect (Ba/RB) and (B2a,RB2) w ith the following probability, as shown on the 
bottom of Figure 4.1:
Therefore, whenever our calculations involve pensioners who do not 
declare a receipt of SB, we shall account4 for the uncertain value of calculated 
entitlement and we shall use the distribution of (Ba,RB) and (B2a/RB2) w ith the 
probability distribution specified above. For instance, let's note that our calculated
P(RB2 is expected entitlement \ D*= 0 )  =
P{RB is expected entitlement | D*= 0 ) == P(NB< 0 )z,(zr= 0)
(1-F)P(NB2^0) 
L(D*= 0 )
(13)
entitlement of a pensioner unit with D*=0 is expected to be
P(NB±0)Ba + (1 -P) P(NB2>0) B2a (14)
L(ZT= 0 )
whereas its ex ante probability of claiming equals
4 Unless we indicate specifically that we do not do so.
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P(NB±0)P(NB>0) + (1 -P) P(NB2>0) P(NB2>0) 
L(ZT= 0)
(15)
These reduce to Ba and P(NB>0) for those pensioners for whom BPROB=0.
We are now able to proceed to the maximisation of our likelihood function, 
w ith the enhancements just made for pensioners. The final likelihood function is:
InL(D*;P1,p2,p 3,a ,o £>ol!,i|r | X fiaJ tB £2aJiB2,BPROB) =
J2  In [(1 -BPROB-ty) p(NB>0)] + £  In[(BPi?OB ilr) P(WB2>0) +P(NBzO)]
D * = 1 D *= 0
W ith  J ' X a - A T V *  X a - x l
P(NB>0 )  =
rwio$( Xa) ( Xa - K) /eflBI CTe J{ °EJ { °N B  ) \
(16)
with ]iv oNB, p and K as defined above, and with P(NB<0)=1-P(NB>0). For 
computations using NB2 instead of NB, we simply replace Ba and RB by B2a and 
RB2.
B- The Data
1 - A Look at the FES Data
To carry out our econometric analysis, we will use the original sample of 
1985 FES data described in Chapter I; we will, however, restrict it in such a way 
as to eliminate from the sample all those units who are necessarily excluded from
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claiming SB, that is, those where at least one of the adults works more than the 
maximum weekly hours specified (24 for a single parent, 30 for a couple) or for 
which savings exceed the £3,000 lim it This leaves 1515 income units, of which 503 
report to have successfully claimed SB.
There are 59 observations of people who report having successfully claimed 
supplementary benefits but who are excluded from our sample on account of 
excessive savings or hours of work. This is probably mostly explained by the 
discrepancy between the conditions under which an income unit has claimed SB 
(e.g., working less than the specified amount of hours) and those under which it 
finds itself at the time of the survey. Although income units have the duty to 
report any change of circumstances to their social security office, they may fail to 
do so, they may believe this change to be temporary, or they may simply delay 
before complying with the regulation. Conversely, there probably are in our 
sample several income units who have just qualified for SB and who may not 
have had the time or opportunity yet to take it up. It is also likely that there exist 
inaccuracies in reporting the level of savings and hours of work analogous to 
those in reporting various income components -- which implies that the exclusion 
method just described will be subject to errors too5. The FES contains little 
information on savings as such, and the £3000 limit m ust be mostly applied using 
a very approximate grossing-up of investment income. To account for these 
inaccuracies and to avoid discarding from our analysis those 59 observations that
5 As discussed below, a failure to account for these errors will often lead the 
analyst to exaggerate the inconveniences to claiming a state benefit and thus to 
underestimate the rate of take-up. This is conceptually identical to the impact of the 
presence of errors in the measurement of Bg for which we are able to correct here.
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declare a receipt of SB, we could add additional "hurdles" for eligibility to SB, 
hurdles that would be provided by the SB regulations on savings and hours of 
work. Since neither the government agency nor the analyst monitor and compute 
perfectly well units' data on labour supply or on savings, units that are dismissed 
here could thus find their way into the analysis. This additional feature would, 
however, involve extra computational complexity and it was not incorporated 
here, although it also clearly matters greatly to the overall assessment of the state 
support's allocative efficiency.
Table 4.1 shows the collection of data according to eligibility and claim; 
slightly more than 10% of the total of units which report claiming SB have 
negative calculated entitlement, that proportion rising to 16% for pensioners. Our 
sample of self-employed eligible to claim benefits is very small, and the results for 
that group might therefore lack precision.
On Table 4.2 we indicate the frequency distribution of claimants and non­
claimants by amount of calculated entitlement. For both of these groups we show 
absolute frequencies in the sample, frequencies relative to the respective sizes of 
the subsamples of claimants and non-claimants, and the cumulative distribution 
(in %) of each subsample. We confirm that about 10% of the subsample of 
claimants are allocated negative calculated entitlement, and that the relative 
frequencies of the claimants with such entitlement discrepancies generally 
increases as we move up to zero calculated entitlement. A large num ber of non­
claimants have a calculated entitlement that is both positive and close to zero 
(18.3% of them between £0 and £10 per week, for instance) and there arises 
therefore the inevitable suspicion that entitlement discrepancies similar to those
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identified in the sample of claimants may have led to an erroneous assessment of 
SB eligibility as appraised by the DSS.
The last line of Table 4.2 computes take-up rates for each appropriate range 
of calculated entitlement. Take-up rates for those with negative calculated 
entitlement cannot, in this table, be assigned rates of take-up since we have not 
yet assessed econometrically the distribution of systematic and random 
entitlement discrepancies between our evaluation of eligibility and that made 
implicitly or explicitly by the DSS. For those units with positive calculated 
entitlement, we observe that as calculated entitlement increases, so does the 
apparent take-up rate, except for those upper ranges of entitlement where random 
fluctuations and low subsample sizes make the estimated take-up rates vary 
irregularly with entitlement ranges .6
2 - On Grossing-up the Data
We might also be interested in knowing how our sample data compare to 
the official statistics produced by the DSS. For this, we consider Tables 4.3 and 4.4, 
where we have also provided separate results for pensioners and single parents, 
in line with the DSS's published figures. Looking first at Table 4.3 suggests the 
existence of a rather weak concordance between the two sets of population 
statistics that is reflected among other things in the difference between the 
estimated SB take-up rates. There are several reasons that may explain such
6 We shall see later in this chapter, however -- and we discuss more extensively 
in Duclos (1992c) -- that even those units with negative computed entitlement can 
straightforwardly be assigned a probability of claiming as well as one of being in 
receipt of SB given that they are deemed by the DSS to be entitled to it. In Duclos 
(1992c) we also exhibit the extent to which the unaccounted presence of random  
entitlement discrepancies in Table 4.2 exaggerates the expected positive relationship 
between entitlement and take-up rates.
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divergences.
First, the DSS makes special adjustment to its FES data on the basis of the 
Department's own statistical enquiries; the most prominent of such adjustments 
is probably that on the subsample of pensioners, as stated above, and for which 
it is suggested that there are approximately 500,000 non-declared SB recipients. 
Accounting for such a number in our reckoning of pensioner recipients and 
eligible non-recipients roughly harmonises our figures w ith those of the DSS.
Second, the accurate estimation of weights for a subsample of relatively 
poor units requires information that is not readily available, and because such 
information may not be adequately transmitted by the use of weights obtained for 
the units of the whole sample, it is not surprising that our grossing-up procedure 
may not yield satisfactory results for the particular subsample of actual and 
potential SB claimants on which our attention is focused here. This w ould explain 
why the grossing-up of values for single parents does not add up to quite the 
same figures as those available from the DSS; we also recall that similar 
difficulties were encountered in the comparison of grossed-up receipts and 
recipients of one-parent benefits in Chapter I.
Third, the distinct population values obtained under the column "eligible 
but not receiving" may simply reflect structural differences in the information set 
used to generate the DSS and our own grossing-up weights. Our own sample 
statistics are gathered from the use of about 6  months of relevant FES data, and 
are grossed up using adjusted annual weights derived for the whole of the FES
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sample7. To obtain "grossed-up" figures from FES sample statistics on the 
apparently eligible but non-recipient population, the DSS can use information 
from its own statistical records on the potential SB population; from this, it is (in 
principle) possible to compute some relatively more accurate grossing-up weights 
that reflect better the differential representation of population characteristics in the 
surveys, especially among the poorer. Whether this potential source of additional 
grossing-up information was appropriately tapped is, of course, a different matter.
Table 4.4 portrays information similar to that of Table 4.3, except that it 
deals w ith monetary statistics of the SB claims and failures to claim. We indicate 
the values of claimed benefits using either the amount of calculated benefits for 
those declaring receipts (shown in parentheses) or the declared amount of SB 
receipt (shown in brackets). As we will find later on in this and the following 
chapter, those two bases on which to compute SB receipts do not necessarily 
ought to yield similar values, and there are good factors (i.e., the presence of 
structural and random entitlement discrepancies) for which they should not. We 
note, incidentally, that the average amounts of claimed and unclaimed benefits 
vary widely between population groups, reflecting the variety of distributions of 
entitlements and burdens to claiming. There are again sizeable discrepancies 
between our global figures and those of the DSS -- reflecting the points made 
above -- but averages, which tend to throw some light on the characteristics of 
individual sample observations, are much closer. This suggests again that it is the 
grossing-up procedure that differs, and it raises issues of sample under-
7 On the derivation of these weights, see Atkinson, Gomulka and Sutherland 
(1988).
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representation and differential response rates that are outside the scope of this 
study.
3- D ifferential Sampling and the Consistency of Estimates
We might therefore be concerned that effective differential sampling of 
population groups may distort our econometric results. So long as the probability 
of a population unit appearing in the sample is independent of the distribution 
of the unobservable cost £ (which seems a reasonable assumption), our estimation 
results on the inconvenience to claiming SB will be unbiased and will yield 
information unequivocally applicable to units outside the sample. This result will 
hold even if the probability of appearing in the sample is correlated with the 
distribution of any of the elements of the vector of cost characteristics X, as long 
as that probability is unrelated to that of observing a particular £.
A similar argument applies w ith respect to the distribution of e, although 
less convincingly since it is likely that, for instance, the distribution of random 
modelling errors e (e.g., from deliberate misreports of income data) be linked to 
the probability of appearing in the FES sample. But what matters of course, for 
our present purposes, is the correct estimation of the distribution of random  errors 
e given that a unit is sampled and modelled, not the estimation of the 
hypothetical e population distribution of sampled and unsampled units. In other 
words, we wish to understand the determinants of our entitlement models for the 
units that do appear in the survey; of course, if differential sampling were to be 
altered or eliminated, say, the shape of our average sample would then change 
and so would likely the determinants of our modelling of entitlement. This also 
reminds us that our empirical valuation of entitlement discrepancies — though not
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that of costs to claiming, if our sample of units has not self-selected itself on that 
basis — will be related to the structure of the survey (the FES) in other ways. 
Better FES data on savings and needs, for instance, would almost certainly reduce 
the presence of entitlement errors generated by the analyst, just as better and 
more regular eligibility assessments by the DSS would curtail entitlement 
discrepancies generated by the government's allocative agency.
Hence, summing up: although differential sampling of the population may 
create grossing up difficulties, it will not hamper the inference of an estimated 
distribution of costs upon the population if differential sampling is independent 
of the distribution of E. Furthermore, since an interest in the distribution of 
modelling errors independently of a unit appearing in the sample does not seem 
particularly relevant, we will not be concerned by differential discrepancies 
between our sample and the population for our modelling of entitlement.
From here onwards therefore, we shall focus exclusively on our sample 
statistics, w ith the caveat that we may not translate them directly into population 
figures. Were the task of extending our empirical results to yield estimates on the 
whole British population eventually to prove desirable, all that would then be 
needed would be the application of relevant grossing-up weights onto the sample 
results we shall derive.
4- Costs and Entitlement Indicators
The vector of characteristics X related to the perceived annoyance of 
claiming SB incorporates variables which have been chosen to reflect the physical, 
psychological, sociological and informational factors that are likely to influence a 
unit's perception of the act of going to the local DSS office and asking for an
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award of supplementary benefits. Many of these variables have, however, more 
than one influence, and their net effect may not be what might a priori have been 
expected. The presence of children, for instance, may increase the physical and the 
time costs of going to the DSS office, but it may also decrease the psychological 
sense of "guilt" and sociological stigma attached to receiving government support. 
Having children may also enhance one's awareness or likelihood to be aware of 
such government support, and it may also generate a lower "equivalent value" of 
the benefit once it is shared across the members of the family unit. It is also most 
important to keep in m ind how some characteristics may be correlated with the 
length of time over which families of prospective claimants expect to receive the 
benefit. Hence, for instance, pensioners and disabled people who might consider 
seeking a state benefit otherwise onerous may nevertheless foresee a longer 
expected period of eligibility and receipt, this latter feature plausibly decreasing 
their average weekly cost of claiming.
Our choice of cost variables has also been influenced by the results of 
previous studies on the take-up of state benefits. On Table 4.7 -- to which we will 
come back shortly — we note by a those characteristics which provided take-up 
parameters statistically different from zero. We see that few studies found that 
several of these characteristics yielded significant parameters. On Table 4.5, we 
disaggregate our FES sample of claimants and non-claimants into groups of 
various characteristics and compute the take-up rate — using as a measure the 
number of claimants divided by the number of those thought to be eligible8 -- for
8 This aggregate take-up rate measure is different both from those used earlier in 
the chapter and from those applied in many earlier studies of the take-up of state 
benefits. We shall examine its desirability later in the chapter and find that, among
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each group.
The variability in Table 4.5 of the group take-up rates with respect to 
changes in group characteristics suggests that the determinants of the take-up 
behaviour may be strongly linked to the socio-economic features of units. Single 
parents display the highest take-up rate (96%) of all groups, followed closely by 
the group of those couples with children (93%). Couples without children have, 
however, a calculated take-up rate of only 78%. One therefore ought to wonder 
whether the presence of children may not decrease significantly the expected 
weekly costs to claiming SB. The number of adults in the unit also appears to 
matter: units comprising no more than one adult member have a take-up rate of 
69%, sizeably lower than for couples with or without children. The type of 
accommodation in which a unit lives also appears to be a take-up indicator, those 
renting claiming by 8% less than those in some special housing (council, housing 
association or new town dwelling). Units with a head not in work do not, on 
average, appear to take-up SB by a larger proportion than a typical sample unit.
The apparent impact of the remaining characteristics of Table 4.5 is, 
however, much more delicate to interpret. Those older units (made of at least one 
adult above retirement age) and those in apparent receipt of N l basic pensions 
(BP) comprise a number of observations for which a confusion of a SB for a BP 
payment is suspected. Hence, we cannot yet tell by how much the low take-up 
proportion for such units (respectively 54% and 52%) arises either from benefit 
confusion or from claiming costs that increase w ith age and pensioner status.
other features, it is robust to the presence of random entitlement discrepancies made 
by the analyst. This topic is also considered in Duclos (1992c).
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Those few self-employed units which feature in our sample yield a very low take- 
up rate of 25%; for such units, there exist, however, indications that income is 
underreported in the FES and thus that we have overestimated their entitlement 
to SB. Thus, we find it unfeasible to determine before the full estimation of our 
model the degree to which such a low take-up rate arises from greater claiming 
costs to the self-employed or from a misleading overstatement of their SB 
eligibility.
There remain, moreover, other reasons to doubt the validity and the 
strength of the suggestive links derived from an analysis of Table 4.5. By 
segregating units according to unidimensional characteristics, such tables cannot 
account for the empirical correlation that exists, say, between the feature of being 
a single parent and that of living in special accommodation. If living in such 
accommodation were more likely to ensure high take-up rates, the finding of 
higher single parent take-up rates in Table 4.5 could rather reveal a positive 
correlation between single parenthood and special housing tenure. Similarly, being 
a single parent may be associated on average with greater SB entitlements, and 
the computation of high take-up rates for that group might simply stem from the 
greater financial appeal of SB not from any lesser claiming costs associated with 
single parenthood.
With these warning remarks in mind, one would like to test whether the 
features listed on Table 4.5 can, after a more elaborate statistical analysis, reveal 
take-up links that are both significant and congruous with the above preliminary 
indications. To describe the socio-economic characteristics of the income units, we 
thus use the number of dependent children (CH) and how many of these are
194
under the age of 5 (CH05), as well as the number and mean age of the adults 
found in the unit (AD and M(AGE,AGES), where AGES is the age of the spouse, 
where there is one). If SING=1 the unit is made of a single-parent family. If the 
head of the unit is also the head of the household (which may contain more than 
one eligible income unit or "family"), then HEAD=1; such a distinction may clearly 
matter if being a head of household also entails privileges or responsibilities (e.g., 
looking after the dwelling) which might be somewhat avoided by other units. We 
also include the type of accommodation in which the unit lives: COUNCIL=l, if 
it is found in a council, housing association or new town corporation dwelling, 
and RENT=1 if COUNCIL=0 though the members of the unit are tenants.
The average of the age at which the adults ended their full-time education 
is indicated by M(ED,EDS), and the average of the hourly wages, by 
M(WAGE,WAGES). When appropriate (viz, for non-participants), the value of 
such wages was predicted and filled using the results of an estimation procedure 
over the whole FES sample, allowing and correcting for various interactions 
between the decision to participate in the labour force and the wage rate faced by 
members of the units9. Although the hourly wages so obtained are for many 
reasons likely to be rather inaccurate indicators of the opportunity cost of leisure, 
we nevertheless include them with the hopeful aim of detecting the value of a 
claimant's expected loss of time or leisure in claiming SB. Wages will, however, 
also be correlated with some of the units' observable and non-observable 
characteristics, and the estimated effect of wages on the costs to claiming may 
rather reflect the impact of these characteristics. We also incorporate variables that
9 The procedure and the results are described in Duclos (1992b).
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denote the absence from the labour force of the head of the unit: UNO=l and 
BPR=1, if the head is not working or is a declared National Insurance pensioner, 
respectively. WKAB shows the number of weeks which the head has been 
spending away from work, up to a maximum of 52. When SN=1, one of the adult 
members of the unit is self-employed. As a further variable we also include the 
log of YGROS, which is income gross of (excluding) SB; this might enable us to 
see if and how the monetary cost corresponding to the loss in utility from 
claiming varies w ith the level of original income, a query suggested by Cowell 
(1986) and related to the nonlinearity of the agents' utility function.
We must also specify the vector of variables which will form the basis of 
our analysis of ^e. To allow for general under- or over-reporting of income and 
thus for over- and under-estimation of entitlement Ba relative to Bg, a unit vector 
(UNIT=1) is fitted. We also include SN and SN-YGROS to provide for the 
modelling of the entitlement of units w ith self-employed heads, as was described 
above.
C- Explaining the Empirical Results
1-Introduction and General Results
We can now present the results of the maximisation of the full likelihood 
function developed in chapter III and adapted above to the requirements of our 
FES sample. We can divide our estimates into 5 groups, corresponding to five 
prominent features of our analysis:
- Costs to claiming
- Entitlement indicators, ]iz
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- Probability of a sub-group of pensioners faithfully reporting receipt of SB
- The effect of housing benefits upon the claims of SB
- Standard deviations of unobservable random effects
The estimated value of the relevant parameters, along with the respective 
asymptotic standard errors in parentheses, are shown on the two pages of Table 
4.6. The first column of estimates shows the results obtained when no constraint 
is put on any of the parameters, except for the normalising of c NB=l. As discussed 
in chapter III, this nevertheless allows for the estimation of the standard deviation 
of costs relative to that of entitlement: a look at the last two lines of the second 
page of Table 4.6 shows that the ratio of the estimated standard deviations is 
0.465/0.885=0.525. This suggests that unobservable burdens to claiming are 
significantly less dispersed in our sample than unobservable and random 
divergences in modelling entitlement.
Five cost parameters appear statistically different from 0 at the customary 
5% significance level: the ones for the number of adults (AD), for a head of 
household (HEAD), for the square root of weeks spent outside work 
(SQRT(WKAB)), for the mean hourly wage (M(WAGE,WAGES)), and for the log 
of gross income (L(YGROS)). Apart from that on HEAD, all such parameters are, 
on closer scrutiny, quite comfortably away from zero. That no more of the 
estimates appear, in fact, significantly different from zero m ust stem partly from 
the large number of the cost parameters (15 in total, including the cost constant 
term) and from the multicorrelation that prevails among several of the cost and 
entitlement characteristics. The MAGE" variable, for instance, is highly correlated 
(i.e., correlation coefficient of above 0.5) with HEAD, BPR, BP and UNO, whereas
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SN is similarly correlated with entitlement B and B2 , UNO and YGROS. We have 
nevertheless opted to leave the set of the original cost variables largely untouched, 
even if removing a few of them might have generated statistical significance for 
some of the remaining others. The parameters pertaining to the entitlement vector 
RB are not significantly different from 0. Let's note in particular the highly 
significant parameter on calculated entitlement Ba and B l^  which confirms the 
report of all studies -- except that of Altmann (1981) for male pensioners -- that 
the take up of benefit is strongly related to the level of entitlement.
BPROB, describing the probability of some pensioners confusing a SB 
payment for a receipt of a retirement pension, has a parameter very significantly 
different from zero; its numerical value, 0.465, suggests that there is almost a 50% 
probability for such pensioners that a confusion of benefits will occur if SB is 
received. One reason for which this parameter of BPROB might have been 
overestimated stems from our implicit assumption that, for a pensioner not in 
declared receipt of SB and for whom it was not possible to be reasonably certain 
that a benefit confusion had not occurred, a declared receipt of retirement pension 
is either fully legitimate or fully misreported. A pensioner unit truly receiving the 
two benefits might be better able (more likely) to distinguish the two benefits than 
a unit receiving only one of the two, and therefore we might expect that a 
pensioner unit already in receipt of a pension payment w ould not confuse a 
separate payment of SB with it. The danger still exists, however, that for those for 
whom BPROB=l only part of the reported pension is in fact a SB payment, in 
which case our calculation of B2a would be mistakenly large, causing in the 
econometric process the estimate on BPROB to be biased upwards.
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The increase in the award of housing benefit whenever supplementary 
benefit is claimed seems to have no discernible empirical effect on the take-up of 
SB: the parameter p2 on BHCS is at its lower bound, 0. Thus, either BHCS suffers 
on its own from severe errors of computation, in which case its inclusion in the 
econometric process cannot yield the desired empirical information, or income 
units simply do not significantly take into account the (admittedly relatively 
small) related change in housing benefit when they consider claiming SB.
2- Sources of Randomness and Divergences in  the Com putation of
Entitlements
We can now impose on our model the previously discussed constraint that 
the parameter on the calculated entitlement variable (Ba and B2a) is one. To impose 
the normalisation, we simply divide all the estimates (including the standard 
errors) on the first column of Table 4.6 by 0.0462, the estimated parameter on Ba 
and B2a, and we eliminate the normalising constraint that oNB=l.
This procedure yields absolute estimates of the standard deviations of our 
error terms, E and e: this is shown on the last two lines of the second page of 
Table 4.6. Unobservable costs to claiming have an estimated standard error of 
£9.66 per week, while that of unobservable modelling errors is slightly more than 
£19 per week. Hence, the unobservable variation of net benefits across our sample 
appears to be mostly due to the presence of random  errors of modelling; the 
untruncated normal distribution of NB has an estimated variance o1NB = o2£+o2e 
= 464, w ith a corresponding standard error of about 21.5. We m ust guard 
ourselves, however, against forgetting that a e does not necessarily reveal 
information on the extent of random  errors stemming from the use of the FES
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income. As we have already said, e should indeed be seen in the context of our 
simplifying assumptions as the difference between the error made in our own FES 
calculation and that made at the DSS; that is,
e = e -  e (17)g a
The standard deviation of e is then:
o e = ^  + a lt -  2-cov(e(1>e p  (18)
This reveals that ae can in fact either underestimate or overstate the degree 
of random  miscalculation using (and random  misreport in) the FES data. So, for 
instance, if, on the one hand, errors made at the government agency (DSS), eg, are 
uncorrelated with those we make using the FES, then c m<oe and a e 
overestimates the spread of the analyst's entitlement errors; if, on the other hand, 
and sa are sufficiently positively correlated, it is possible that a^xy^ and the 
estimated variance of e will underestimate that of efl.
Our procedure also generates values of entitlement parameters which can 
be readily interpreted, although none of them are statistically significant from zero 
by the conventional 5% criterion. The intercept (UNIT) has an estimated 
parameter which suggests that, relative to Bg/ we underestimate by about £4 the 
entitlement of our units as assessed by the government agency. This relative 
underestimation could partially be attributed to our inability to account for 
various supplementary requirements or needs which enter SB but which cannot 
be imputed from the FES. It could also stem from differences between the report
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and accounting of income data in the FES and in the DSS offices. Prospective 
claimants might conceal more income when they meet their social security officer 
than they do when prompted by the FES interviewer, or their DSS officer might 
be on average more lenient and less inquisitive than the SB rules seem to demand. 
This relative DSS generosity is intuitively also consistent w ith the expectation that 
units will on average reveal more readily to the agency changes in their situation 
that augment their SB entitlement than changes that do the opposite.
For self-employed units, our estimates suggest that we may generally apply 
arguments opposite to those just stated. Using the model of entitlement for self- 
employed developed above, we note that the (net) fixed effect of dealing w ith a 
self-employed unit when attempting to establish its entitlement Bg is that of 
overestimating it by an amount of £23.9 per week. Furthermore, from the value 
of the parameter on SN*YGROS, we find that the point estimate of b in
YGROS, = b-YGROS. + a  -  n„ (19)g a *a
equals b=l+0.437=1.437, which implies that the absolute level of overestimation 
(YGROSg-YGROSa) increases with reported gross income. We must, however, 
wield the latter estimates with care since they are clouded with imprecision. This 
comment seemingly applies to all our results regarding the self-employed, for 
whom the sample of relevant observations is very small.
3- On the Costs to Taking up
We now turn to the determinants of w hat we have called the "costs to 
claiming" SB. As mentioned earlier, we are not able to segregate empirically the 
impact of characteristics upon different types of costs, e.g., the effect of having
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children on the separate physical and psychological inconvenience of taking up. 
This being said, we also note that the burden implied by many characteristics is 
not different from zero at reasonable statistical significance levels, and that we 
might therefore take it with a grain or two of salt. We m ust also keep in mind 
that the parameter estimates of Table 4.6 cannot always be read accurately as 
estimates of the expected burden of claiming. This is because the normal 
distribution of E is truncated below -Xa, and that expected take-up costs equal:
E[Xa + E\ = X a + —
d>
= Xa + k*(c)’aE
with c=Xa/o£ and X*(-) being the complement of Mills' ratio. Thus the expected 
marginal cost of a characteristic X, in the vector X is:
S£[*“+g| - «, • ( i - [c • r(c) ♦ {r(c)}2] ) (21)
° x i
where the term in squared brackets is always smaller than 1 and where the 
derivative thus has always the same sign as a ;. The expected marginal cost is 
largest (lowest) when c is large (low), and approaches a, when c tends to 
infinity.10
10 Similarly, the variance of the truncated distribution of E can only asymptotically 
be that of the untruncated normal, cE, and will generally be lower than the latter. 
Using integration by parts and the fact that h(§(x))/§x=-x§(x) we can find that the 
variance of the truncated distribution of costs equals ozE(l-[cX*(c)+(X*(c))2]).
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f Xa (20)
Hence, we may keep in mind that the estimates shown on the last column 
of Table 4.6 overestimate at least slightly the expected marginal burden to which 
the corresponding elements of X are associated. It is also instructive to compare 
our qualitative results with those of earlier studies -- which provided evidence on 
the effect of various socio-economic characteristics on the probability of claiming 
state benefits -- and this is done in Table 4.7. A "+" appears w hen a 
characteristic is associated w ith a greater (lesser) probability of taking up. In 
contrasting our findings, we ought to bear much more in mind those results 
which were found to be statistically significant. To this effect, we indicate by a 
star those parameters estimated to be different from zero at a conventional 5% 
level. "NA" shows that the effect of the characteristic could not be adequately 
inferred from the results of the studies. Furthermore, only two inquiries are really 
directly comparable with our own examination: the analysis of Altmann (1981) on 
the claims of SB by male pensioners, and that of Fry and Stark (1987) on SB claims 
for separate groups of pensioners and non-pensioners. We therefore separate them 
in Table 4.7 from the other studies and will wish to pay special attention to their 
peculiar comparative findings.
Our results show that, to a unit already saddled w ith sizeable claiming 
costs, the addition of a dependent child would entail costs lower by about £4 a 
week on average, this effect being insignificantly different from zero. 
Psychological reasons for the existence of such a lower burden can easily be 
found, such as a lesser sense of guilt and a more intense feeling on the part of the 
income unit that the benefit is then a "due". Such factors would then outweigh the 
greater physical burden of requesting a state benefit when one m ust care for
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children. This lower inconvenience to claiming in the presence of children also 
appears to be supported by the evidence of previous studies, although none 
reported statistical significance.
The presence of an extra adult can augment the claiming inconvenience by 
up to £32.20. Furthermore, this strong effect is also significantly different from 
zero and adds to the result of Dorsett and Heady (1991) on housing benefits, 
although it finds no support among the previous SB inquiries. Thus, families with 
several adults will, other things being the same, be much less likely to take up 
Supplementary Benefits. This may be due to the presence in these units of a 
stronger sense of stigma and uneasiness when state support is sought. 
Alternatively, since eligibility to SB depends on the combined income of all adults 
and on their joint absence from full-time work, it may be that units w ith several 
adults expect the costs of taking-up to be spread only over a relatively short 
period (e.g., until one of the members finds full-time work), thus leading to 
relatively high average weekly costs.
Being a single parent will entail sizeably lesser costs (a fall of up to £10.8) 
than those faced by two-parent families, especially so if we were also to 
incorporate the impact of AD (the number of adults) just discussed. This 
statistically insignificant result would tend to confirm the earlier result of Fry and 
Stark on the claims of SB by non-pensioners. It provides another example of how 
a characteristic can be associated with widely different impacts on the perceived 
burden of claiming a benefit. The presence of more than one adult should 
generally make it physically easier for the unit to apply for SB, and should 
therefore limit the trouble of taking up; a unit w ith only one adult may yet feel
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that it deserves state support more than other units, the psychological stigma and 
uneasiness of going to the DSS office might be so much the lesser, and the 
expected time of eligibility and receipt may be much longer.
Becoming older or being a head of household both shrink the perceived 
costs and reluctance of taking up SB. These two impacts hover around the 5% 
level of conventional statistical significance. Becoming older may signal a lesser 
dislike of state support, and can be correlated with a greater expected period of 
benefit eligibility. Alternatively, it can hint to a greater awareness of the 
availability of state support and of a poor person's "right" to it, though this 
(statistically insignificant) result is not supported by most previous studies. The 
parameter on HEAD is particularly large, which, as suggested above, m ight imply 
that a head of household considers his set of responsibilities and needs to be 
sizeably enlarged, decreasing the perceived inconvenience of requesting the state's 
support. Both of these results support the statistically significant findings of 
Altmann (1981).
Being more educated bears no statistical significance and very little absolute 
impact on the cost to taking up. The same can be said of the effect of living in a 
council, housing association or new town corporation dwelling (COUNCIL=1). 
Renting a private accommodation, though not yielding statistical significance, is 
associated with a sizeable additional burden to claiming, in the order of up to 
£10.9 per week. That these variables do not generate significant results seems 
unsurprisingly to reflect the mixed evidence of the previous studies and fails to 
replicate the significance of housing in Altmann's enquiry, based as it is on a 
pension subsample.
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Work status appears to provide important take-up determinants. Being 
outside paid work entails statistically insignificant weekly costs of up to £6.30, but 
a very significant effect is that of the number of weeks spent outside work: a 
stretch of 16-week unemployment may cut average weekly costs to claiming by 
up to £35, either by spreading the take-up costs over a longer period, or by 
making the information and opportunity costs of seeking state support lower, or 
by being correlated with other unit characteristics which denote a lower claiming 
burden. Statistically insignificant are the self-employment and receipt of a 
National Insurance pension parameters, indicating extra costs respectively of up 
to £12.80 and £6.32 per week. Furthermore, it is not practicable to compare our 
estimate of the impact of pensioner status on SB take-up since all relevant former 
studies have applied separate analyses on the subsamples of pensioners and non­
pensioners.
The monetary variables included in the analysis of costs (hourly wages and 
log of pre-SB income) yield not wholly expected results. The coefficient on the 
mean of wages is negative and significantly different from zero, implying either 
that the variable is a poor indicator of the opportunity cost in leisure to those 
more likely to contemplate taking up the benefit -- the majority of whom are out 
of work -- or that the parameter picks up a correlation between, say, the ability 
and awareness of units and the value of their (mostly potential and predicted) 
wages. A similar comment applies to the estimated negative and significant 
impact of L(YGROS) on the trouble of claiming, an impact which is the opposite 
of what a model with decreasing marginal utility of income would a priori 
suggest. Greater original income may, however, be linked to greater physical and
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informational ease to taking up SB. This unit income result nevertheless 
contradicts the apparent findings of Fry and Stark on SB take-up and of Blundell, 
Fry and Walker on HB take-up. It is worth recalling, however, that such studies 
did not account for random entitlement discrepancies in understanding the take- 
up of state benefits. Because of this, they had to justify the presence of apparently 
low take-up rates at low computed entitlements partly through the generation of 
statistical biases on cost parameter estimates. It is thus not entirely surprising that 
they attribute a negative parameter estimate to a variable (household or unit 
income) that is negatively correlated with computed entitlements.
Table 4.8 gives an overall impression of the estimated magnitude of 
expected costs involved in claiming a benefit and of the considerable variation 
that seems to prevail between units of different characteristics. For the three 
reference units depicted, weekly expected costs range from a little less than £1.50 
for a 6-month unemployed single parent to up to £30.30 for a family of four of 
whom one member is in self-employment. As we have discussed, expected costs 
are greater for the younger, the tenants and the self-employed, and lower for 
those with children, the single parents and the one-adult units.
From our estimation of the parameters of the likelihood function, we can 
readily illustrate probabilities that units will claim SB, given their calculated 
entitlement and their observed characteristics. For this, we need to compute the 
expected take-up costs involved (using, say, Table 4.8 as a guide), and we also 
require the calculation of the unit's entitlement Bg as assessed, on average, by the 
government agency (equal, for BPROB=0, to Ba+RBmp3). We then simply plot the 
two values obtained on Figure 4.2, which show the estimated probability
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(PROBTAKE) that a unit with expected agency entitlement "ENTLMENT" and 
expected costs "COST" will claim SB. Thus, if we establish that the entitlement Bg 
of a unit is, say, expected to equal £28 per week, and that its observed 
characteristics lead to expected costs to claiming of £30.24, Figure 4.2 readily tells 
us that there is yet a 45% chance of the unit claiming SB, allowing for 
unobservable costs and random errors of modelling entitlement. We also note that 
even those with negative expected entitlement Bg can display a sizeable 
probability of claiming SB, especially if they exhibit characteristics that hint to a 
low inconvenience of taking up.
4- On Type I and II Errors
We have already stressed that our simplifying assumptions made for the 
purposes of estimation are not sufficient to reveal unbiased estimates of B\ In 
general, we cannot say anything on the value of B* (=Ba-ea) since we only observe 
Ba and our estimates of the distribution of e combine the unknown estimates of 
the distribution of sfl and that of eg. For illustrative purposes, however, we will 
assume in this short section that Ea=0 and therefore that Ba=B*: the analyst always 
computes accurately the true level of entitlement to a benefit. Such an assumption 
is of course unrealistic since it implies that all entitlement divergences s stem from 
administrative errors made by the government agency, but it is helpful since it 
allows the computation of the distribution of Bg when we can measure B*. We may 
then illustrate the impact of administrative errors on the level of the Type I and 
II errors introduced Chapter III.
A Type I error occurs when a unit that is truly entitled is not considered 
eligible by the administrative agency. Conversely, a Type II error arises when a
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unit requesting a state benefit is wrongly considered eligible by the agency. In 
Table 4.9, we consider the "potential" level of each error type as well as their 
actual "occurrence" under the assumption that Ba=B\ "Potential" levels of type I 
and II errors refer to those that would be achieved by the agency if all units were 
assessed or, equivalently, if units faced no costs to requesting the state benefit. 
Hence, the first column under "Type I errors" reveals that, if all units were to 
apply, there would be on average a conditional probability of 18.1% that a unit 
be mistakenly refused eligibility when it is truly eligible (B*>0), leading to wrongly 
retained benefits equal to 6.68% of the total benefit payable by the agency and to 
a group of the size of 23.2% of recipients not duly receiving state support. If all 
units were to apply, there would exist a 18.8% average conditional probability that 
a unit not truly entitled be mistakenly granted some state support leading to a 
correspondingly greater relative cost (7.55% of total benefit payable) in benefit 
levels. On this benefit basis Type II errors would thus appear potentially slightly 
more costly than type I errors. When we consider the number of mistaken cases, 
however, type I errors exceed somewhat those of type II.
In practice, units also face claiming costs which limit their utility to 
requesting a state benefit. Thus, given that a unit is truly eligible (B*>0), there 
exists a conditional probability of 30.2% that it does not receive the state support. 
The difference between the "occurrence" and the "potential" (0.302-0.181) shows 
the impact of inconveniences to claiming upon the desire of a truly eligible unit 
to take up the benefit. The cost of such type I errors -- both in the number of 
mistaken cases and in the sum of the benefits not granted to truly eligible units 
-- is also increased when we account for inconveniences to claiming. Conversely,
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costs to claiming reduce the likelihood of a Type II error arising because fewer 
"impostor" units then find requesting the benefit worthwhile; in other words, 
inconveniences to claiming then act as a screening device. Comparing the values 
for Type II errors under the column "Potential" to those lying below "Occurrence", 
we find that costs to taking up reduce the conditional probability of a Type II 
error arising from 0.188 to 0.098, and the level of mistakenly granted benefits 
decreases from 7.55% to 5.45% of the level of total benefit payable by the agency. 
The number of mistaken Type II cases also falls sizeably.
As discussed by Cornia and Stewart (1992) on the basis of data across a 
number of developing countries, the pursuit of a low level of mistakes of one type 
would thus characteristically spur the appearance of errors of the other type. The 
imposition of sizeable deadweight losses will therefore be optimal if the state's 
objective function does not discount much the size of gross benefits by the level 
of claiming costs incurred, but finds it explicitly or implicitly undesirable to grant 
help to those not truly deserving it. In this case, the government may well find 
it best to keep claiming costs high such as to keep the probability of Type II errors 
low. The optimal setting of claiming costs is then the outcome of a trade-off 
between decreasing the "occurrence" of Type I errors via a lower inconvenience 
to seeking the state's support, and decreasing the "occurrence" of Type II errors 
via a rise in the level of the same inconvenience. We will come back to this issue 
in the next chapter.
5- On the Fit of the M odel
Before we go on to throw some light on various take-up statistics, we might 
want an indication of how well our model fits the data of non-pensioners and
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pensioners alike. This can be seen from Figure 4.3a, which shows the cumulated 
number of observed and predicted claims from non-pensioners along the axis of 
the centiles of calculated entitlement Ba. The solid curve A shows the SB claims 
as observed in the FES, whereas the four others indicate claims predicted by the 
model under various assumptions. Hence, the second (B) curve displays the 
proportion of claims that would be obtained if we were to predict take-up on the 
basis of calculated entitlement only, with no costs to claiming and no adjustments 
for confusion of benefits. Under such assumptions, anyone calculated from FES 
data to have positive entitlement to SB would be predicted to register a SB claim. 
Curve B thus shows as a straight line as soon as calculated entitlement becomes 
positive.
To curve B we can then add curve C which exhibits the cumulated number 
of predicted claims of a unidimensional Probit model in which observations of 
claims and non-claims are explained solely by "modelling" errors and divergences 
in the computation of entitlement, using the entitlement indicators (Ba/UNIT, SN, 
SN*YGROS) of the complete model. That is, we run a simple Probit model using 
as exogenous variables those that appear in the vector of our entitlement 
indicators. Although such a model assigns observations of claims and non-claims 
to pure random errors in our computed level of entitlement and thus assumes no 
cost to claiming, it is structurally identical to all the models of Table 4.7 and serves 
to show once more the undesirable implicit design of previous enquiries into the 
allocative efficiency of state support. This restricted model easily fails a likelihood 
ratio test against the full model at a 1% statistical significance level11, but curve
11 The log-likelihood of this restricted model equals -567.98.
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C nevertheless explains remarkably well the cumulative distribution of claims, 
especially in comparison to the full model depicted by E. Thus, if a relatively 
efficient curve fitting (as opposed, say, to good explanatory power) of the take-up 
of SB were desired, a univariate Probit could be rim on all observations and all 
apparent failures to claim could be straightforwardly attributed to random  and 
systematic errors in calculating entitlement An immediate corollary of such a 
simple analysis would be the finding of 100% take-up rates if the basis of 
eligibility were that made by the DSS. The removal of all entitlement discrepancies 
would, under such assumptions, also lead to the observation of perfect rates of 
take-up, a feature which is, again, not intuitively very sound. Because of its 
structural lacunae, the model would moreover not be fit for assessing either the 
aggregate or the individual impact of tax and benefit reform.
We can also set a curve D displaying the prediction of claims using the 
estimates of the full model but subsequently assuming for predictions that there 
are no costs to claiming SB. The gap between curves D and E then illustrates well 
the impact of the estimated inconvenience to claiming upon the take up of state 
benefits. This graphical fit of E, the predicted claims using our full-fledged model, 
to A, the registered distribution of claims, is not perfect. The two curves follow 
each other fairly well throughout the range of entitlement, but there are some 
divergences around the level of 0 calculated entitlement w hen the model 
overpredicts the cumulative take-up of SB.
Figure 4.3b replicates the above procedure for the subsample of pensioners. 
There curve B, built from attributing predicted claims to the pure computation of 
entitlement, does not follow well the distribution A of registered claims. As
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expected, estimated costs carve a widening wedge between curves D and E. A 
statistical model built solely on ascribing claims to calculated eligibility and 
random  and systematic entitlement divergences would yield curve C of predicted 
claims; this would do no worse in the task of curve fitting  than our full model E, 
which allows for benefit confusion and which consistently overestimates the 
cumulative declaration of claims A.
D- On the Statistics of Benefit Take-up
We will, in this section , focus on some of the issues surrounding the rate 
of benefit take-up, i.e., the proportional importance of benefit receipts relative to 
benefit entitlement. We shall first consider how the rate can and should be 
defined empirically under varying assumptions and definitions12, and we will 
then examine the ways in which our econometric findings might provide evidence 
of the take-up of SB.
The rate of benefit take-up features prominently in analyses of the 
efficiency and equity of social security and state support13. It is clear, however, 
that a take-up rate has little analytical value; as a single indicator, it cannot but 
describe poorly the joint distribution of costs to claiming and benefit entitlement 
which is the essential structural tool to explain the impact of a government's 
intended support. As Fry and Stark (1987) point out, it is also obvious that the 
rate of take-up is not invariant to changes in the distribution of entitlement -- or,
12 Issues surrounding the definition of take-up in the context of state benefits 
(such as FIS and HB) that are structurally different from SB are described in Duclos 
(1992c).
13 See, for instance, on that topic the official 1985 government response [e.g., DSS 
(1989)] to opposition critics regarding the Supplementary Benefit, Family Income 
Supplement and Housing Benefit schemes, made public by the DSS.
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for that matter, to changes in the distribution of the burden of claiming — and 
thus to changes to government policy. We will consider this last point in greater 
detail in the next section.
The principal aim, in defining the index, must be to assess as accurately as 
possible the set of those claiming and that of those eligible to claim. One must 
also specify whether the interest is in those who are in principle positively entitled 
(B*>0) or in those who would be deemed by the government agency to be eligible 
(Bg>0). For the purposes of the exposition we shall initially assume that eg=0 and 
thus that B*=Bg. All errors of modelling e are thus made by the analyst and it is 
then possible to compute unbiased estimates of B*. We shall subsequently see how 
the optimal definition of the take-up rate might change w hen this assumption 
does not hold and when our estimates of e also subsume administrative errors 
made by the government agency. We finally provide some summary results based 
on our econometric estimates.
1- Absence of administrative errors (e^ 0 )  or take-up statistics based on 
administrative eligibility B„>0
We first assume that B* is exactly assigned by the government agency when 
assessing the entitlement of units. The results of this section should hold 
analogously if we simply wanted our take-up statistics to be based on 
administrative eligibility (Bg>0). By displaying the magnitude A to E of various 
sets, Table 4.10 shall help us consider various empirical definitions of the take-up 
rate, definitions which invariably involve the ratio of the size of a set of claimants 
over the size of a set of the eligible.
To evaluate the magnitude of these two separate sets, the habit of the DSS
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has been to combine its own statistical enquiry to estimate the number of 
claimants, A, and to add to it the number, C, of eligible non-claimants as 
estimated from the FES, yielding A/(A+C) as an estimate of the rate of take-up. 
We stress that, in contrast to us, the DSS is thus able to assess the number of 
claimants A from an alternative data set, whereas we m ust rely on the FES to 
provide information on both the set of claimants and the set of the eligible. The 
soundness of the DSS's procedure clearly depends on the accuracy of the 
Department's enquiry but also on the extent to which "errors of modelling" efl are 
made in the calculation of eligibility. Assuming that the two sources of 
information are broadly equivalent (i.e., in the limit the information which they 
would commonly provide on the set of claimants is identical), the DSS estimates 
will likely underestimate the actual rate of take-up, since the size (A+C) will 
include all those calculated to be eligible plus some units which would have been 
calculated to be ineligible recipients but which still appear in the denominator as 
entitled recipients since they declare claiming SB. In other words and for f/e<0, 
(A+C) overstates the number of the eligible since it includes through A all those 
considered eligible by the government agency (but whom  we may not have 
thought to be eligible) but fails to exclude from B those whom the agency would 
not have considered eligible (because we believe them to be eligible). Thus, even 
if A might provide an accurate estimate of the number claiming, adding A to C 
would overestimate the number of the eligible in the presence of purely random 
modelling errors efl. This is what would happen in Table 4.10, where we have 
assessed A using the FES; there, (A+C) overestimate in normal circumstances (i.e., 
in the absence of systematic and adverse entitlement errors pi£) the size of the set
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of eligible recipients.
Fry and Stark (1987) propose a different empirical definition of the take-up 
rate, which relies on the exclusive use of FES data and which they consider "to be 
a natural definition -- namely the proportion of those thought to be entitled to 
benefit who actually claim it" (p.5). They thus suggest using B/(B+C), the ratio of 
those claiming and thought to be eligible over those thought to be eligible. 
However, in the circumstances described above14, the measure B/(B+C) proposed 
by Fry and Stark does not help matters, for it further underestimates the take-up 
rate. Whereas (B+C) may estimate better than (A+C) the size of the set of eligible 
units, using B instead of A will generally underestimate the set of those claiming 
since it makes the status of claimant additionally conditional upon the status of 
calculated eligibility to SB. The correct estimate of an individual's "take-up" rate, 
based on Zf, is given by P[NB>0 /B*>0]. When Bg=B*, this conditional probability 
expands into
P[NB>0  I B ’>0] = PlNB>0 A f l ,> 0 ]  = P[W B>0] (22)
P [B ’>0] P [B ’>0]
To obtain an estimate of the "aggregate" take-up rate, one w ould need to divide 
the sum of all numerators by the total of all denominators. One would then obtain 
an asymptotically correct estimate of the size of the set of claimants over that of 
the set of the eligible. By making the relevance of claims dependent upon 
computed eligibility, Fry and Stark asymptotically sum the following numerators:
14 That is, eg=0 (no administrative errors) or when take-up is measured on the 
basis of DSS eligibility Bg.
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P[NB>0 A Ba>0] (23)
which are always strictly less than P[NB>0] whenever the probability of making 
random modelling errors efl is not null. The more variable is Ba around B*, the 
more will B/(B+C) understate the take-up rate when £g=0. Since B is always no 
greater than A, the measure B/(B+C) will underestimate the take-up rate further 
than the measure A/(A+C) proposed by the DSS. This can also be checked in 
Table 4.10, where the aggregate take-up rate falls from 66.5% when defined by 
A/(A+C) to 64.2% when described by B/(B+C).
The best estimate of the aggregate take-up rate that one could possibly 
provide, in the absence of an econometric model of entitlement and costs to 
claiming, is A/(B+C) -- possibly making, as much as is reasonably possible, ad 
hoc corrections for deficiencies in sampling and reporting procedures. This is 
because the best we can then hope is that A will be asymptotically equal to the 
population size of the set of claimants and that (B+C) would reasonably yield the 
best estimate of the number of the eligible. Ceteris paribus, there are then no a 
priori reasons for preferring B to A or (A+C) to (B+C). Using A/(A+C) or B/(B+C) 
would yield more accurate take-up estimates only by coincidence and only when 
systematic errors in efl are difficult to assess. In spite of the apparent awkwardness 
of including in the number A  some units which are calculated not to eligible to 
receive the benefit, A/(A+B) equals asymptotically the true take-up rate in the 
absence of systematic entitlement errors pe. As can be seen from Table 4.10, using 
A/(B+C) rather than A/(A+C) or B/(B+C) can make an important difference to 
the estimated aggregate take-up estimates. As mentioned above, this is necessarily
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true under the assumption of no administrative errors, 8^=0, or when we wish to 
measure the rate of take-up on the basis of eligibility as appraised by the DSS.
We can, however, do better in the circumstances and provide estimates of 
the sizes of the expected sets of those claiming and of those eligible. These are 
respectively shown in columns D and E, leading to the take-up rate D /E . D /E  
differs sizeably from A/(A+C) and B/(B+C), especially for subgroups such as 
pensioners and the self-employed. For pensioners, D /E  attempts among other 
things to redress the 'benefit confusion" bias which other studies would have 
likely tried to correct indirectly. For the self-employed, the increased take-up rate 
is mostly a cause of the revision of entitlement, allowing among other things for 
relative underreporting of income data. We also note that the "econometric" take- 
up estimate D /E  is in the aggregate closer to A/(B+C) than it is to the DSS's 
A/(A+C) and to Fry and Stark's B/(B+C).
2- Existence of administrative errors (e^O) and take-up statistics to be based on 
true eligibility (B*>0)
The usefulness of our econometric estimates to evaluate the aggregate rate 
of take-up depends on how closely we can assess efl (entitlement errors made by 
the analyst). It also hinges on whether we are interested in the probability that a 
unit claims given that it is truly eligible or given that it would be considered 
eligible by the government agency. In the latter case, we can use our estimates of 
the entitlement as assessed by the agency, Bg=Ba+e, to provide estimates of the 
take-up rate even if we cannot appraise efl separately; an individual probability of 
take-up is then P(NB>0 / Bg=Ba+e>0), where e=B -^efl and where efl is not separately 
identifiable. In the event in which P(NB>0 / B*=Ba-ea>0) is the desired measure,
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the soundness of using P(NB>0 / Bg=Ba+Eg-Ea>0) will rest on whether Eg can 
reasonably be neglected. If as a relative source of entitlement errors cannot be 
sensibly dismissed, B* differs significantly from Bg and none of the measures 
described above will necessarily yield better take-up estimates.
In the extreme case in which the analyst makes no errors in assigning 
entitlement, viz, t=0, Fry and Stark's B/(B+C) would provide the best estimate 
of the aggregate probability of receiving SB given that a unit is truly eligible 
(B*=Ba>0) and our econometric estimates D /E  would yield the correct probability 
of take-up given that a unit is judged eligible by the government agency 
(Bg=Ba+E>0). The use of B in B/(B+C) then succeeds in separating those who have 
been mistakenly granted SB and includes in the set (B+C) of the eligible some 
units who would mistakenly not have been regarded as eligible by the agency. 
However, if agents base their decision to request the benefit not on the level of B* 
but rather on a fairly accurate perception of Bg/ using D /E  even when e =0 then 
generates a better index of the costs and inconveniences to seeking SB.
3- Summary Results
It should by now be clear that our econometric model allows for the 
establishment of entitlement figures, Bg/ which can be significantly at odds with 
those provided by our initial estimates, Ba. Table 4.11 displays the effect of the two 
most important factors, moving from Ba to expected eligibility based on Ba and 
B2a/ and subsequently incorporating RB and RB2 in the computation of entitlement 
Bg. We see that (granting the probability that a unit mistakenly reports a 
retirement pension instead of its receipt of SB and taking expected values)
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expected eligibility -- both in number and in average benefit entitlement -- 
increases somewhat for pensioners, as was anticipated, along with a large increase 
in average benefit entitlement. The last column shows the size of the final and 
complete sets of the eligible, with a rise of more than 100 units compared to what 
was suggested by the use of calculated Ba. The bulk of that increase comes from 
the effect on the subsample of pensioners, whose entitlement we have estimated 
to be sizeably underestimated by Ba. Such reassessments of entitlement are, by 
themselves, expected to have an important impact on the rate of take-up, as can 
be checked on Figure 4.4. Using fully revised entitlement figures pushes down 
and right to B the take-up curve A based on calculated eligibility and on observed 
FES claims. Curves C and D display on the left vertical axis the average 
entitlement figures for each of the centiles of calculated entitlement of the 
horizontal axis, w ith revised entitlement D lying fairly close to calculated 
entitlement C.
We m ust not forget that one driving force behind the increase in projected 
entitlement is the failure of some pensioners to report accurately their SB receipt. 
In Figure 4.5, curve A plots observed FES claims from pensioners, whereas B 
shows predicted FES declarations of claims and C displays predicted claims by 
pensioners. Comparing A and B indicates that our predicted results fail to fill a 
fairly large accumulation of declared claims starting at revised entitlement Ba+p.e 
(allowing for the probability that B2a ought to replace Ba) of about £5, and 
suggests that a more refined model of pensioners' SB reports might be needed, 
allowing, say, for a lesser likelihood of benefit confusion for those w ith apparently 
low entitlement to (and lower needs of) SB, and conversely for the others.
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Nevertheless, we must also notice that the overall level of pensioners' reports of 
SB is well untangled, as the ultimate crossing of curves A and B shows. Finally, 
allowing for many more actual pensioner recipients of SB than there are, declared, 
in the FES data will, of course, swell the rate of take-up. Curve C of Figure 4.5 
exhibits this actual take-up rate predicted by our econometric results for 
pensioners; it is much higher than that displayed by A, which does not allow for 
mistaken concealments of SB receipts.
We end this chapter by summarising our take-up results in Table 4.12, 
where the findings are shown for the whole sample and for the subsamples of 
pensioners and non-pensioners and where eligibility is computed either on the 
basis of Ba or on that of Bg=Ba+e. The column "claim" shows that registered FES 
receipts of SB are closely interpreted by the econometric estimates and that 
expected actual claims are predicted to differ significantly from the declared ones 
by an amount of 645.0-518.9=126.1. Adding eligibility figures to these results 
permits the computation of take-up rates, which are shown on the two last 
columns. Because revised entitlement Ba+e (allowing for the probability that B2a 
ought to replace Ba) is on average greater than Ba, the last column shows estimates 
which are smaller than those based on Ba. Allowing for benefit confusion almost 
doubles the final estimate of pensioner take-up, increasing it from 43.8% to 78.3%, 
but due to a higher average estimated burden to claiming for that group, this 
take-up estimate still remains slightly lower than the non-pensioner take-up rate 
of 81.3% .
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Conclusion
This chapter applied the methodology developed in chapter III on 
furthering our understanding of the take-up of state benefits. We first modelled 
some of the suspected deficiencies of our 1985 FES sample of British family units 
and discussed the apparent socio-economic determinants of the take-up of SB. We 
subsequently presented the results of our estimation procedure. Among other 
findings, we note that, for our sample, random and systematic divergences 
between the calculation of entitlements by the government agency and by the 
analyst are substantial, and that ignoring them will lead to misleading positive 
and normative observations. A number of variables are estimated to have a 
statistically significant impact on the burden to seeking Supplementary Benefits, 
viz, the number of adults, absence from work, the importance of the income unit 
within the household, and the mean wage and the level of pre-SB gross income. 
Estimated costs to claiming vary greatly across types of units. Under some 
stronger assumptions, it is also possible to illustrate the extent to which 
administrative errors on the part of the government agency and costs to claiming 
may misallocate (or, in the case of costs to claiming, may sometimes help to 
allocate) state support among the population. We have also seen how the 
unsuspected presence of "modelling errors" may distort statistics on take-up rates 
and how an estimation of the level of entitlement as assessed by the government 
agency can amend our understanding of the take-up of state benefits.
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Table 4.1
Calculated Eligibility and Reported Claims of SB
in the FES Sample
Number of family units
Positive calculated 
entitlement
Negative calculated 
entitlement
Claim Not claim Claim Not claim
Total 453 253 50 759
Pensio­
ners
128 160 21 326
Self-
employed
4 12 0 181
Single
Parents
67 6 3 24
Table 4.2
Frequency Distribution of Claimants and Non-Claimants
Calculated Entitlement (Pounds Per Week)
Between
And
< -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 >
-80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 80
Clai­
mants
AF 0 0 0 0 4 1 7 12 26 128 31 127 67 40 31 23 3 3
RF 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.2 1.4 2.4 5.2 25 6.2 25 13 8.0 6.2 4.6 0.6 0.6
CD 0 0 0 0 0.8 1.0 2.4 4.8 9.9 35 42 67 80 88 94 99 99 100
Non-
Clai­
mants
AF 93 28 32 33 43 69 87 133 241 185 18 34 7 0 5 1 1 2
RF 9.2 2.8 3.2 3.3 4.2 6.8 8.6 13 24 18 1.8 3.4 .7 0 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2
CD 9.2 12 15 18 23 29 38 51 75 93 95 98 99 99 100 100 100 100
Take-
up1
41 63 79 91 100 86 96 75 60
AF: Absolute frequencies
RF: Frequencies relative to sample of claimants or no-claimants 
CD: Cumulative distribution at end point of range of entitlement
1 The rate of take-up (in %) is measured by range of entitlement, using the number of claims 
divided by the number of calculated eligible units.
Table 4.3
Population Eligibility and Take-up2 in 1985
DSS Data 
( Our Initial Data )
Number of recipient units 
thousands
0,
'O
Take up 
(caseload 
estimates)
Receiving
Eligible 
but not 
receiving
Total 4390 840 84
(2906) (1702) (63)
Pensioners3 1450 380 79
(980) (1023) (49)
Single Parents 520 20 96
(332) (26) (93)
2 Take-up rate as defined by the DSS: (number of claims) /
(number of claims plus number of eligible but not receiving) . The 
source of the DSS data is Department of Social Security (1989) .
3 In apparent receipt of a National Insurance pension.
Table 4.4
Amounts of Entitlements and Claims in 1985
DSS Data 
( Our Initial Modelled Data )
[Using FES Declared Receipts]
Average 
£ per week
Total value of SB 
£m per annum
S'
take-up4
(expenditure
based
estimates)
claimed5 not
claimed
claimed6 not
claimed
Total 25.50 12.60 5810 550 91
(20.20) (10.50) (3053) (929) (77)
[25.21] [3810] [80]
Pensio­ 7.60 4.40 570 90 87
ners7 (5.60) (4.19) (285) (223) (56)
[4.17] [213] [49]
Single 40.20 40.80 1090 40 96
Parents (27.25) (29.00) (470) (39) (92)
[37.13] [641] [94]
4 Take-up rate as defined by the DSS: value of benefit 
receipts over the combined value of receipts and that of 
calculated benefits apparently not taken up. Source of official 
DSS data: Department of Social Security (1989).
5 Value of benefit claimed (as defined in the second column 
to the right) divided by the number of claimants of the previous 
table.
6 For our grossed-up data ( ) , this is the amount of 
calculated benefits for those declaring receipt. For the FES data 
[ ], figures show grossed-up declared amount of receipts.
7 In apparent receipt of a National Insurance pension.
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Table 4♦5
Preliminary Sample Take-up Statistics (caseload)
Eligible Claim Group Take-up 
Rate8 (%)
Total Sample 702 503 72
Single Parents 73 70 96
Couples With 
Children
73 68 93
Couples 169 131 78
One-Adult Units 537 372 69
Special Housing 426 320 75
Renting, but not 
Special Housing
61 41 67
Head not Working 617 446 72
Older Units 326 175 54
Recipients of NI 
Pension
288 149 52
Self-Employed 16 4 25
8 Take-up rate calculated as number of claimants divided by- 
number of eligible. This is different from those measures used 
by the DSS and from those suggested by most previous studies.
Table 4.6
Estimation Results
Definitions Variables Estimates of Parameters 
(standard errors)
Cost Variables (X ) 
parameters=a
Original Normalised
Dependent Children CH -0.176
(0.200)
-3 .81 
(4.32)
Number of adults AD 1.49
(0.351)
32.2
(7.60)
Mean age of adults M (AGE, AGES) -0.0192
(0.00995)
-0.417
(0.215)
Single parents SING -0.498
(0.600)
-10.8
(13.0)
Head of household HEAD -0.749
(0.372)
-16.2
(8.05)
Mean education 
level
M(ED,EDS) -0.0053
(0.0303)
-0.109
(0.656)
Special housing COUNCIL 0.0905 . 
(0.197)
1.96 
• (4.26)
Renting, though not 
COUNCIL
RENT 0.505
(0.305)
10.9
(6.60)
National Insurance 
Pension Recipient
BPR 0.292
(0.393)
6.32
(8.51)
Square root of 
weeks absent from 
work
SQRT(WKAB) -0.407
(0.172)
-8.81
(3.72)
Head not working UNO 0.291
(0.334)
6.30
(7.23)
Self-employment SN 0.589
(0.770)
12 .8 
(16.7)
Mean hourly wage M(WAGE,WAGES) -0.296
(0.108)
-6.41
(2.34)
Log of gross income L(YGROS) -0.385
(0.123)
-8.35
(2.66)
Table 4.6 (continued) 
Estimation Results
Definitions Variables Estimates of Parameters 
(standard errors)
Entitlement Indicators (B m , B 2 t , 1 Original 
R B . R B 2 ) . oarameters p., and p.,
Normalised
Intercept UNIT 0.196
(0.105)
4.25 
(2.27)
Calculated
entitlement9
Ba,B2a 0.0462
(0.00403)
1.0
(-)
Self-employed SN -1.10
(0.908)
-23 .9 
(19.7)
Self-employed's gross 
income
SN*YGROS -0.0202
(0.0149)
-0.437
(0.323)
Other Variables
Probability of some 
pensioners not to 
report SB
BPROB 0.469
(0.0375)
0.469
(0.0375)
Effect on housing bene­
fit of claiming SB
BHCS 0* 0*
Standard deviation 
of costs
sin (^ ) 0.465
(0.00411)
9.66
(0.0890)
Standard deviation 
of benefits
cos (£) 0.885
(0.00216)
19.25
(0.0468)
Log-likelihood -461.92
Number of observations 1515
* : The estimate of p2  i - s  at its lower limit: the non-negativity 
constraint is binding.
9 B 2 a complements B a in the set of entitlement variables of 
those pensioners who may have confused a SB payment for one of 
NI basic pension. See the text for more details.
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Table 4.7
Comparison of Results with Previous Studies'10 
Effects on the Probability of Claiming
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)Our
estimat
es
E n t i t l e m e n t
P r e s e n c e  o f  
a d d i t i o n a l  
c h i l d r e n
NA NA
P r e s e n c e  o f  a d d i ­
t i o n a l  a d u l t s
+  / - +  / -
A g e +  / -
S i n g l e  p a r e n t +  / -NA + /-NA
H e a d  o f  h o u s e h o l d + / - NA NA NA NA
E d u c a t i o n NA
P r i v a t e  t e n a n t s
O w n e r - O c c u p i e r s + / -
S h o r t - T e r m
U n e m p lo y e d
NA NA NA NANA NA
H o u s e h o l d  I n c o m e + / -NA
P a r t - t i m e  W o rk NA NA NA
S p e l l s  A w ay  F ro m  
W o rk
+  / -NA NA NANA NA
L o n g - T e r m
U n e m p lo y m e n t
NA NANA NA NA NA
TX) Altmann (1981)
(B) Fry and Stark (1987) for non-pensioners
(C) Fry and Stark (1987) for pensioners
(D) Blundell, Fry and Walker (1988)
(E) Dorsett and Heady (1991) , on Family Income Support
(F) Dorsett and Heady (1991), on Housing Benefits
10 Altmann's study covered a sample of male pensioners gathered over 
several years of FES; Blundell, Fry and Walker analysed the take-up of Housing 
Benefits (HB), of which the determinants may conceivably be different from those 
of SB, also studied by Fry and Stark. Dorsett and Heady attempted to estimate the 
interdependence between the take-up of HB and that of Family Income Support (FIS) 
between 1984 and 1987. 'NA* is indicated when the effect of the characteristic 
was not part of the study. A ■ + ■ (or a "-•) shows that the characteristic is 
found to increase (or decrease) the probability of a claim, other things being 
equal. A manifests statistical significance.
Table 4.8
Expected Costs (£ per week) to Claiming Supplementary Benefits 
Variations in Circumstances of 3 Reference Units11
Changes in 
Characteristics
Family of 4 
AGE=35, 
AGES=30, 
CH=2
Single 
Parent, 
AGE=30, 
CH=1
Pensioner,
AGE=75,
UNO=l,
WKAB=0
(reference unit) 18.4 2.97 3.76
+1 child 15.4 2 .71 -
AGE => +10 15.2 2.68 3.33
AGE => -10 22.0 3 .32 4.30
ED => +6 17.9 2.92 3.69
COUNCIL=1 20.1 3.13 4.00
RENT=1 28.5 4.06 5.47
UNO=l, WKAB=26 3.66 1.45 -
SN=1 30.3 4.31 -
YGROS=50 16.9 2 .84 3.56
AD=2, AGES=7 0 - - 21.5
11 Initially, all typical units have the following 
characteristics, besides being home-owners: HEAD=1, WAGE=£4.5, 
YGROS=£40, ED=16, and, where applicable, WAGES=£2.00 and EDS=16.
Table 4.9
On Type I and II Errors,
Under the Assumption That £=6^ and B»=B*
Adjusted for the Estimated Probability of Benefit Confusion by Pensioners
Type I errors Type II errors
Potential
Bf£0|B*>0
Occurrence 
NB<*0 | B*>0
Potential 
Bo>01 B*^0
Occurrence 
NB>0|B*£0
Conditional probability of errors over 
the relevant sample
0.181 0.302 0.188 0.098
Costs of errors in benefit level (as 
% of total benefit payable by agency)
6.68 13.0 7.55 5.45
Number of mistaken cases (as % of 
total recipients)
23.2 38.8 20.0 10.4
Table 4.10
Calculating the Rate of Supplementary Benefit Take-up
A
Claim
B
Eligi­
ble
and
claim
C
Eligi­
ble but 
not 
claim
D
Predic­
ted 
to claim
E
Predicted 
to be 
eligible
A/
(A+C)
%
B/
(B+C)
%
A/
(B+C)
%
D/E
%
Total 503 453 253 645.0 806.7 66.5 64.2 71.2 80.0
Pensioners 149 128 160 286.7 366.4 48.2 44.4 51.7 78.4
Self-employed 4 4 12 5.2 7.9 25.0 25.0 25.0 66.4
Single Parents 70 67 6 68.9 72 .1 92.1 91.8 95.6 95.5
o? 
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Table 4.11
On Entitlement and Eligibility
number eligible to claim SB 
(average benefit entitlement)
Basis of eligibility calculations
Calculated 
entitlement, 
with Ba
Expected 
calculated 
eligibility, 
with Ba and B2a
Revised 
eligibility 
with RB and 
RB2
Total 706 758.21 806.73
(20.61) (29.15) (30.75)
Self- 16 23.09 7.86
employed (38.25) (32.44) (25.95)
Pensio­ 288 329.39 366.40
ners (5.19) (23.70) (25.29)
Single 73 70.24 72 .10
parents (29.89) (32.62) (34.76)
Table 4.12
The Take-up of Supplementary Benefits
Groupss and basis of computation Claim % Take-up12 % Take-up13
Total
as declared in FES sample 503 71.2 62.3
expected to declare in survey 518.9 73.5 64.3
expected SB claim 645.0 91.4 79.9
Pensio­
ners
as declared in FES sample 149 51.7 40.7
expected to declare in survey 160.6 55.8 43.8
expected SB claim 286.7 99.7 78.3
All but 
pensio­
ners
as declared in FES sample 354 84.7 80.4
expected SB claim 358.3 85.6 81.3
12 Basis of entitlement is calculated Ba.
13 Basis of entitlement is Ba+e, also allowing for B2a and RB2.
Figure 4.1
Entitlement and Distribution of Pensioners’ Claims
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Figure 4.2
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Figure 4.3a
Fit of our Model 
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Figure 4.3b
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Curves under the full model allow for benefit 
confusion and misreporting.
Figure 4.4
Entitlement and the Rate of Take-up 
Using Observed FES Claims
Mean of Entitlement Cumulative Take-up Rate
200 0.8
100
0.6
( 100)
0.4
(200 )
(300)
0.2
(400)
(500)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Centiles of Calculated Entitlement
A B
Take-up rate Take-up rate
Calculated entitlement Revised entitlement
Q
Centile mean of ^  D Centile mean of
calculated entitlement revised entitlement
Entitlement is either as originally calculated 
or as revised (with revision based on the econo­
metric results and including B2 and RB2)
Figure 4.5
Misreport of SB and the Rate of Take-up 
Data from Pensioners
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Chapter V: Income Support. Contracting Costs and
Social Welfare
Introduction
Our enquiry into the burden of claiming state benefits has made it possible 
to attempt to understand the behaviour of eligible claimants and their decision to 
avail themselves or not of state support. It has also enabled us to throw light on 
the presence of discrepancies between our assessment of entitlement and that we 
estimate would be carried out by the DSS. In this chapter, we will consider the 
theoretical and empirical effect of such imperfections in the administration of state 
benefits upon the optimal allocation of benefits and on social welfare and equity. 
That is, we go beyond the typical analysis of the effect of state benefits by 
considering not only what might have been their intended effect — e.g., granting 
income support to bring everyone at or above a particular poverty line — but also 
their unintended and suboptimal real impact on the members of a given society1. 
We shall proceed in several steps.
Firstly, we provide a simple model of the optimal allocation of state 
support in the absence of uncertainty but in the presence of units which differ by 
their levels of original income and costs to claiming. The analysis is conceptually 
different from the traditional study of optimal income taxation [as reviewed, for 
instance, in Tuomala (1990)], where labour supply and income generation are 
endogenous but where redistributive imperfections are generally ruled out [see
1 This impact will not include the deadweight losses which distortions of 
household behaviour entail, through, say, the effect of taxes and benefits on the 
choice of labour supply and savings.
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Stern (1982) for an exception to this]. We shall see that some simple rules which 
hold when income redistribution and poverty alleviation are costless do not hold 
anymore when more general cases are considered. Secondly, we throw some 
empirical light on the efficiency of government support in providing net benefits 
and thus in influencing the level of "social welfare". In the third section, we 
simulate the effect of changing marginally the administration of Supplementary 
Benefits in 1985 and we discuss briefly a few of the considerations involved in the 
optimal design of a redistributive policy. The last two sections present both a 
theoretical and an empirical analysis of the impact of allocative imperfections 
upon the level of progressivity, vertical equity, horizontal inequity and 
redistribution operated by income support programmes in Britain and elsewhere. 
At the end of this chapter, therefore, we shall have had a valuable survey of most 
of the important features of the optimal and empirical allocation of state support. 
A- Social Welfare and Redistributional Costs
In this section we provide an analytical illustration of how government 
benefits might be allocated to optimise the level of the state's objective function. 
Bourguignon and Fields (1990), who are concerned with "the measurement of 
poverty and the implications for anti-poverty policy" (p.409), have already noted 
some of the redistributive requirements of a state trying to lower some index of 
poverty in the presence of perfect targeting of poor units and in the absence of 
administrative and claiming costs. In particular, they consider how the optimal 
allocation of state support (as a function of pre-transfer incomes) to the poor 
population changes when different members of the class of poverty measures 
discussed in Foster et al. (1984) are chosen or when the Sen (1976) index is
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adopted. As we shall see more clearly soon, their analysis is a special case of ours.
Perfect targeting is, of course, not generally possible, and Kanbur (1985) 
analyses how, for the same Foster et al. (1984) class of poverty measures, the 
allocation of budget expenditures across distinct groups of the population (each 
containing initially some poor) should be made when there are spillovers of state 
benefits upon some who are not poor. In such circumstances, the state will want 
(through an optimal budget allocation) to equalise the marginal welfare returns 
to increasing budget expenditures in each of the groups; this, however, will not 
imply that indices of poverty will optimally take the same ultimate values in each 
of the population groups. Because of this, "a simple rule such as directing more 
expenditure towards a group with higher poverty is not necessarily optimal" 
(p.17). Expending aggregate expenditures uniformly over a group that has, for 
instance, a larger poverty gap than another one but has relatively fewer poor on 
a headcount basis would lead to relatively more squandering of state expenditures 
on non-poor units. On a similar note, Kanbur (1987) studies the principles of state 
support allocation when only broad and coarse redistributive tools (such as the 
grant of an equal absolute benefit to all) can be used.
When assessing an optimal redistributive scheme, the presence of imperfect 
information and a distaste of the associated imperfect targeting must naturally be 
coupled with concerns about the presence of allocative costs -- which would 
typically increase with any attempt to improve the accuracy of state support 
allocation. In fact, as Besley (1990) indicates, "imperfect information may also 
imply that the optimal cost to be incurred in claiming in claiming benefits is not 
zero" (p.126). The combined presence of both these features — imperfect targeting
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and allocative costs -- is as (and probably even more) important for developing
countries as it is for societies w ith more economically developed economies. As
Ravallion (1992) notes,
"Directly targeted poverty alleviation schemes have been widely used in 
developing countries. Assessing impacts on the poor is an important but 
difficult analytical problem, recognizing that administrative capabilities 
typically fall well short of what would be needed for perfect targeting, and 
so some often subtle but real costs are incurred by both poor and non-poor 
in participating" (p.97).
Besley and Coate (1992) examine precisely this question of the optimal 
distribution of participation costs in populations of poor and non-poor for which 
direct targeting is not possible. They analyse two separate incentive arguments for 
the optimal imposition of costs and workfare constraints on welfare programme 
participants: "a screening argument that work requirements may serve as a means 
of targeting transfers and a deterrent argument that they may serve as a device to 
encourage poverty-reducing investments" [Besley and Coate (1992), p.249]. They 
discuss among other things the various optimal allocative equilibria of work 
requirements and lump-sum grants among two groups that differ by ex ante 
unobservable ability. One finding is that imposing deadweight losses and 
constraints on claimants might sometimes be beneficial and so even more 
beneficial would it be to impose 'productive' workfare (standing in line waiting 
for benefits, for instance, would then be replaced by a valuable work contribution 
to the state). Making ability (and the status of poor) endogenous appears to 
increase even more the desirability of active workfare or cost-generating policies: 
increasing the burden of participating indeed encourages the generation of 
poverty-reducing ability.
In building models of optimal income support, there thus appear to be two
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main dimensions:
Perfect targeting Imperfect targeting
No allocative costs A l A2
Bourguignon and 
Fields
Kanbur
Allocative costs B1 B2
our analysis Besley and Coate
Bourguignon and Fields (1990) have focused on the A l class of models, where 
targeting is perfect and allocative costs for both the claimants and the 
administrative agency are null. Kanbur (1985, 1987) considered models based in 
the A2 class and thus did not ponder the presence of allocative expenses in 
granting state support. As clearly shown by the Besley and Coate (1992) analysis, 
and as documented somewhat by the evidence in Grosh (1992) on Latin American 
programme experience, these two dimensions are neither fully exogenous nor 
independent: In order to generate a greater degree of targeting perfection, an 
administrative agency may find optimal, for instance, to increase its operational 
costs or the costs which agents m ust incur in claiming a state benefit. The 
imposition of sizeable deadweight costs or burdensome workfare constraints 
would, for instance, be "more likely to be the optimal solution if the truly poor 
represent a small fraction of the target population" [Besley and Coate (1992), 
p.254]. This is confirmed by the empirical evidence in Ravallion and Datt (1992), 
where the presence of a high proportion of poor in two Indian villages leads to 
results suggesting that
"the direct impact on poverty in theses villages arising from [cost-inducing]
employment on rural public works scheme is no greater than could be
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achieved with a uniform (un-targeted) allocation of the same gross budget 
across all households" (p.21).
Welfare reforms would thus typically weigh the costs and benefits or moving
across A2 and Bl, but rarely would it of course be possible to induce both better
targeting and a fall in allocative costs for a constant aggregate budget level.
In studying the optimal allocation of state support for the class B2 of
models, one should therefore not take the degree of imperfect targeting as
exogenous, but rather as a function of the level of administrative and claiming
costs to allocating a state benefit. On precisely this, we already noted in Chapter
IV that there were empirical social welfare gains to the presence of claiming costs
— they reduced the occurrence of the Type II errors, those by which undeserving
units are awarded state support. The presence of both Type I and Type II errors
is a clear case of imperfect targeting; when we add to this the empirical presence
of allocative costs, we thus naturally find the class B2 of models to be the most
realistic one. We leave, however, the study of this more encompassing class of
models to some future endeavour.
Our intent for now is — in contrast with the earlier studies to which we
referred above -- to define the optimal allocative policy for the Bl cases, those in
which perfect targeting and identification of units is possible but for which
redistributive costs exist. As noted above, these costs can be both administrative
(directly borne by the state) and incurred by benefit applicants and recipients
(such as those estimated in the last chapter). Later, we shall consider a practical
example (using the results of the previous chapter) of a way in which the state
may determine the optimal respective sizes of administrative and claiming (or
participation) in the total allocative costs. We shall also comment on how our
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results would be affected by the impossibility (for various reasons) of perfect 
targeting.
We first assume that the redistributional or poverty alleviation objectives 
of the state are described by a social welfare or objective function of the form:
SW = Y , W&'+NByZ) (1)
ieS
where X- is the original income of unit i and NBU the net benefit to unit i, of the 
offer of a benefit B*, and where S defines the set of units over which the social 
welfare function SW is defined. Z is a vector of all relevant policy parameters. As 
it stands, SW is akin to that used by Atkinson (1987) in attempting to encompass 
most proposed indices of poverty. Thus, if S is the set of poor people and W is 
linear, for instance, in X,+NB„ SW will be a linear transformation of the "poverty 
gap" once state support has had its impact in the shape of net benefits. In general, 
however, SW can take a variety of shapes and yield wide classes of poverty or 
inequality measures. SW might then be seen as an element of a larger social 
welfare function, an element for the maximisation of which the government 
allocates a budget B, such that
£  B "  <. B (2)
ieS
with B** the actual level of benefit received by unit i. B* represents the level of the 
offer by the state of some benefit to unit i. Thus, if B* is less than Cf, the positive 
cost to unit i of claiming B*ir then the award of the benefit B*\ and the net benefit
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NB; will be null. However, when B*>Cif then B~-B*- and NBf=B*-Cz. Alternatively, 
if C, represents a level of administrative costs necessary to grant income support 
to unit z, Bj* is the level of expenditures (gross of administrative costs) which the 
state is willing to spend on unit z, B** is the level of gross expenditures actually 
spent on z, and NB, is the level of benefit net of administrative costs which 
eventually reaches the unit. Costs C, are only incurred when the gross offer of 
help B* is in fact claimed or granted. The government department responsible for 
the administration of B will thus wish to
max SW = £  W(Xt+NBiyZ)
{B*\ieS} ieS
subject to ^2 Bi*zB (3)
ieS
with B**=NBi=0 if B*<Ct ,
B**=B* and NBr B*i *-Ci if B*i zCi
NBj and B~ are not differentiable with respect to B* at the point at which unit z 
becomes effectively entitled to and in receipt of state support, viz, when BZ‘=C,. 
This causes no analytical difficulty since, as we shall see, the optimum solutions 
of B* for this maximisation problem will never have to lie at the corner points
b;=c .
We define % as the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint, 
and W' as the non-negative derivative of W  with respect to its first argument. 
Thus, to maximise SW, the government will wish to ensure that the following 
condition is met at the optimum values of B* and X, for each of the units in the 
set S to be in receipt of state support:
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dNB.
W'^+NB,#) ■-----   = X
dB,
da; dB;
(4)
The optimum value of X will reflect the social welfare opportunity cost of not 
using government resources for state purposes other than granting benefits B* 
(such as reducing taxes). We shall discuss later the optimal conditions of receipt 
(i.e., whether, for unit i, NBt>0) of state support. For now, we nevertheless note 
that the allocation of benefit offers Bf* below Cz will not matter, for then 
dNB/dB*=dB**/dB*=0; that is, the offer of gross government benefits has then no 
welfare impact and no costs since it is not taken up and it is not granted. For 
those units to which the state will optimally not wish to grant gross support B* 
in excess of the necessary redistributive costs C*, we thus find the equilibrium 
condition W'(Xj+NBi,Z)*dNB/dB*=0.
The above equilibrium condition for those to be in receipt of income 
support assumes that an interior solution for B* then exists for each recipient unit 
and that, in particular, the functions W are continuously differentiable at each of 
the optimal value of X,+NB,. There are immediate instances in which this is not 
the case. The adoption as a SW function of the head count measure, for which W 
takes a constant value until X,+NBZ reaches a given cut-off level -- say, a poverty 
line equal to Zp -- makes W discontinuous. This SW function will force the 
government to distribute B** in such a way as to raise above the given cut-off 
level Zp as many as the units in the set as possible. In order to do this, it will 
grant income support Zp-X,+C, first to that poor unit for which that amount is 
lowest, then to the poor unit with the second lowest Zp-Xj+Q, and so on until the
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budget B has run out.
Considering the poverty gap as the functional form of W makes SW  
continuous but not continuously differentiable with respect to Xt+ N B Choosing 
it as the preferred W  function would force the state to choose recipient units in 
order to maximise the returns in poverty gap reduction per unit of state 
expenditure. In other words, the state will wish to minimise the aggregate level 
of claiming and administrative costs incurred for the total level of expenditures 
B. Or said again differently, the state will attempt to fill as much as possible of the 
poverty gap, avoiding as much as possible in the process the wasteful spill-over 
of government expenditures as compensation for administrative and taking-up 
expenses. Because there are fixed costs to allocating government support per 
claimant, once a desirable benefit recipient has been identified, the state will wish 
to spend on him as much as is necessary to raise his net income to Zp. Thus, the 
government's agency ought to compute an "efficiency" ratio (Z -X)/(Z -X{+C) of 
full poverty gap reduction over expenditure for each unit i, and grant benefit 
Bt*=Z -Xj+Ci first to that unit with the greatest "efficiency" ratio, then to that with 
the second highest ratio, etc., until the budget B is depleted2. Because some 
income assistance to some relatively poor units may yet arouse relatively high 
claiming costs — or necessitate relatively high administrative expenses — the state 
may thus find it preferable to grant income support to relatively richer units. We
2 If the choice of B is made on the basis of an exogenous X (i.e., given a constant 
level of opportunity cost of government expenditures), the state will generally find 
it optimal to grant units in S either the full support necessary to bring them to Z , or 
no support at all. In the event, however, in which there were some leftover B that 
was not sufficient to raise any one of the remaining units up to Zp/ the government 
would then need to compare carefully the possible average poverty gap reduction per 
unit of expenditures for each of the remaining units.
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shall discuss more thoroughly below the optimal conditions of poverty alleviation 
under the choice of the poverty gap as the SW objective function.
Whether a unit derives any net benefit from the offers of B * depends on its 
original income X- and upon the redistributive cost Cf of granting it state support. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates this dependency. The straight line X-B* displays the 
opportunity cost in social welfare of granting to unit i a benefit B*. The claim of 
such a benefit to unit i will, however, bring a net benefit NBt that will increase Wf 
(the contribution of i to the "social welfare function" SW) upwards from 0, the 
normalised starting position, once the claiming burden has been redressed. The 
shape of W, above 0 will depend on the concavity of the function W iX^NB^Z) 
with respect to its first argument and on the original income X,-. Units for which 
it is possible to find a level of expenditure B-* for which W(X-+B-”-Q,Z) -W(Xz,Z) 
>XB** will be conceded eligibility. Whether W; eventually reaches X-B* — and 
whether, therefore, the social welfare benefit of granting state support to unit i is 
worth its opportunity cost — will thus also hinge on the size of C„ the size of the 
claiming and administrative costs that limit the appeal and the welfare impact of 
gross expenditures B*\
We show on Figure 5.1 four examples of units. Unit 1, which faces expenses 
C3, will happily be offered and claim benefit B3*, w ith a net benefit reward of 
NB3=Bj*-Cj. The SW improvement produced by such a grant, measures by W3 at 
B/, greatly exceeds the opportunity cost XB1* of spending B3\  Unit 2, which faces 
the same inconvenience to claiming but has a higher original income, will barely 
be deemed to be eligible, just as is the case regarding unit 3 with a lower X but 
a much higher C. Once qualified and claiming, however, the two units 2 and 3
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will receive what may be a sizeable net and gross benefit, thus showing an 
important discontinuity in the allocative function of optimal state support. From 
the above optimality condition, we may indeed note that, when B* is claimed, the 
corresponding net benefit shall equalise the post-benefit claimants' income, net of 
claiming costs; that is, at the optimum:
Xl +NBl = X2+NB2 = X3+NB3 = e (5)
where e is that value of net income which all eligible units will enjoy (equal, as 
seen above, to Zp w ith the use of the headcount and poverty gap measures as W). 
Unit 4, which enjoys a relatively large X and moreover faces high costs, does not 
benefit from the programme. The shape of the curves W, of the social welfare 
contribution of net benefits NBt thus determines if unit i is to be deemed worthy 
of the state's income support. For instance, all those units with:
original income no less than X2 and costs greater than C2, 
or original income greater than X2 and costs no less than Q , 
or original income no less than X3 and costs greater than C3, 
or original income greater than X3 and costs no less than C3 
ought not to be allocated state support. From this, we may already see that the 
greater the trouble to claiming, Q, the less the chance of receiving a positive B* 
but the greater this B* is if the benefit is claimed; furthermore, the greater its 
original income Xf, the less likely is the unit to take up a positive B- and the 
smaller is B* if it is claimed.
One could extend this exercise to a whole population of functions W curves 
and determine the set of (Cif X )  for which a benefit would be payable by the state.
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The shape of this set would, of course, depend on the nature of the SW  function 
adopted. We illustrate this using two examples.
1- The Poverty Gap
The adoption of the poverty gap measure as an index of SW implies the 
use of W^-tZp-iXi+NBj)] as a functional form for WiXj+NB^Z). A unit i would then 
be granted eligibility to state support if the absolute change in the poverty gap 
from a receipt of B** did not fall below the opportunity cost of B*\ For all such 
eligible units, the state will also w ish to raise their net income to the poverty line, 
Zp, w ith gross benefits or expenditures equal to BT=Zp-Xz+Cz. Hence, units will be 
deemed eligible to state support if and only if:
i  kB", with B "  = Zp-Xi+Ct (6)
We can think of X here as the value attached to reducing the government budget 
revenue requirement relative to using the money to reduce the poverty gap, with 
the numeraire being a £1 reduction in the poverty gap. A person or a society may 
feel, for instance, that a £1 reduction in the poverty gap is worth a £2 increase in 
tax raised, with a consequent welfare value of X of X=l/2. Thus, for units to be 
eligible, the welfare benefit of poverty gap reduction m ust exceed the opportunity 
cost (in welfare units) of gross state expenditures on unit i. Otherwise, state 
expenditures would be better spent elsewhere than on income support, or taxes 
could be beneficially cut. Rearranging the above expression, we equivalently find:
Bt > Ci+XBi (7)
(gross expenditures k allocative cost + opportunity cost)
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where, again, B ~=Zp-X;+Q. Allocating income support entails both administrative 
and claiming costs as well as the opportunity costs of the gross expenditures, and 
in determining whether unit i should receive such assistance the sum of the costs 
involved must not surpass the social welfare value of the expenditure. Finally, we 
can deduce a third equivalent eligibility condition:
(1-A.) • (Zp-Xt) ± XCt (8)
{net welfare value o f poverty reduction ^ welfare cost)
This makes the eligibility choice more explicitly dependent on the net value in 
welfare of a possible state's redistributive intervention. If the welfare value of the 
fall in the poverty gap (net of the opportunity cost of such a reduction) exceeds 
the value in welfare of the deadweight allocative cost Cf, eligibility will be 
granted; if not, the unit ought not be entitled to state assistance.
The definition of an optimal set of claimants can thus be made on the basis 
of an opportunity cost in welfare, X, and on the interaction of X, and Cf. From the 
above conditions, we see that all units with
C, s ^ - ( Z p-X )  (9)
will fulfil the prerequisite to eligibility to income support Bf"=Z -Xj+Q. A value 
of X equal to 1 would deny eligibility to all units w ith costs greater than zero; the 
lower the value of X and thus the lower the opportunity cost of government 
expenditures, the easier it is for units to qualify for income support. The condition 
above thus explicitly defines a (convex) set of the eligible for which the location
255
of the border is governed by a linear trade-off between Cz and X;. To know the 
precise position of such a border and the size of the set of the eligible, we must, 
of course, stipulate directly or indirectly the perceived value of the opportunity 
cost of government expenditures, X. Doing this involves for the state either of 
three policies:
- set the value of X directly, taking into consideration the social welfare 
value of reducing tax revenues relative that of decreasing the poverty gap;
- establish a budget level B that reflects the government's political or 
economic "capacity" to pay and derive the associated value of X;
- determine a point (X^C) that lies on the border of the eligibility set and 
calculate the associated X.
We shall here adopt the third option, which combines advantages of greater 
wieldingness and of easier and more intuitive interpretation. At the border of 
eligibility, we note that:
Z — X. , x
X = — I— l—  (10)
c t+z p - x t
If we were to agree that, for instance, units for which the sum of claiming and 
administrative costs would equal one-quarter of the poverty line and with original 
income one-half of the same line (viz, C/Zp=0.25 and X /Z p=0.5) would barely be 
deemed to fit in the set of optimal claimants, we would infer an associated X-2/3. 
This indicates that a £2 decrease in the poverty gap is deemed, at the margin, 
socially worth a £3 increase in taxes. W ith this information, we can then define the 
whole set of the eligible. This derived value of X-2/3 would tell us, for instance,
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that units with no original income at all would yet not enter the optimal set of the 
eligible if the costs associated w ith the state's income support were to exceed 50% 
of the level of the poverty line. All those deemed eligible would, however, be 
granted government support B^Z^-Xf+Q that would equally raise their net 
income to Zp.
2- The Square of the Poverty Gap
Our second illustrative functional form for W, and SW is inspired by a class 
of measures discussed by Foster et al. (1984) for which
WiX^NBpZ) = -(Zp-(Xi+NB))a , with a>0 and ZpzXi+NBi (ID
The measure just discussed in the previous section and based on the poverty gap 
is straightforwardly obtained with a=l. We develop here the special case of a-2, 
but (as shall become even clearer) we must stress that the results of our model are 
general to a wide class of SW  functions. Analogously to the first example above, 
units found to be eligible to state support on this new criterion will be those for 
which the social welfare gain of government assistance exceeds the opportunity 
cost of the gross expenditures:
{Zt - X f  -  (Zp-Xr B;*+C,)2 * A.B,** (12)
with XtzZp
and where, for those eligible and as found above, Bi**=e-Xi+C,, e being that 
constant value to which the net income of all eligible units will be raised. We can
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then develop this algebraic expression, as we did for the case of a=l or for the 
more simple poverty gap measure above, and find that eligible units will fulfil the 
prerequisite that:
XCt i  - i 2 + 2 i-% i + x f-2X,+Xx( (13)
The variables with "hats" (or A) are those as previously defined but normalised by 
the poverty gap (e.g., e=e/Zp). Hence those units for which the allocative burden 
of granting income support is sufficiently low will be deemed eligible by the state. 
Because the return to decreasing the square of the poverty gap decreases as net 
income approaches Zp/ redistributive policy will only be applied to unit i if 
\<2*(Zp-X ), the initial marginal welfare return to raising the income of unit i. If 
this condition were not satisfied, unit i would not receive income support even 
in the absence of administrative and claiming costs. Using this feature, it can also 
be shown that the likelihood of a unit remaining eligible decreases as its original 
income X, rises.
Hence, the above equation defines a set of eligible units based on values 
of original incomes X; and allocative costs C{. Those units with low original 
incomes or low costs will be granted eligibility; the others will not be considered 
optimally fitted to receive state support. The value e of the constant level of net 
income which all eligible units will enjoy is intrinsically linked to the opportunity 
cost of government expenditures % by the equilibrium condition that at such level 
of net income e the marginal welfare gain of increasing the value of the state's 
transfer to an eligible unit is precisely equal to the opportunity cost % of such 
additional expenditure. If such a condition did not hold, the government would
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clearly find it optimal to increase its support to the relevant eligible unit (instead 
of granting assistance to a new, additional unit) since administrative and claiming 
costs would then already have been "sunk". Hence, it m ust be that
£  =  2  • (1  - i )  ( 1 4 )
Using this expression, the border of the eligibility set can now defined by
Xt -  2eX, + *  (15)
2 ( 1  - i )
To define the precise set of eligible units in terms of the state must
therefore only determine (directly or indirectly) the parameter value of the 
opportunity cost of state expenditures, %. As before, the government may either 
set X directly, agree on a budget B, or rule on the location of one of the border 
points of the eligibility set3. In addition, the state could also decide on the level 
of e at which it feels that the level of all eligible units' net income should be 
raised.
In adopting such a stance, we explicitly express a value judgement on the 
limit of acceptability in the use of costly redistributive tools. For a given SW 
functional form, choosing a border point (or a budget B, opportunity cost %, or 
equalised net incomes e) defines the limiting edge passed which we do not feel
3 Presumably, by setting the location of two of the border points or by combining 
information from two of the options opened to the government (e.g., setting B and 
finding a border point) the state could also derive the associated values of the 
parameters % and a — the parameter of the Foster et al. poverty aggregate which we 
take to be equal to 2 in this example.
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that there exists any net social welfare gain to income redistribution. This has 
repercussions not only in establishing one of the limiting cases of redistributive 
policy, but also in settling the whole set of the poor units which will be in receipt 
of the state's support and in setting the point of equal net income to which we 
would like to raise the income of some of these poor units of a society.
We illustrate the policy implications involved in such a choice by using the 
same border unit as that already introduced4: (C—0.25, X —0.5). For such a border 
point we find e=0.809 and X=0.382. Using the inequation above defining the 
eligibility set, we note that when X,=0, for instance, allocative costs can go up to 
C—1.71 of the poverty line before eligibility to income support ought to be 
withdrawn. This high deadweight value of C is nevertheless consistent w ith the 
achievement of the social welfare objective of the state as embodied here by the 
minimisation of the square of the poverty gap. For all eligible units, net income 
will be raised to e=0.809 w ith state expenditure being equal to When
there are no costs to redistribution, units with original income X, up to the point 
of e will qualify for state support. Figure 5.2 describes such policy implications 
graphically by showing both the set of the eligible units -- as a function of their 
original income X, and of the administrative and claiming costs involved in 
attempting to grant income support to such units -- and, on the vertical axis, the 
level of expenditures which the government would find optimal to bestow on 
them for purposes of income redistribution and poverty alleviation. All variables
4 We could of course increase the "generosity" of our redistributive and poverty 
alleviation scheme by increasing the units' level of costs or of original income for 
which we would still find it acceptable to grant income support. This would 
correspond to a lower valuation of the welfare opportunity cost of government 
expenditures and to a greater value of e.
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are normalised by the poverty line Zp, and the definition of the eligibility set is 
that derived in this section for a SW based on the square of the poverty gap.
3- Lessons of the Theoretical Model on the Optimal Redistributive Policy
There are important lessons to be retained from such a figure and from our 
general analysis. First and as said above, entitlement and expenditure rules similar 
to those portrayed on Figure 5.2 can be derived for the whole class of SW 
measures. In this study, we have made them explicit only for the headcount, the 
poverty gap and the square of the poverty gap measures. As said above, this class 
of SW measures can also encompass indices of redistributive desirability that 
incorporate units that would not necessarily be classed as absolutely or relatively 
poor. Second, state expenditures B **(or B on Figure 5.2) for those eligible optimally 
grow in order to compensate fully for lower original income or higher allocative 
expenses. Two eligible units, for example, with equal respective differences 
between allocative costs and original incomes will be granted the same level of 
state expenditures and be raised to the same level of net incomes.
Third, the case of no claiming and administrative burden is a special case 
of our investigation: On Figure 5.2, it shows along the line where C=0. In the 
presence of allocative costs, some well-known and intuitive results do not hold 
any more. It is not true, for instance, that the state is indifferent as to the identity 
of the poor recipients of assistance aimed at decreasing the poverty gap; as we 
saw above, there are clear directions on who among the poor should be relieved 
for poverty. Similarly, we notice on Figure 5.2 that all units with zero costs are 
optimally eligible to state support regardless of their own resources. With positive 
or growing costs, eligibility quickly becomes restricted to the very poor. As the
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burden of assisting units rises, the marginal welfare gain of supporting those with 
relatively high original incomes rapidly falls below the opportunity cost of not 
spending the state budget on other units or for other purposes. Hence, as long as 
there prevail at least some administrative or taking up expenses in the allocation 
of state support, not all income units should be raised to the same final net 
income, but an optimal selection would rather need to be made on the basis of 
original income and levels of allocative expenses. This result does not require the 
existence of varying allocative burdens across units: Although the more positive 
the empirical correlation between levels of original income and redistributive 
costs, the greater the chance that poor units would be deemed entitled to state 
support, we only require that there exists at least some burden to reaching the 
better off poor for the richer of them not to feature in the optimal set of claimants. 
This can be seen on Figure 5.2 for those units with X; at or slightly below 0.8, 
which swiftly become suddenly ineligible to state assistance w ith small increases 
in the level of the redistributive costs necessary to support them. This non­
convexity of the optimal level of state expenditures (or entitlement in the absence 
of administrative burdens) as a function of original income also occurred, for 
instance, in SW measures that are discontinuous even with C~0 — such as a SW 
base on a poverty headcount. With this latter index, w ith zero allocative costs and 
for a limited budget B, the state might find optimal to raise out of the poverty set 
only those units w ith original incomes above a particular floor level. The presence 
of allocative costs generalises the presence of such non-convexities to the whole 
class of SW functions.
Fourth, our theoretical model suggests features of optimal redistribution
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that are somewhat disturbing, at least when considered in the context of our 
discussion in earlier chapters. We have noted earlier that, on account of varying 
allocative costs to reaching units, some relatively richer ones might be deemed 
optimally eligible to income support whereas some poorer units might be denied 
it. This result clearly casts doubt on the welfare attributes of the measures of 
vertical equity introduced in Chapter II. Supporting the poorer and not the richer 
may generate a greater level of vertical equity and of redistribution but is not 
necessarily optimal if units differ in ways (other than their original income) that 
are relevant to the redistributive effectiveness of the state -- such as the presence 
of varying allocative costs.
As importantly, our theoretical findings here on an optimal redistributive 
policy of the state also extend an extra shadow on the social welfare bearing of 
our measures of horizontal inequity. On Figure 5.2, we note that all eligible units 
will receive income support £ ”=0.809-%+^ that will raise their net income to 
0.809, also the level of expenditures B disbursed on units with &=0 and C=0 (the 
vertical height at the point to the farthest right of Figure 5.2). There are, however, 
many units with X<0.809 who do not qualify for state support and whose net 
income will consequently have to lie below that level. Once optimal state 
redistribution has taken place, therefore, some of the originally poorer units will 
enjoy a level of net income above that of formerly richer units.
This reranking is especially likely for those richer units presenting high 
levels of allocative costs; furthermore, it will also occur among those relatively 
rich and poor units generating identical allocative expenses. Even more 
significantly and as can additionally be seen from Figure 5.2, there are originally
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richer units w ith an associated allocative burden lesser than that of units 
originally poorer that will be denied eligibility and end up  relatively worse off 
than their initially poorer counterparts. This is explained by the feature that in 
allocating optimal income support, the state ought to choose the recipient units 
among those for which the net social welfare gains are the greatest; once the 
redistributive expenses have been incurred, the government will spend on the 
eligible units as much as is necessary to raise these formerly poorer units to a 
relatively high net income level. If deemed to be socially important, the explicit 
consideration of horizontal inequity as a social evil would thus necessarily restrain 
the effectiveness of state redistribution as measured by the class of SW measures. 
B- Policy Effectiveness: Costs, Benefits, and Net Benefits
Costs to claiming act in the above model as a deadweight loss which the 
government will attempt to avoid by concentrating its offers of help onto those 
units with lower original incomes (to the extent that W exhibits such an 
inclination) and lower costs to claiming. Only when greater equality of X^+NB; is 
desired among the relevant population would the state be willing to widen the 
set of eligible units and to dissipate more funds as implicit compensation for 
higher claiming inconveniences. As a rule, and ignoring the competing issue of 
fairness and greater equality, it is thus also more efficient to concentrate 
additional help on those already claiming, for whom no more resources are 
squandered on paying for the fixed burden of taking up, thus providing an 
argument against enlarging the set of units eligible to state support and 
decreasing it whenever possible, for the same overall budget B.
Needless to say, trying in practice to allocate benefits on the basis of the
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size of at least partially unobservable and unidentifiable take-up costs is rather 
difficult, and may generate a considerable degree of perceived and real inequity. 
Because the size of administrative and (in particular) claiming costs is often 
difficult to assess and cannot therefore be used as a reliable and discerning guide 
to poverty alleviation and to the redistributive allocation of state support and 
taxes, we may not allow the C, of the previous section to feature explicitly in the 
individual allocative rules derived above. Similarly, it may be that the government 
is concerned with income rather than with utility or individual welfare. In the 
present context, the state could leave out the costs of claiming when evaluating 
the impact of transfers -- because, for instance, it attaches no weight to the time 
costs of the claimant or to the disutility of effort or stigma.
There may also be political reasons for which an explicit dependence of 
expenditures on taking up or administrative costs is not permitted (e.g., pressure 
groups are concerned about the spread of equal net benefits to units with identical 
original incomes, not about the possibly differing costs in gross expenditures). As 
Kanbur (1987) notes, "the administrative costs of schemes which attempt even 
moderate targeting turn out to be excessive, and any scheme which relies on 
bureaucratic vetting of low-income households on a case-by-case basis is open to 
corruption and manipulation" (p.72). The government may therefore be politically 
or practically constrained to derive an expenditure formula, B(X), that depends 
explicitly only on original income X (assuming we can at least reliably observe 
it...). The gain of making the explicit formula B(X) implicitly dependent upon the 
distribution of C would then hinge both on the accuracy of our appraisal of the 
distribution of administrative and claiming expenses and on the shape of the
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conditional density function, f(C/X). The less precise our assessment of the 
distribution of C or the lesser the empirical dependence of C on X, the lesser the 
interest of adapting the allocative formula B(X) to take into account the 
distribution of redistributive costs.
It can also be suggested (Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982)) that 
inconveniences to claiming play a useful role in separating deserving recipients 
of state support from "impostors"; this can occur when income (say) and thus 
correct entitlement cannot be accurately monitored by the DSS, but when the 
value of the benefit or that of the costs to claiming are nevertheless function of the 
unobserved correct levels of income and "merit". If the level of inconvenience to 
the process of claiming a state benefit decreases w ith the imperfectly observable 
true level of entitlement, the imposition of deadweight losses will impose greater 
relative annoyances on the charlatans and can thus succeed in extracting some of 
the impostors from the process of claiming; that is, "the demeaning qualification 
tests and tedious administrative procedures involved in many transfer 
programmes 'm ay' serve such a sorting function" (Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982, 
p.376). Or, as Ravallion sets it in the context of developing countries, "work 
requirements can provide seemingly excellent incentives for self-targeting in that 
the non-poor rarely w ant to participate and a great many of the poor do" (p. 102). 
The additional transfer of resources from the "rich" to the truly poorer that is then 
possible may well yield social welfare benefits that exceed the costs which the 
burden of claiming or participating imposes on the remaining state support 
recipients. This policy would become even more attractive if the imposition of 
costs on claimants helped diminish expenses of administering the transfer
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programmes.
It is thus interesting to consider the extent to which resources might be 
empirically "dispelled" by existing benefit systems as simple compensation for the 
cost of taking up state support. Our econometric estimates allow us to do this, 
and we illustrate the results in £ per week in Table 5.1. The amount of benefits 
paid appears in the second column, and net benefits flowing from the grant of SB 
are indicated in the last one. The average level of predicted benefits per claimant 
is well over £30 per week, except for pensioners. The third column of Table 5.1 
displays the level of costs which we would expect, ex ante, units with observable 
cost characteristic Xa to face if they claimed SB. The next column shows the level 
of costs incurred by the same units when they choose to claim. The cost figures 
of the third and fourth columns differ since those units w ith unexpectedly (and 
unobservably) low costs to requesting the state benefit will also be more likely to 
claim Supplementary Benefits. The discrepancy between "ex ante expected costs" 
and actual "costs incurred" thus displays the extent to which the decision to take 
up SB reveals lower than ex ante expected costs on the part of the units.
The total net benefit is equal to 82.8% of the total payment of SB; this 
would suggest that approximately one-fifth of the total income support (SB) 
budget might be lost to claimants in the form of various inconveniences to 
claiming. Thus the net benefit of state support to recipients can differ sizeably 
from the level of benefits offered. As we have seen above, this can have important 
implications for the desirability and efficacy of transfer programmes. It also ought 
to influence the labour supply choices of those comparing the utility of full-time 
work, say, with that as a state support recipient, for which studies have typically
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assumed that no cost was attached to the receipt of state support. Average costs 
per claimant are highest for the self-employed and lowest for the single parents; 
that, indeed, makes the average claiming self-employed much worse off from 
claiming SB than an average single parent and slightly less well off than an 
average pensioner, though a look at the "benefits" column indicates that self- 
employed units are expected to receive, in gross benefits, on average more than 
pensioner units. Inferring post-benefit welfare from the level of benefits claimed 
might therefore be a tricky procedure, even for comparisons of group averages. 
Contrasting columns 3 and 4 also shows that taking into account the inevitable 
"self-selection" of units -- namely, the fact that those units w ith unobservably 
smaller taking up annoyances will also be more likely to incur the claiming costs -
- would decrease the expected burden assumed in claiming by about 15%, relative 
to the ex ante expected levels.
That approximately only 80% of those entitled do receive SB and that, for 
these recipients, about 20% of the total benefits paid are lost in deadweight 
claiming costs clearly raise important issues about the design of redistributive 
policies. The deadweight cost efficiency of redistributive programmes would be 
the greatest for those programmes -- such as child benefits, "basic incomes", "social 
dividends", or state pensions that are not means-tested — that are universal or that 
depend on characteristics that are easily observable and cannot be readily altered
— such as age or citizenship. These forms of state support involve the least physical 
and psychological burdens to receiving the state's support. Such programmes are 
also more efficacious since their take-up rates are typically very high, thus 
preventing the occurrence of sizeable "holes" in the safety net.
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In practice, unfortunately, those tools of redistribution that are the most
effective in achieving high take-up rates and low claiming ordeal are also the ones
more likely to be most costly in aggregate benefits and the ones least "targeted"
towards the poor. Besley (1990), who analyses and simulates the alleviation of
poverty using the same Foster et al. (1984) class of measures as that employed
above, describes the condition as follows:
"Universal provision entails a cost in the form of a leakage of some of the 
benefit to the non-poor. On the other hand, means-tested programmes may 
be costly to administer since they require a test of eligibility for claimants. 
They also impose costs (psychic and pecuniary) on the poor who have to 
claim, which may deter some of them from claiming" (p. 119).
This is conceptually related to the study of Stem (1982), who analyses the extent
to which the welfare costs of administrative errors (making, say, Type I and II
errors) can outweigh the welfare costs of income taxation (or, in our context, the
allocative costs of better targeting). Thus, in alleviating poverty, there exists a
trade-off between aggregate benefit expenditures (with their opportunity cost of
not making alternative use of them) and the level of efficacy and deadweight cost
efficiency exerted by redistributive tools. For instance, a universal and sufficiently
high basic income (which may be taxable) would probably alleviate the poverty
of a greater number of individuals with a lesser claiming burden than the current
means-tested Income Support is able to achieve in Britain, but it would also
involve a much greater aggregate expense and consequently higher marginal tax
rates for the rest of the population5 As seen above, an analogous trade-off also
exists, for a given government budget, between targeting precision and
5 Marginal tax rates for a full basic income would plausibly hover around 70%. 
On this, see Parker (1989).
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deadweight cost efficiency.
C- On the desirability of marginal reforms to the administration 
of State Benefits
We can also consider the simulation and desirability of marginal changes 
in the way the SB scheme is administered. A typical government agency is first 
and foremost concerned about the level of benefits paid -- the sum of which must 
be, say, kept in proportion with the government's "ability to pay" -- and about its 
administrative costs, which may well be inversely related to the inconveniences 
faced by units when applying for an award. As we discussed above, the relevant 
department should also concern itself about costs and net benefits to claiming, 
though it will often be more explicitly preoccupied by summary statistics such as 
the rate of take up. To decide on the best course of action, the department must 
enter into its objective function U6 all appropriate information: B for the level of 
total benefits paid, AC for the administrative costs, and NB for the sum of net 
benefits:
U = U(NBJ}J£) (16)
In choosing whether to change (marginally) its administration of the benefit 
scheme, the government must ascertain if the modification will, at the margin, 
improve on the level of U; that is, for a policy change AV  in the policy parameter 
V, whether
6 U can be seen as an extended version of the objective function SW  used above, 
where the budget and administrative costs are made endogenous, but where W is 
reduced to a linear function of net benefit.
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AU = AV ANB + AUAB  + AU AAC * Q (17)
AV ANB AV + A B ^ V *  AAC AV  >
Table 5.2 contains the information necessary for the analysis of the marginal 
desirability of one such alternative. In an effort to cut its budget deficit, say7, the 
government must choose between increasing the costs to claiming benefits (and 
thus likely reducing the administrative expenses of scrutinising the award of 
benefits) and decreasing the overall level of entitlement. W hat possible effects 
does this alternative subsume?
From Table 5.2 we see that increasing ex ante expected costs by £1.02 will 
generate a fall in net benefits approximately equal to that of lowering everyone's 
entitlement by £1. We can therefore ignore the ANB/AV term. As can be 
anticipated, however, the impact on B of the two options is very different: B falls 
when the burden of claiming is increased, for fewer units then bother taking up 
SB; when entitlement falls, B drops yet further from the lesser entitlement of those 
still claiming. Hence, decreasing entitlement and eligibility allows for additional 
budget savings of about £669 for our sample, relative to increasing ex ante costs 
to claiming. If the government department is roughly indifferent between savings 
of £1 in administrative expenses and identical savings in awarded benefits, then 
AU/AB « AU/A(AC) and we need the inconvenience-increasing policy to generate 
more than £669 in administrative savings relative to the entitlement-reducing one
7 A similar analysis could be made for an expansion of the level of budget 
spending, except for the proviso that there is a limit to the extent to which claiming 
costs may be decreased without subsequent falls having to be considered explicitly 
as increases in benefits and entitlements.
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to be preferred to it — that is, additional administrative savings of about £1.06 for 
each of the 632 units still claiming. These additional savings could not arise much 
from a reduced application load since the number of expected claimants left in 
both options is roughly the same. A lesser degree of sensitivity of the 
department's U to changes in AC would require proportionately greater 
administrative savings for the inconvenience-increasing policy to be still optimal.
The government, of course, may well be more concerned about more 
straightforward effects, such as increasing the rate of take-up. In the latter case, 
it is unambiguously better to decrease entitlement8 than to increase costs, since 
increasing costs leads to roughly the same fall in expected claims but leaves 
untouched the set of eligible units. The entitlement reducing policy decreases the 
aggregate take-up rate by only 0.1%, but that rate falls instead by 1.8% to 78.1% 
when the expected burden to requesting the state benefit is increased.
Finally, the government may be interested in the marginal transformation 
of additional SB resources into net benefit: the fall in entitlement by £1 removes 
net benefit at a rate of 83%, basically equal to the average transformation quoted 
above. Hence, marginal government payments of benefits may or may not be 
slightly more effective than the average already achieved. This, however, is not 
entirely surprising. Figure 5.3 shows the costs incurred and the net benefit (NB) 
derived in an hypothetical sample of units ordered according to their level of 
entitlement and facing -- for simplicity -- identical and non-stochastic burdens to 
claiming. Those for whom the benefit offered is no greater than the cost per
8 Or not to increase it if the aim is to increase net benefits in an expansionary 
budget exercise.
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income unit of taking up do not claim. Increasing everyone's entitlement by a 
marginal amount moves the benefit curve up and left and increases the size of the 
triangle NB and of the rectangle of costs incurred by ANB and A Costs, 
respectively. Benefits increase by ANB+ACosts: hence, the marginal contribution 
of benefits to net benefits depends on the size of ANB relative to ACosts. Marginal 
claimants do not add to the net benefit of the state support. Thus, we can see that 
as long as the effect of increasing entitlement on expected claims is not too large, 
the marginal net benefit of state support will exceed its average level; that, for 
marginal claimants (and thus for most claimants of a small and limited 
programme), the net benefit of state support is null; and that, for programmes that 
are both universal and widely claimed (e.g., child benefit), the marginal net 
benefit of state support is close to one.
D- Equity, Administrative Errors and Contracting Costs
We can now more easily identify some straightforward reasons for which 
our earlier applied analysis of the extent of vertical equity and horizontal inequity 
in 1985 Britain was incomplete:
(1) the presence of administrative errors on the part of the government agency;
(2) incomplete take-up of state benefits;
(3) divergences between the level of benefit and that of net benefit of the state's 
support to units.
Each of these three imperfections in the operation of the benefit system can 
limit the magnitude of the redistribution and increase the degree of horizontal 
inequity exerted by state benefits. We have described in chapter II how one can 
disaggregate total redistribution -- as indicated by the difference between original
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and net income Gini coefficients, GX-GN — into progressivity, average tax (or 
benefit), vertical equity, and horizontal inequity effects. We quickly recall this 
discussion in order to identify the theoretical and empirical impact of (1), (2) and
(3) on redistribution and equity.
We revise our definition of the Kakwani (1977a) index of progressivity to 
focus it better on our discussion of the benefit system and we omit the subscripts 
i distinguishing between different benefits. The definition of this revised index 
(minus the old index) is then given by:
n *  = g x- ibji ( i s )
IBX is simply the value of the index of inequality in the distribution of benefit B 
defined in Chapter II, and Gx is the Gini coefficient of the distribution of original 
income X. I1K will be positive for a progressive benefit system: the benefit share 
of the poorer population will then be at least as great as their share in original 
income. We can also show9 that
F(X) (19)
w ith \iB being the average benefit and F(X), the cumulative distribution of X.
To obtain an indicator of vertical equity, we simply multiply YlK by the 
average benefit (^B) as a proportion of the average net (or post-tax and benefit) 
income (p.N). Total redistribution, however, is given by GX-GN/ and GN-IN/X can then
9 This covariance formula is derived, for instance, in Lambert (1989), p.43.
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indicate the extent of total horizontal inequity operated by the combination of all 
taxes and benefits.
We may then discuss the impact of each of the three above imperfections 
on the progressivity, vertical equity, horizontal inequity and redistribution of state 
benefits.
1- The Presence of Administrative Errors on the Part of the Government 
Agency.
These errors may come in two shapes. The government agency responsible 
for the administration of some state benefit may first systematically over- or 
underestimate the entitlement of all units. Alternatively, these errors can be a 
function of observable characteristics (such as part-time self-employment) or may 
be distributed randomly across the population of units.
Systematic errors in assigning entitlement will affect the equity of state 
benefits in a relatively straightforward manner. Reducing everyone's benefit 
entitlement by a given absolute amount will, for instance, increase the intrinsic 
progressive bite of a typical state benefit since that will concentrate the benefit 
expenditures on those at the lower end of the income distribution. That systematic 
fall in benefit entitlement will, however, cause a drop in the average rate of a 
means-tested benefit sufficient to decrease the level of vertical equity exerted by 
the benefit. The redistributive impact of the means-tested benefit will also fall, and 
horizontal inequity should also drop slightly due to the lesser significance of 
income redistribution. The reverse case can of course be made for an 
overestimation of or a rise in everyone's entitlement.
Random administrative errors in the computation of entitlement to a
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means-tested benefit can be expected to raise the benefit's redistributive impact, 
although they will intuitively also swell the occurrence of horizontal inequity. 
Let's denote by B*(X) the level of correct entitlement, and by B the level of 
entitlement as assessed by the government agency. We have
B = B'(X) + e (20)
Benefits payable are equal to
with SB*(X)/bX<0 and e being a random error term with mean zero.
To assess the bearing of random errors e upon the Kakwani index of 
progressivity we must consider whether
2 - c o v
( B b(X) ,F(X) (22)
is lower or larger than the corresponding inequality index in the distribution of 
the benefit corresponding to entitlement B*(X). Intuitively, random  errors e are on 
average beneficial to all units for, although they will never entail a below zero 
level of benefit payable (that is, taxes are not payable by those with assessed 
negative entitlement), they may lead to a sizeable exaggeration of entitlement 
relative to B*(X). Those, however, whom we expect to benefit most from random  
administrative errors are the ones at the limit of eligibility to the state benefit: they 
are indeed the ones most likely to profit from random  largesses of the
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government. There are thus two effects on the Kakwani index as considered 
above. First, the average benefit will increase in size and, second, those gaining 
most absolutely will not lie at the bottom of the distribution but will be found in 
the area at which eligibility to the benefit ceases. Hence, random entitlement 
discrepancies will have an indeterminate global impact on the Kakwani index of 
progressivity. Nevertheless, random administrative errors can be expected to 
increase the degree of vertical equity and redistribution exercised by means-tested 
benefits since they will raise the average benefit level and may lead to a sizeable 
redistribution in favour of a relatively poor (though not the poorest) subset of the 
population. As mentioned above, we also expect them to lead to a significant level 
of horizontal inequity.
2- Incomplete Take-up of State Benefits
There are several ways in which one may wish to consider the effect of less 
than complete take-up rates of state benefits upon equity and redistribution. The 
first one is by specifying a new benefit function
b _ jp(X)B*(X), if B \X )>0 (23)
U  1 0, ifB*(X)<0
where p(X) is a probability function that takes values of between 0 and 1. We may 
check that if p'(X)=0 and that p(X)=p the imperfect take-up of benefits does not 
change the value of the Kakwani index and that the progressive bite of the state 
benefit is therefore unaffected -- B is simply a proportionately scaled down 
measure of B*(X):
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Vertical equity then drops by the same proportion as the relative fall in average 
benefit, and horizontal inequity and redistribution similarly dwindle. We do 
anticipate, however, that p'(X)*0 and that, in particular, p'(X)<0, in which case the 
propensity of units to claim a lesser proportion of their smaller benefit entitlement 
will enhance the progressivity of the state benefit, since it will tend to redistribute 
the benefit relatively more towards those with lower X. In other words, a take-up 
rate that increases with entitlement and decreases w ith X helps to concentrate 
further the state's support onto the subset of those with the lowest original 
incomes. The average benefit will, of course, be lower than when a full take-up 
rate applies. Hence, notwithstanding the greater progressivity, we expect the level 
of final redistribution operated in the whole population by the state benefit to 
drop, even in the case in which p'(X)<010.
There naturally arise in the preceding analysis important issues of ex ante 
and ex post equity. Ex ante, the above procedure does not generate inequality and 
horizontal inequity among identical units since all entitled units with income X 
would expect to receive, on average, benefits of p(X)*B(X). Ex post, inequality and 
horizontal inequity would be increased by the feature that a proportion p(X) of 
the units with income X would be in receipt of B(X) and that l-p(X) w ould not.
10 Decreasing take-up rates could nevertheless conceivably increase income 
redistribution if benefit eligibility was widespread enough to make those at the top 
of the distribution fail to claim sizeable benefit amounts.
Hence, a second way in which we can consider the effect of less than complete 
take-up rates of state benefits is by specifying (0,1) events of a successful benefit 
claim. Progressivity and vertical equity will not be much affected relative to the 
first option since our sample units would be allocated, on average, the same 
benefit. This specification, however, simulates much better the ex post stochastic 
distribution of receipts and non-receipts. It will also allow for a sounder analysis 
of horizontal inequity: for two units w ith similar income and relevant 
characteristics, one may well choose to request the state's support and the other 
may not, the incongruity in circumstances stemming from a different level of costs 
to claiming. This stochastic approach is the one we shall be preferring in our 
empirical application below.
3- Divergences Between the Level of Benefit and That of Net Benefit of the 
State's Support to Units.
As we noted above, the net profit to units of some state assistance can lie 
well below that of the size of the gross benefit if physical and psychological 
obstacles to seeking it are important. The existence of constant costs to claiming 
would definitely decrease11 the net redistributive impact of the state support 
since such costs would hit absolutely and relatively more those with the lower X, 
viz, those who deserve the benefit more. This is so since -- compared to a full 
take-up case — those with a relatively low entitlement to the state benefit and a 
relatively high X can always prefer not to bear the claiming costs by choosing not 
to seek the benefit: the maximum they will then lose is their relatively low benefit
11 Unless the costs led to a fall in administrative expenses that then fuelled a rise 
in benefit expenditures.
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entitlement. Moreover, those who are relatively high in the income distribution 
and who are not in any case entitled to the state's support will clearly not suffer 
from the presence of claiming costs. Those, however, w ith a sufficiently high 
entitlement to the benefit will still prefer to seek it if requesting costs arise and 
will therefore bear the full extent of the claiming burden.
The only rare circumstances in which the occurrence of claiming costs could 
possibly swell the redistributive impact of state benefits is when costs, not being 
constant across the population, happen to be particularly low for those potential 
claimants at the bottom of the income distribution (e.g., for single parents and 
widows). Costs are, however, slightly more likely to raise the progressivity of 
state benefits since it measures the relative concentration of net benefits across the 
population and is not lessened by the fall in the average value of the state's 
assistance to individuals.
Costs to claiming have an ambiguous effect on the level of horizontal 
inequity relative to what occurs with the imperfection (2). On the one hand, 
horizontal inequity tends to fall compared to (2) since, for two units w ith similar 
characteristics and original income, the net advantage of the one which chooses 
to claim when the other does not is reduced by the level of costs which the 
claiming unit m ust incur and discount. Hence, claiming burdens tend in this way 
to limit the horizontal unfairness of unequal assistance to units otherwise similar, 
similar except for the fact that one finds it worthwhile to seek the benefit and the 
other does not. On the other hand, however, observably and unobservably 
different costs to soliciting state support tend to increase the variability of the net 
impact of redistribution across the population. Identical SB grants to similar
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individuals may yet result in widely different levels of net benefits. It may be seen 
as unfair, for instance, that a claimant living far away from his or her Social 
Security office may face significantly higher transportation and information costs 
than an otherwise similar claimant who just happens to live next door to the 
Department's local bureau.
E- Equity and the Take-up of State Benefits in 1985 Britain
How much do the three above imperfections in the operation of the benefit 
system actually affect equity and redistribution? We dedicate this last section to 
an empirical illustration of how the planned impact of Supplementary Benefits in 
1985 Britain might have been distorted by the imperfection of the allocative 
process. We underline "might" since, to render this illustrative analysis possible, 
we must make some important simplifications in addition to those made in the 
derivation in Chapter III of our take-up estimation procedure.
We make throughout the implicit assumption that we measure original 
income, needs and SB entitlement accurately. In particular, we do not correct for 
a likely underreporting of self-employment income. Nevertheless, we adjust 
consistently our results for the likelihood of some benefit confusion on the part 
of some older people, making adequate alterations to the occurrence of National 
Insurance Basic Pensions. All random divergences between our computation of 
entitlement and that official computation which we estimate has (or would have) 
been made are attributed to random errors made by the DSS, the government 
agency responsible for the administration of Supplementary Benefits. It is, of 
course, possible that the reverse assumption be valid, that the DSS measure 
entitlement with precision, and that all stochastic discrepancies ought to be
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attributed to our inability to model entitlement and original income accurately. In 
these circumstances it would then be plausible that most of the horizontal inequity 
here imputed to DSS administrative errors would disappear; there w ould still 
remain, however, the horizontal inequity stemming from varying contracting costs 
to claiming and from imperfect take-up rates.
Income is always expressed below in the form of equivalent income, using 
the equivalence scale implicit in the 1985 Supplementary Benefit scale, excluding 
from such a scale the element of SB springing from the payment of mortgage 
interest by owner-occupiers. We use the grossing-up weights derived in Atkinson, 
Gomulka and Sutherland(1988) and we focus our analysis on individuals, not 
families or households, assuming that family income is equally divided across 
members and attaching an initial weight to each family equal to its num ber of 
members. When modelling the circumstances of a family unit for which there 
exists a positive probability that it receives income support in the form of SB, we 
create two observations for which the separate weights sum to the weight of the 
original unit. In one of these observations, the unit is not entitled to or does not 
claim SB but, in the other, it receives the level of grant or net benefit conditional 
on a unit being in receipt of SB. As discussed above, this mildly stochastic 
procedure can be expected to yield a reasonably good picture of the wide 
distribution of SB grant and net benefit in the population.
Figure 5.4 indicates the movement of the Lorenz curve A of original income 
to concentration curves of various income distributions (B to D, ordered by the 
level of original income) towards the Lorenz curve E of net and final income. The 
impact of income support on the level of net income is then measured through
282
the level of SB bestowed on units net of claiming costs (as imputed, for instance, 
in Table 5.1). We note the movement of B away from A operated by the sizeable 
vertical equity exerted by the combination of all benefits and taxes apart from NI 
Basic Pensions and SB. We also notice that the wobbly increasing and decreasing 
slope at the bottom of B suggests the existence of a significant amount of 
horizontal inequity in the movement of A to B: some units towards the right of 
B have less income (the concentration curve B there displays a shallower slope) 
than other units towards the left of B (the concentration curve B there displays a 
steeper slope). Hence, reranking the curve B units according to their income on 
B would move some of the initially poorer units to the right, passed other units 
formally richer. This horizontal inequity is greatly reduced as the impact of NI 
pensions and revised SB entitlement (Bg/ w ith systematic and random  
administrative errors) is also felt, leading to the concentration curve D. Because 
concentration curve D incorporates all expected gross benefits and taxes, it lies 
closest to an equal income distribution curve. To obtain an accurate picture of 
actual redistribution we must, however, predict actual claims of SB and subtract 
from the level of gross Supplementary Benefits the amount of claiming costs 
incurred and we must subsequently rerank the distribution of individuals 
according to the size of their final net income. This is shown on curve E, which 
lies surprisingly close to the dotted curve C that includes all bu t SB. The 
combination of SB costs to claiming and the level of total horizontal inequity 
exercised by all taxes and benefits thus appears to withdraw almost completely 
the vertical equity impact of the grant of Supplementary Benefits.
Table 5.3 disaggregates more clearly than the above figure the impact of SB
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upon progressivity, vertical and horizontal equity, and redistribution. As noted 
in Chapter II, NI Basic Pensions are somewhat less progressive than SB, their 
Kakwani index of around 1.0 being about 25% lower than the SB's. This is not 
very surprising since such pensions were mostly granted independently of the 
receipt of other incomes, whereas the SB's income support is strongly means- 
tested. We also note that reported FES figures on NI Basic Pensions can 
overestimate significantly their redistributive impact, for some older individuals 
will mistakenly declare a receipt of a state pension instead of that of SB. Our 
results show that the average NI Basic Pension benefit as a proportion of net 
income drops from 4.9% to 4.4% w hen we attempt to correct the FES figures, with 
a concordant fall in the extent of vertical equity exercised by the benefit.
Lines (c) to (g) of Table 5.3 show the variations in equity effected by SB 
when we harmonise our entitlement figures to those we estimate would on 
average be computed by the DSS (d), when we allow for random administrative 
errors (e), when the take-up rate is incomplete and varies according to observable 
and unobservable characteristics (f), and when the size of SB must be discounted 
by the presence of claiming costs (g).
The Kakwani index of progressivity varies very little across these different 
specifications. The biggest change occurs when random administrative errors are 
introduced, a feature which creates potential holes in the grant of SB and makes 
the programme less reliable and less globally progressive, causing a fall of the 
Kakwani index from 1.318 to 1.301. As discussed above, imperfect take-up rates 
make the SB programme more progressive, since those with a lesser entitlement 
are also the ones least likely to seek the state's support. Somewhat surprisingly,
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the index also increases slightly when costs to claiming are incorporated, 
suggesting that such costs happen to be relatively low in our sample for those 
towards the bottom of the original income distribution.
Because progressivity (or the "potential" vertical equity bite of SB) is so 
little affected by the movements from (c) to (g), it will be the changes in the 
average support provided by SB that will govern the shifts in vertical equity. We 
recall that the computation of entitlement by the DSS appears to be systematically 
more generous than the one we make, and this accounts for the increase from 
2.7% to 3.1% in the average benefit when we shift from (c) to (d), and for the 
matching increase in vertical equity. It is at least as interesting to note that the 
presence of random administrative errors will cause a further substantial increase 
in the aggregate level of SB granted. Total SB payable as a proportion of total net 
income jumps from less than 3.1% to about 3.5%. This can have important 
applications for the exercise of tax and benefit analysis and for the consistency of 
simulated aggregate figures with official ones. Ceteris paribus, in the presence of 
random  administrative errors12, we expect aggregate figures predicted by tax and 
benefit models to underestimate the level of aggregate payments made by the 
government, an underestimation which can be substantial if we are to be guided 
by the results of Table 5.3. Fortunately, however, this bias is reversed if the 
analyst is rather the one mostly responsible for generating the random  entitlement 
discrepancies. This latter situation would arise, say, if the DSS was able to monitor 
closely the eligibility of current and potential claimants but w ith the survey 
information at the disposal of the analyst being relatively inaccurate. In such
12 So long as the error term has a zero mean.
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circumstances, the analyst's computation would on average grant a positive 
benefit even to those correctly considered by the DSS not to be eligible as well as 
a higher than appropriate benefit to those deemed positively entitled by the 
government agency. Too high a level of benefits would then be predicted by the 
analyst, relative to the aggregate amount awarded by the then more precise DSS.
The level of benefit granted understandably falls when we move to (f) w ith 
an imperfect take-up of SB. The extent of vertical equity then exerted by SB 
correspondingly falls by about 10% of its peak at (f). The fall is even greater when 
we add to the fact that not every eligible unit does claim SB the consideration 
that, for those who do receive it, the level of aggregate net benefits is only 80% 
of that of the SB paid. Net SB contributes significantly less in vertical equity than 
either payable SB (e) or taken up SB (f), and even less than our original calculated 
SB entitlement.
When considering the impact of income support upon the level of 
horizontal inequity exerted by all taxes and benefits, we ought to keep in mind 
that SB constitutes only a small element (less than 5% of the sum of the absolute 
payment of taxes and receipts of benefits that are modelled by our tax and benefit 
computer programme) of the government's overall redistributive tools. Thus, the 
increase from 0.018 to 0.021 of the index of total horizontal inequity w hen we add 
an element of randomness in the allocation of Supplementary Benefits -- a move 
from (d) to (e) — must be seen as an important indicator that a significant degree 
of inequity may prevail empirically in the operation of redistributive policies. 
Such horizontal inequity is decreased to 0.019 when claiming costs reduce the net 
advantage of those who do find it worthwhile to seek the state benefit.
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Combining the change in the level of vertical equity exerted by SB and the 
change in the index of the level of horizontal inequity exercised by all taxes and 
benefits can account for much of the movement in the Gini coefficient shown in 
the last column of Table 5.3. The Gini coefficient falls to 0.286 w hen revised (d) 
rather than calculated (c) entitlement is used since SB is then greater as a 
proportion of overall net income, pushing vertical equity upwards. The 
subsequent and similar increase in vertical equity when random administrative 
errors are incorporated is mitigated by a sizeable increase in total horizontal 
inequity, and the Gini coefficient falls to its overall low, 0.283. Less than perfect 
take-up rates push the coefficient above the level imputed for (d) — where we 
ignored random entitlement discrepancies -- as vertical equity and the importance 
of SB as a redistributive tool drop. Finally, incorporating costs to claiming raises 
the Gini coefficient to an overall high, and thus decreases redistribution to an 
overall low. There, progressivity, total net income support, and vertical equity all 
lie below the level corresponding to calculated SB entitlement (c) from which we 
started our analysis, with horizontal inequity slightly higher than at (c) but much 
decreased from its peak at (e). Needless to say, these changes in the value of 
aggregate indices conceal a much greater diversity in individual circumstances 
stemming from the incorporation of SB allocative imperfections.
Conclusion
Redistributive instruments may have practical effects far different from 
those intended by legislators and policy activists. Combining the tools developed 
and applied in earlier chapters, we are able in this chapter to enquire into the
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suboptimal and real impact of suspected imperfections in the administration of 
state benefits. We first consider what inconveniences to seeking state benefits 
implied for the optimal allocation of benefits in a model of perfect targeting. 
Simple rules applicable to the case of no redistributive costs do not apply 
anymore, and the optimal policies derived have important and disturbing bearing 
on issues of vertical and horizontal equity. We then estimate that incurred 
contracting costs to claiming amounted to about 17% of the level of all 
Supplementary Benefits granted in our 1985 sample. These costs are largest for the 
largest units and are in general unequally spread across the population, making 
welfare comparisons based on benefits and net benefits sometimes yield different 
results even across groups of family units. Our analysis yields some very relevant 
input into the selection of optimal redistributive tools, e.g., on choosing universal 
rather than targeted state support. The study of marginal income support reforms 
suggests that increasing entitlement would not change sizeably the aggregate take- 
up rate but that decreasing costs to seeking the state's support could increase it 
much (although this latter policy would also increase the misallocation of benefits 
to those not considered to be truly deserving them). Reducing contracting costs 
can therefore be a rather more efficient way of helping the poor than increasing 
entitlement to state benefits.
Finally, we illustrate the impact of imperfections in allocating state support 
upon the level of equity and redistribution in 1985 Britain, using for this purpose 
the framework developed in Chapter II. The analysis is tentative since, in making 
it, we ignore the likely presence of analogous imperfections in our computation 
of income and entitlement. We do, however, show how the rectification of the
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records of older units' National Insurance Basic Pension receipts in our survey 
changes the Pension's vertical equity and redistributive im pact Given our 
assumptions, we find that random and systematic errors raise very sizeably the 
level of income support granted, and similarly augment the degree of exerted 
vertical equity and redistribution, at the cost of greater horizontal inequity. 
Claiming inconveniences and imperfect take-up smother the bearing of income 
support, decreasing somewhat the amount of horizontal inequity and lowering the 
degree of vertical equity and redistribution exerted by income support below that 
initially predicted by the original tax and benefit analysis.
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Table 5.1
Benefits, Costs and Net Benefits 
total
(average over the relevant sample of expected claimants)
Benefits Ex ante 
expected 
costs
Costs
incurred
Net
benefits
Total 22889 4643 3920 18969
(35.49) (7.20) (6.08) (29.41)
Pensioners 8598 1817 1560 7038
(29.96) (6.33) (5.44) (24.52)
Self- 179 72 64 115
employed (34.29) (13.79) (12.26) (22.03)
Single 2442 248 201 2241
parents (35.39) (3.59) (2.91) (32.48)
Table 5.2
Simulation of Changes in the Administration of Supplementary Benefits
total 
(change)
Expected
costs
incurred
Expected
benefit
Expected
number
entitled
Expected
number
claiming
Take-up rate
%
Expected 
net benefit
£1.02 ex 4456 22773 806.73 630.30 78.1 18317
ante 
increase in 
expected 
costs
(536) (-116) (0) (-14.72) (-1.8) (-652)
£1 ex ante 3787 22104 791.83 631.53 79.8 18317
decrease
in
entitlement
(-133) (-785) (14.90) (-13.49) (-0.1) (-652)
Table 5.3
Income Support and Equity
Kakwani
Index1
Average 
Benefit 
as Proportion 
of Final Net 
„ Income
Vertical
Equity
Total
Horizontal
Inequity2
Final Gini 
Coefficient
(a) Original NI Basic Pensions3 1.033 0.0491 0.0508 0.018 0.289
(b) Revised NI Basic Pensions 1.014 0.0442 0.0448 0.018 0.289
(c) Calculated SB Entitlement 1.314 0.0268 0.0353 0.018 0.289
(d) Revised SB Entitlement 1.318 0.0305 0.0402 0.018 0.286
(e) Revised SB Entitlement with 
Random Administrative Errors
1.301 0.0349 0.0454 0.021 0.283
(f) Benefit Level, 
Imperfect Take-up
1.307 0.0316 0.0413 0.021 0.287
(g) Net Benefit Level, 
Imperfect Take-up
1.311 0.0255 0.0334 0.019 0.292
Or
1 This indicates the difference G X - I B / X .
2 Indicates the difference G N - I N i X . For the two lines (a) and (b) of figures on pensions, the 
calculated SB entitlement is used to compute the index of total horizontal inequity exerted by all 
taxes and benefits. For all other lines, the revised NI basic pensions are applied (in conjunction 
with the varying SB variables).
3 For the two lines (a) and (b) of figures on pensions, the calculated SB entitlement is used.
Figure 5.1
Social Welfare and Costs to Claiming
Units of 
Social 
welfare
Figure 5.2
The Optimal Set of Claimants 
and Levels of State Expenditure
Figure 5.3
Income Support Efficiency
£ per week 
i
Benefit
per unit
Units
A Costs
Figure 5.4
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Conclusion
We are now at the finish of our enquiry into the impact of personal taxes 
and state and social security benefits in modern economies. We modestly believe 
to have fulfilled three major goals, but for each we ought to highlight honestly the 
major weaknesses of our analysis.
Firstly, we have provided a unified approach to the depiction of the 
progressivity, redistribution and equity of taxes and benefits. We have, as far as 
was reasonable, strived to identify the separate effects of individual taxes and 
benefits, focusing our empirical application on the system prevailing in Britain in 
1985. There are, however, some important shortcomings in this applied work. Our 
definition of income is at best incomplete and our failure to embrace various 
imputed income streams (e.g., those for home ownership) can lead to misleading 
conclusions. We only consider a temporal snapshot of a society's units and we do 
not ponder the effect of taxes and benefits over a life-cycle or across generations. 
Neither do we provide evidence on the statistical reliability of our results, 
especially for those results that lend themselves more easily to normative 
statements. We believe that our measure of original income is a good indicator of 
w hat income streams would prevail in the absence of taxes and benefits, but this 
ignores what are plausibly very important general equilibrium and behavioural 
forces. In particular, because agents' economic behaviour will normally adapt to 
policy adjustments in such a way as to improve on the first-round, fixed- 
behaviour, outcome, the assumption of behavioural unyieldingness will often 
underestimate the gains and overestimate the losses in welfare of the imposition 
of taxes and benefits. Finally, the role of the state is far from being limited to the
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setting of personal taxes and income transfers; to present a more comprehensive 
picture of such a role, one would obviously wish to incorporate indirect taxes, 
expenditures in kind, the provision of public goods, the effect of government 
regulations, etc.. Interesting extensions of our work would also include the 
determination of optimal state support when "notches" are allowed. In so doing, 
one would likely account for both redistributive and efficiency concerns, and for 
the need to suscitate as much as is reasonably possible a degree of autonomy and 
labour market integration on the part of state support recipients. One would also 
wish to derive measures of progressivity and vertical equity which w ould -- 
unlike those belonging to the class of measures of Chapter II -- not be biased by 
the presence of reranking and which would generate less ambiguous indicators 
of the redistributive impact of taxes and benefits.
Secondly, we have been relatively successful at constructing and 
implementing an econometric model that furthers our understanding of the take- 
up of state benefits in several important ways. A striking feature is our ability to 
generate estimates of entitlement discrepancies and inconveniences to claiming out 
of regular and broad survey data. The presence of such entitlement divergences 
raises important questions about both the reliability of using sample micro data 
for the analysis of taxes and benefits and the accuracy of the government's 
assessment of state support entitlement. The availability of micro data on revised 
administrative eligibility and non-eligibility (out of a second and more careful 
application process for some potential claimants, say) could obviously enrich our 
analysis and make possible the relative identification of the size of errors made 
by the analyst versus those made during the first enquiry by the government
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agency. Uncertainty of entitlement on the part of potential state support claimants 
is likely to be a most important take-up determinant, and a good and feasible next 
step would be to model it explicitly and consistently. Including a labour supply 
behavioural component to one's status as a potential claimant would plausibly 
reveal lesser costs to seeking state support for those more likely to be entitled to 
it and thus for those working less or simply out of work. This is because 
eligibility, in addition to taking up or not, is also a choice variable, and low costs 
to claiming make it more attractive to increase entitlement by decreasing work 
efforts. Plausible errors and discrepancies on hours of work and levels of savings 
ought also to be modelled since they enter crucially into the determination of 
eligibility to Income Support in Britain. They also compound the importance of 
sound modelling in the analysis of state support.
Thirdly, we recognise explicitly the imperfections of the government's 
redistributive intervention. We do not discuss much the presence of administrative 
expenses, which can be easily documented, but we focus rather on those 
contracting costs which potential state support claimants m ust bear and on the 
allocative errors made in the process of granting income support. Our analysis 
potentially suffers here from flaws analogous to those described above, especially 
on the validity of our use of "original income" data and on the statistical reliability 
of some of our results. An important extension of our theoretical findings would 
be that of determining the optimal redistributive policy as a function of original 
income, administrative costs and the accuracy of the distributional information 
which the state is able to use in assessing the socio-economic characteristics of 
units.
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We believe that the analytical and empirical framework developed in this 
doctoral thesis can also be usefully carried to other areas of applied economic 
analysis. In particular, our enquiry into levels of benefits and contracting costs 
lends itself nicely to a large array of economic applications. The closest 
conceptually to our own work is probably the desire of firms to qualify or not for 
business subsidies of various sorts, when such subsidies carry an application 
burden as well as economic distortions to the firms. Seeking state subsidies in 
such circumstances then amounts to considering the costs to be lower than the 
value of the state stipend. By a similar token, the availability of sufficiently 
suitable data would help price the inconveniences of tax evasion and elusion by 
private and corporate tax units and thus assist the government in designing 
optimal tax policies. The benefit to "cheating the government" can be 
straightforwardly (although imperfectly) appraised by the amount of taxes saved 
on income concealed or redirected to "offshore facilities", but there are also 
numerous transaction and opportunity costs (as well as the obvious fines if caught 
in illegal dealings) of hiding from the taxman.
Evident examples outside the world of public finance include consumption 
and investment behaviour in the presence of transaction, "shopping" and 
investment costs. The forward returns, besides being possibly uncertain (and 
imperfectly observable by the microanalyst), then have to be discounted by 
equally imperfectly observable costs. Similarly, the net benefit of collusion 
between firms depends on a level of benefit derived from such behaviour (which 
the analyst may believe to be non-positive) and on the extent of the presence of 
various contracting and collusive costs. All such examples have in common the
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concept of an (at least partly) observable decision based on the value of an 
imperfectly observable net benefit, for which the benefit may be estimated or 
proxied with errors by an analyst. As illustrated by our work, however, such 
studies can carry important positive and normative conclusions.
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Appendix A: Statistical Notes on the Use of the 1985 Family 
Expenditure (FES) Survey Data
The FES is a continuous enquiry into the expenditure and income of private 
households in the United Kingdom (UK), carried out by the Office of Population 
Censuses and Surveys on behalf of the Department of Employment. The annual 
sample is about 11,000 households, representing roughly 1 in 2000 of all UK 
households, and of which around 70% (67% in 1985) accept to cooperate. People 
living in hostels, hotels, boarding houses and institutions are excluded. Evidence 
on differential response rates has been gathered over the years1, suggesting that 
(among others) those without children, the self-employed, the older and the 
owner-occupiers had a lower response rate. In general, however, the FES provides 
an excellent and very reliable source of detailed knowledge about the 
characteristics — including the labour supply behaviour and the distribution of the 
labour and non-labour revenues — and the income of a large num ber of 
individuals. Full information on the FES (including copies of the questionnaire 
and the annual response analysis) can be obtained from the Department of 
Employment and from the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, Social 
Survey Division, London.
By agreement with the Department of Employment, conditional access to 
the FES data for the purpose of my doctoral work was granted following an 
application to the ESRC Data Archive at the University of Essex. 1985 was the
1 See, for instance, Kemsley, Redpath and Holmes (1980), Atkinson and 
Micklewright (1983), Redpath (1986), Atkinson, Micklewright and Stern (1988), and 
the empirical evidence presented in Chapter IV.
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most appropriate year for which such data could be used at STICERD from the 
time at which this research was started. We concentrate exclusively on the use of 
the FES data gathered from April 8th to October 7th, 1985, these dates 
encompassing the policy period starting after the 1985 budget and ending with 
various autum n reviews to the tax and transfer systems.
The FES definition specifies that a household comprises one person living 
alone or a group of people living at the same address, having meals prepared 
together and w ith common housekeeping. We disaggregate households into 
income units (variable A008) as defined by the FES, and assume generally that 
these correspond to those units relevant to the appropriate computation of taxes 
and benefits, making explicit allowances when it is clear (such as in the case of 
Supplementary Benefits) that the consideration of different social categories 
matters. Because of this, heads of units will encompass all single person income 
units, including many of the young adults still living at home. People who are 
under 18 years of age and unmarried are classified as children. Dependent 
children are those below the age of 16 or those below 19 and in full-time 
education. We indicate below the way in which some of the variables of our tax 
and benefit model were derived using the 1985 FES data: "A..." denotes a FES 
variable appearing in the information codes of the household schedule, and a 
variable "F..." belongs to the incom e/expenditure codes of the same schedule.
We obtain the level of the last gross pay by the following formula: 
F303+F305+F306+F422-F388*(A234=1)+F422+F424-F429+F316+F320+F312. This 
excludes statutory sick pay but includes the value of coke and coal and of the 
meals and vouchers provided by the employer. The hourly wage is then found by
303
dividing this pay level by A216 [when different from zero, otherwise we estimate 
the hourly wage using the procedure described in Duclos (1992b)], the actual 
number of hours worked for the last pay. Original or gross income includes, 
among other variables, interests and dividends (F371, F376, F378, F374), labour 
income, non-BP pension receipts, statutory sick pay (F378), allowances from 
friends and former spouses (F352, F385), and private benefits and bus tokens 
(F366, F163). Self-employment income equals F327+F3276 and incorporates the 
value of self-supplied goods, and self-employment status comes from the variable 
A203.
A010 gives the age at which full-time education ceased and, combined to 
age, can therefore also provide a rough indication of the amount of work 
experience gained by members of the sample. The current receipt of 
unemployment benefits is shown by A223.
Mortgage interest is taken as declared (F130 and F150). If the household 
does not know the amount of principal repaid along w ith the interest, it is 
assumed that it is null; mortgage interest is then F201+F202+F203+F204+F205. 
Similarly, when a unit does not know whether the interest paid was gross or net 
of MITR, we suppose that it was net of the subsidy. We take for the nominal 
interest rate on mortgages the value of 13.47%, a figure provided by the 
Association of Building Societies for the mean of the 1985 mortgage rates. Using 
this, we can impute the value of the unit's mortgage, of which the interest of only 
the first £30,000 qualify for mortgage relief.
To determine the level of savings for the estimation of eligibility to 
Supplementary Benefits (SB), we use the variable A284 — which includes SAYE
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and the national saving certificates and premium bonds held -- to which we also 
combine the information derived from the created variable BST. The level of 
capital imputed for the receipt of interests and dividends BST is obtained by 
grossing BST up by inverse of 0.06, the assumed average return to savings 
accounts and relevant shares. Long-term SB are granted to those units of which 
one of the members is aged 60 or over, or to those in receipt of benefits or 
pensions indicating the occurrence of special needs: A259, A238, F340. To find the 
size of the additional requirements, we use the condition that any of A238, F417, 
F421, F340, A225, A234, A259 be greater than zero or that age surpass 85. To 
define the level of the housing requirement not covered by Housing Benefits but 
rather part of SB, we use mortgage interest as discussed above as well as A163, 
F050, F232, F070 and F233.
Taxes retained under the composite rate scheme are computed from F376, 
F378, F371, F374 and using as an approximation to the composite rate the value 
of the basic tax rate, 0.30. Non-labour taxable income includes the amount of 
pensions exceeding NI basic pensions -- the computation being based on F342, 
F343, F344, F345, F346, F347 and F351 -- and on interests and dividends received, 
statutory sick pay, allowances from friends and absent spouses (F352, F385), 
widow 's benefit (F339) and secondary earnings. Non-labour non-taxable income 
includes the value of redundancy payments (F356), war benefits (F340), various 
invalidity, sickness and injury allowances (F369, F325, F363, F418, F367, F417, 
F421), school meals and free milk (F259, F260, F263), income of dependent 
children, scholarships (F209, F210) and Training Opportunity Scheme (TOPS) and 
YOPS allowances.
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Entitlement to National Insurance basic pensions (BP) — i.e, not including 
the graduated or earnings-related pensions — is equal to the variable F338 in most 
cases, unless F338 exceeds the 1985 BP values, in which case entitlement is 
reduced to the flat-rate part of the NI scheme. We therefore can allow somewhat 
for the deflating impact on the level of BP entitlement of an incomplete NI 
contributory record. Other necessary adjustments to BP are described in Chapter 
IV -- where it is necessary to calculate a "floor" level of BP received, taking into 
account the possibility that a receipt of SB may have been mistaken for one of BP. 
Whenever possible, we then use the declaration of the receipt of some spouse's 
BP addition as an indicator of some minimum BP indeed received by the unit. 
Otherwise, the minimum BP receipt is set to zero. Finally, "various (observed) 
benefits" include the value of those benefits whose allocation is recorded in the 
FES but which are modelled separately in our tax and benefit model; they 
comprise war benefits, w idow 's benefit, invalidity pensions and allowances, 
individual injury disablement pension, National Insurance sickness and industrial 
injury benefit, mobility and attendance allowances, TOPS and YOPS grants, school 
meals and milk, war benefits and other minor additions to non-labour income.
The complete set of SAS and FORTRAN files used to generate the 1985 tax 
and benefit model is available upon request.
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Appendix B: Note on the Major Changes to the British Tax and 
Benefit System Between 1985 and 1992
The methodological and theoretical contributions of the thesis are applied 
to the taxes and benefits and to the socio-economic circumstances of the United 
Kingdom in 1985. As such, the empirical findings presented in this work are 
intrinsically linked to the particular conditions of the UK at that time, and we 
would expect the applied results to be different were they to be derived from 
other distributions of income and household characteristics. Our empirical 
findings also hinge strongly on the structure of the 1985 British tax and benefit 
system, although the system's major features show surprising recurrence across 
time and societies.
The British tax and benefit system underwent substantial changes in the 
years 1985 to 1992, the year in which this thesis was completed. The number of 
personal income tax brackets decreased from six in 1985, with marginal tax rates 
ranging from 30% to 60%, to only two by 1988 to 1991, with a basic tax rate equal 
to 25% and a higher one of 40% affecting no more than around 5% of the British 
families. In the 1992 budget, an additional tax bracket of 20% was introduced in 
order to give greater credibility to the governing party 's official long term policy 
of lowering the basic rate of tax from 25% to 20%. Independent taxation of wife 
and husband was introduced in 1990, w ith a Married Couple's Allowance being 
available in addition to single allowances to offset part of the husband's and the 
wife's income.
The "composite rate of tax" on interest and dividends has since 1985 been 
abolished, with the implication that those not liable to pay income taxes may
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receive interest and building society dividend payments at the gross rates. Tax 
incentives for savings channelled in "TESSA's" were introduced, and the tax 
generosity of Personal Equity Plans (PEPS) was enhanced. Mortgage relief at the 
higher rate was stopped (with the effect that the subsidy is now payable at the 
same rate for all tax and non-tax payers) and the £30,000 limit was not raised in 
line w ith the general and housing price levels. The rate structure on National 
Insurance Contributions varied for contributions on low levels of earnings -- the 
changes removing slowly over time the non-convexity of taxing all earnings once 
a lower earnings limit has been reached -- but the upper earnings limit has 
remained until now, being increased only in line with the price level. Domestic 
rates were displaced by the Community Charge (better known as the "poll tax"), 
of which a minimum of 20% had to be paid by all adults (including those for 
whom all domestic rates had been previously reimbursed by the state) and which 
will itself be replaced next year by a "new" hybrid, the Council Tax.
The nature and the generosity of Social Security benefits also evolved. The 
value of child benefits was kept nominally constant over almost the whole 1985- 
1992 period and was thus eroded in real terms. The "earnings rule" on the 
availability of National Insurance pensions was removed, making their payment 
not conditional upon the current earnings status of pensioners. Contribution rules 
for eligibility to unemployment benefits became stiffer. The regulations governing 
the operation of State Earnings Related Pension (SERP) changed drastically, 
although the full impact of such a reform will not be felt until some more years 
yet.
The Supplementary Benefit (SB) scheme was replaced in 1988 by a new
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Income Support programme. The entitlement and payment rules were somewhat 
simplified, and "long-term needs" were supplanted by premia for belonging to 
various socio-economic categories. The benefit became much less generous (and 
often unavailable) for people under the age of 25. A less generous "Social Fund" 
replaced the single need and urgent needs payments previously available under 
SB. Standards common to the administration of Family Credit (which then 
replaced the less broad Family Income Supplement) and Housing Benefits (for 
which steeper withdrawal rates were imposed) were established regarding capital 
and income limits. The administration and the allocation of the various state 
benefits thus became more homogenous and the prevalence of implicit rates of 
taxes and withdrawals above 100% could thus be more easily averted.
The changes in the rate structure of personal income taxation and the 
provision of greater tax and shares incentives imply some strong shifts towards 
a generally less progressive and redistributive tax system, although a net 
assessment would also take into account the impact of the changes in mortgage 
subsidisation and of the new 20% tax bracket. Notwithstanding the reforms 
described above, the design of state benefits remains, however, broadly the same. 
Benefits have unevenly kept pace with the general increase in prices, and have 
almost uniformly fallen behind the rise in earnings and average living standards. 
Stronger considerations of cost "efficiency" and economic incentives have 
furthermore led to a tightening of eligibility rules and to a more direct targeting 
of state support towards those considered to be in greatest need. In the light of 
the empirical results of this thesis and of those of other works, these recent 
features can almost certainly be predicted to decrease the direct redistributive
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im pact of the state.
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